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INTRODUCTION
The attorney-client privilege is a mess. One might expect a few
unresolved issues because there is no national law governing the
privilege, no codification of the privilege in the federal courts, and
little leadership from the Supreme Court on the subject. Yet the
conflict and confusion runs deeper and is more widespread than
many observers realize. Unlike most other areas of the law of
evidence, there is a lack of convergence in key aspects of the attorney1
client privilege. The law of privilege varies greatly from state to state,
federal circuit to federal circuit, and context to context, and its
application often is unclear within particular jurisdictions and even
within particular cases. Most strikingly, the conflicts and ambiguities
are not relegated to the margins. Fundamental issues, such as the
requirements of confidentiality, the parameters of the corporate
attorney-client privilege, and the scope of the crime-fraud exemption
are disputed or largely unresolved.
Moreover, choice-of-law
principles governing the choice between conflicting privilege
doctrines of interested jurisdictions simply exacerbate the
unpredictability because these principles vary widely and often
default to application of the law of the forum.
The disarray reflects our love-hate attitude toward the privilege.
Attorneys and clients assessing their own relationships believe the
privilege promotes candor, communication, and sound legal advice,
and serves other important interests, such as protecting privacy and
ensuring loyalty. Indeed, the mere suggestion that attorney-client
1. See Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance—Testimonial
Privileges and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 786 (2002) (noting
that, in the federal system, many important, unresolved issues relating to testimonial
privileges involve the attorney-client privilege); see also Margaret A. Berger, The Federal
Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the Goals of Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255,
256 (1984) (discussing the trend toward codification by states, Puerto Rico, and the
military of evidence codes following adoption of, and based on, the Federal Rules of
Evidence); Note, Making Sense of Rules of Privilege Under the Structural (IL) Logic of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (1992) (stating that the
attorney-client privilege has long been the most controversial area of federal
evidence law).
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confidences may be disclosed or used against the client evokes
outrage in many members of the legal profession. The recent uproar
over the Justice Department’s post-September 11 decision to allow
government officials to monitor prisoners’ telephone conversations
2
with their attorneys is an obvious example.
Yet, when the focus shifts outward, specifically to an adversary’s use
of the privilege as a shield in discovery or at trial, attitudes toward the
privilege turn decisively sour. From this perspective, attorneys and
their clients view the privilege as a formidable barrier to ascertaining
truth, and the plaintiffs’ bar in particular sees claims of privilege as
3
largely overstated and obstructionist. Likewise, the public takes a dim
view of assertions of the attorney-client and other privileges by those
under scrutiny in well-publicized disputes or scandals, such as the
4
tobacco litigation and the recent Enron debacle.
These strong feelings and competing interests ensure that
controversy over the privilege will not go away. Skeptics will remain,
among them commentators who question the basic assumption that
the privilege produces social benefits, particularly in the corporate
5
context. Yet, given its long history and solid foothold in every
jurisdiction, the privilege—including the corporate privilege—is here
to stay, in one form or another. The question then, is not whether to
keep or abandon the attorney-client privilege, but rather, how to
2. On October 31, 2001, the Justice Department announced that it had the
authority to monitor conversations between detainees and their attorneys whenever
the government has “substantial reason” to believe that the conversations could
facilitate violence or terrorism by passing on information or instructions. Prevention
of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2002). Some criminal
defense attorneys and civil libertarians have called the rule “horrifying” and have
expressed concerns that the rule will make it impossible for attorneys to prepare
defenses. Tom Brune, Rule Would Bypass Attorney Privilege, NEWSDAY, Nov. 6, 2001,
available at http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/nation/nyusrule06245043
1nov06.story. The American Bar Association also opposed the rule. Review Wire
Services, ABA Opposes Monitoring of Client-Lawyer Talks, But Supports Use of Tribunals, 76
MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., Jan. 11, 2002, at 13.
3. See Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary
Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 722-25 (1998) (discussing attitudes of plaintiffs’
attorneys toward the defense and corporate bars and finding most plaintiffs’
attorneys believe the other side is obstructionist and evasive in discovery). While
there may be good reasons for drawing sharp distinctions between different contexts,
shifting attitudes with respect to the circumstances in which the privilege should
apply also often reflect differing experiences and sympathies.
4. See, e.g., Jonathon D. Glater, Round Up the Usual Suspects. Lawyers Too?, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, at C4 (noting public criticism of efforts by lawyers and other
corporate executives to conceal malfeasance through the attorney-client privilege);
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Tobacco Lawyers and The Case For Cover-Up Reform, NAT’L J., Feb. 10,
2001, at 388 (criticizing lawyers who use the attorney-client privilege to shield
evidence of the harmful effects of tobacco).
5. See infra notes 53-57, 70-73 and accompanying text (articulating specific
criticisms of the privilege).
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maximize its potential benefits while limiting its costs.
Some are content to let parties and courts continue to hash out
privilege doctrine on a case-by-case, jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis.
That is what Congress did in 1975, when it chose to leave the
6
development of privilege doctrine to the courts. Continuing on this
course makes no sense, however. First, re-litigating the parameters of
privilege doctrine over and over again creates enormous transaction
7
costs. More importantly, the uncertainty that this approach has
produced defies the principal justification for the modern privilege.
By shielding attorney-client confidences from discovery, the privilege
is supposed to promote communication and candor between the
attorney and client, which, in turn, is supposed to foster compliance
with the law, facilitate the effective administration of justice, and
produce other social benefits. Sufficient certainty or predictability
that these confidences will be protected from disclosure is essential to
promote, and avoid chilling, client candor. Indeed, an uncertain
privilege offers nothing but harm: it inhibits access to the truth and
creates enormous transaction costs while failing to enhance attorneyclient communication and candor. Thus, today’s highly uncertain
privilege is intolerable.
In the quest for greater certainty, many commentators have called
for reform. Some have advocated specific changes to the substance
of privilege doctrine or called on specific jurisdictions to change the
8
way in which they approach or apply the privilege. Others have
taken a more holistic approach. One commentator, for example, has
called for adoption of new choice-of-law principles that enhance
predictability by ensuring that the law of the jurisdiction in which the
attorney practices governs the privilege determination, rather than
9
the privilege law of the forum state. In addition, there is a revitalized
movement to abandon the common-law approach to privilege in the

6. See infra notes 109-17, 126, 129 and accompanying text (describing Article V
of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, which was proposed to codify the law of
privilege).
7. See Paul R. Rice, The Evidence Project: Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules of
Evidence With Supporting Commentary, 171 F.R.D. 330, 346 n.16 (1997) [hereinafter
Rice, Evidence Project] (noting that both federal and state bodies of case law on the
attorney-client privilege include more than five thousand cases). This case law,
however, has not established clear standards nor prevented re-litigation of privilege
issues.
8. See infra notes 68, 327 and accompanying text (explaining arguments used to
advocate reform of privilege law, such as the need for greater predictability and
certainty).
9. Steven Bradford, Conflict of Laws and the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Territorial
Solution, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 909, 912-13 (1991).
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federal courts and codify a set of testimonial privileges.
These proposed reforms, however, cannot solve the uncertainty
problem. Obviously, clarification of particular aspects of privilege
law, a well-crafted set of new privilege rules for the federal courts, and
a more sensible choice-of-law regime would be welcome. Yet, given
the competing policies at stake, enormous differences between and
within jurisdictions inevitably will remain. A better choice-of-law
regime will not address the uncertainties resulting from “vertical”
inconsistencies—that is, federal versus state law—or, even more
fundamentally, uncertainties within jurisdictions.
This is true
because the law of privilege is largely or exclusively a product of the
common law, which has not, and in my view cannot, produce
governing principles that foster certainty and predictability in
privilege protections. Likewise, although a new set of privilege rules
for the federal courts may foster greater certainty in federal criminal
and federal question cases, these rules will not result in sufficient
inter-jurisdictional agreement and corresponding predictability,
given that many states have been reluctant to follow the federal
common-law lead on attorney-client privilege law. Moreover, none of
these approaches to reform addresses the troublesome question of
the application of privilege protections in arbitral, administrative,
legislative, and other nonjudicial fora, which oversee a growing mass
of adversarial disputes, and in which decision makers may feel less
constrained by the privilege rules applicable in state and federal
courts.
The time has come for a more radical solution. A quarter century
after the last serious congressional consideration of, and ultimate
inaction on, the attorney-client privilege, this area of the law is now in
serious need of renewed congressional attention. Yet enhancing
certainty demands more than changes in choice-of-law principles or
10. See, e.g., Broun, supra note 1, at 769-72, 789-815 (arguing that Congress
should codify a set of rules governing testimonial privileges, including the attorneyclient privilege, applicable in federal criminal and federal question cases); Rice,
Evidence Project, supra note 7, at 346 (same); Kenneth R. Tucker, Note, Did Congress
Err in Failing to Set Forth Codified Rules Governing Privileged Relationships and Resulting
Communications?, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 181, 184 (1994) (advocating congressional
codification in all federal cases). Indeed, the Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Evidence has begun to consider codification of various testimonial
privileges. Broun, supra note 1, at 814 n.292. Others, however, believe that the
federal decision makers should not attempt to codify the law of privilege. See, e.g.,
The Committee on Federal Courts, Association of the Bar of the City of New York: Revisiting the
Codification of Privileges Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 55 THE REC. 148, 152-53
(2000) [hereinafter Committee on Federal Courts]; Raymond F. Miller, Comment,
Creating Evidentiary Privileges: An Argument for the Judicial Approach, 31 CONN. L. REV.
771, 772 (1999).
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the codification of a set of privilege rules for the federal courts.
Rather, to resolve both lingering conflicts between jurisdictions and
confusion within jurisdictions, we need a single, codified solution.
Congress, therefore, should federalize the law of privilege
preemptively, creating uniform protection for client confidences that
will apply in every proceeding in federal and state court, as well as in
arbitration proceedings, administrative hearings, and legislative
proceedings. Federal privilege legislation providing clear,
11
unqualified, and generally applicable privilege protections will
produce a level of certainty sufficient to reap the potential benefits of
the privilege while ultimately lowering its transaction costs. Congress
has both the capacity and the constitutional power to enact this
needed reform.
Part I of this Article discusses the need for reasonable certainty in
attorney-client privilege protections. It begins by tracing the history
of the privilege, outlining the doctrine’s basic elements, and
reviewing various justifications for the privilege. It then discusses the
predominant utilitarian or instrumental rationale, which is premised
on the assumption that the privilege promotes client candor and full
communication between attorneys and clients, and thereby produces
social benefits that outweigh its social costs. Next, Part I outlines why,
to achieve any social benefits, privilege protections must be
sufficiently certain to assure that attorneys and their clients can fairly
predict whether their communications will be subject to later
disclosure. Finally, Part I concludes that, because absolute certainty is
not attainable, policy makers should seek to ensure that the privilege
doctrine provides at least reasonably certain protections, thereby
allowing attorneys and clients to assess accurately whether various
communications will be protected.
Part II details why the protections that the modern privilege affords
are often uncertain. It begins by tracing why Congress chose not to
codify the attorney-client privilege in the early 1970s and the effects
of that choice. Part II then shows how the Supreme Court has since
provided little leadership on privilege doctrine. Next, it outlines the
significant tangle of inter-jurisdictional conflicts and the lingering
intra-jurisdictional confusion on privilege doctrine. Similarly, Part II
11. By “unqualified,” I do not mean without exceptions. A qualified privilege, as
I use the term, means a privilege that is subject to a judge’s discretionary or post hoc
balancing of interests on a case-by-case basis. Any privilege regime will contain
exceptions and waiver doctrines; thus, an unqualified or absolute privilege is one
that contains exceptions and recognizes waiver doctrines, but these exceptions and
doctrines are both categorical and defined in advance, giving attorneys and clients
notice of the limits of the protection.
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discusses the varied and flawed choice-of-law approaches that states
apply in choosing among the conflicting privilege laws and the largely
unexplored question of application of privilege protections in
nonjudicial fora, such as arbitral, administrative, and legislative
proceedings. Given all of this, and the fact that communications may
lose their privileged status once a single decision maker compels
disclosure, this Part concludes that privilege protections are highly
uncertain.
Part III offers a new approach to reform. Other proposed reforms
cannot resolve the existing problems either because they are limited
in reach or because they do not address the systemic problems with a
court-centered, common-law approach to developing privilege
doctrine. For these reasons, the solution to the problem of
uncertainty must be both legislative and national in scope. This Part
therefore proposes that Congress federalize the law of privilege,
adopting a clear, unqualified, and generally applicable privilege
statute that preempts contrary state law. Such a law would provide
the client with a federal privilege right applicable in all proceedings
in federal and state court, and in all nonjudicial proceedings.
Although Congress refused to act a quarter century ago, today it has
greater history and resources to draw upon in crafting such
particularized legislation and avoiding political derailment. Finally,
Congress has the power to enact this preemptive legislation under
the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses, and the exercise of this
power will not offend the Tenth Amendment or the values of
federalism it serves.
I.

THE NEED FOR REASONABLE CERTAINTY

A. The Privilege’s History, Elements, and Purposes
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the evidentiary
12
privileges, predating the Constitution.
The Anglo-American
12. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (noting that
the attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the common-law privileges for
confidential communications) (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton
1961)); 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 181,
at 302 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 2001) (noting that privilege originates in Roman and
canon law); 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE § 503.03 (2002)
(explaining the rationale and nature of attorney-client privilege); see also Note,
Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the
Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1227-28 (1962) [hereinafter
Functional Overlap] (noting that recognition of the attorney-client privilege by British
and American courts predates the recognition of all other professional privileges by
nearly 300 years). Indeed, the privilege originates in Roman and canon law. JOHN
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privilege developed contemporaneously with the right of compulsory
13
process, and the availability of the doctrine is unquestioned in every
14
jurisdiction in this country. Indeed, some form of the privilege is
probably guaranteed in the criminal context by the Sixth
15
Amendment to the Constitution and parallel state constitutional
16
provisions. In the civil context, the protections that the privilege
provides do not rise to the constitutional level, but such protections
17
are recognized by the federal courts and all fifty states.
Despite the privilege’s long history and the enormous amount of
18
litigation it has spawned, the basic elements of the privilege have
remained largely the same for over a century. Unless it is waived, the
attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications
between the client and attorney made for the purpose of obtaining or
19
providing legal advice. Of course, questions regarding each of these
WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE § 1.04 (3d ed. 2001).
13. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 181, at 302.
14. See generally PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: STATE LAW § 1 (1996)
(discussing the history of the attorney-client privilege in each state and the District of
Columbia).
15. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the
assistance of counsel for his defense.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 n.4 (1977) (assuming, tacitly,
that government intrusion on confidences between criminal defendants and their
counsel would violate the Sixth Amendment); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12,
§ 181, at 305 (stating that attorney-client privilege also has been viewed as an adjunct
to the privilege against self-incrimination, at least to the extent that incriminating
admissions of a defendant could otherwise be extracted from the defendant’s
attorney).
17. See generally RICE, supra note 14, § 1 (examining the attorney-client privilege
in all states and the District of Columbia).
18. Rice, Evidence Project, supra note 7, at 346 n.16.
19. Genentech, Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1415
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED
STATES § 2:1, at 2-45 (1993)). The Third Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers
offers a substantially similar definition.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000) (protecting a communication made between
privileged persons, in confidence, for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal
assistance for the client). Another often accepted statement of the scope of the
privilege is embodied in the Revised Uniform Rule of Evidence 502(b):
General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent any other person from disclosing a confidential communication
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal
services to the client (i) between the client or a representative of the client
and the client’s lawyer or a representative of the lawyer, (ii) between the
lawyer and a representative of the lawyer, (iii) by the client or a
representative of the client or the client’s lawyer or a representative of the
lawyer to a lawyer or a representative of a lawyer representing another party
in a pending action and concerning a matter of common interest therein,
(iv) between representatives of the client or between the client and a
representative of the client, or (v) among lawyers and their representatives
representing the same client.
REV. UNIF. R. EVID. 502(b) (1999); see also 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 347-48
n.19 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 5th ed. 1999) [hereinafter MCCORMICK ON
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elements generate controversy—i.e., who is the client, when is a
communication made in confidence, when are attorney
communications to the client privileged, and when is confidentiality
waived.
The protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege and other
unqualified evidentiary privileges is distinguishable from the
protections afforded by other evidence rules that operate to
exclude—e.g., hearsay, opinion evidence, and character evidence
restrictions—in two respects. First, privileges not only prevent the
use of protected communications at trial but also prohibit adverse
parties from gaining access to such communications, even if they
contain otherwise relevant information.
Privileges protect
communications by both parties and non-parties from discovery and
other forms of compulsory disclosure. Thus, unlike other legal
doctrines classified as evidentiary rules, privileges protect against
20
discovery of relevant information.
Of course, the attorney-client
privilege does not protect underlying facts or information, which can
be discovered through means other than disclosure of the attorney21
client communication.
Second, the testimonial privileges, including the attorney-client
privilege, are unlike other exclusionary rules because they are not
designed to assist in finding the truth by excluding evidence which is
22
unreliable or likely to be unfairly prejudicial or misleading. To the
contrary, privileges have the effect of inhibiting, rather than
23
facilitating, the illumination of the truth. Privileges serve to protect
other interests that are regarded as sufficiently important to warrant
24
limiting access to relevant evidence.
Throughout the attorney-client privilege’s long history, a number
of justifications have been offered to support the protection it
25
affords.
For example, in 1768, Blackstone suggested that the
EVIDENCE] (relying on and excerpting Rule 502(b)).
20. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 170, at 220-21 (noting the
distinct rationale and broader sweep of privilege rules in relation to other evidence
law, specifically referring to privileges’ unique ability to exclude probative evidence,
hinder the discovery of truth, and produce inefficiency in the litigation process).
21. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981). Indeed, since the
underlying information contained in the attorney-client communication is otherwise
obtainable, some have argued that the costs of the privilege to truth-seeking are
limited. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
22. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 72, at 298-99 (contrasting
exclusionary rules with rules of privilege, noting that the former seek to exclude
prejudicial, misleading, or unreliable evidence, while the latter seek to inhibit the
truth).
23. Id. at 299.
24. Id.
25. Indeed, the prevailing justifications have evolved over time. See, e.g.,
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privilege is an extension of the right of individuals to avoid self26
incrimination. Modern commentators have contended that the
privilege is necessary to preserve a criminal defendant’s Fifth
27
Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and Sixth
28
29
Others have argued that the
Amendment right to counsel.
privilege is necessary to uphold the professional relationship between
the attorney and client: without it, there could be no confidentiality
30
and corresponding trust and loyalty. Similarly, some commentators
suggest that the attorney’s traditional role as an advocate in our
adversarial system would be seriously undermined if attorneys could
31
be utilized routinely as a source of information about the client.
Still others have contended that the attorney-client privilege is
necessary to protect the client’s privacy or dignitary interest in
preventing interference with the client’s relationship with a close
32
advisor.
Bradford, supra note 9, at 913-14 (describing the various policy justifications from
Roman times to the present); GERGACZ, supra note 12, § 1.04 (same).
26. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 370 (1768); see also Note, Developments in the
Law—Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1501, 1502 (1985) [hereinafter
Privileged Communications] (discussing Blackstone’s self-incrimination theory).
27. “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
28. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the
assistance of counsel for his defense.” Id. amend. VI.
29. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional
Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 485-86 (1977) [hereinafter Attorney-Client Privilege]
(explaining that, although the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, when viewed together,
seemingly do not provide for the attorney-client privilege protection, the absence of
such a privilege would preclude enjoyment of rights enumerated in either
amendment).
30. E.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980); MODEL CODE OF
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1980) (stating that both the attorney-client fiduciary
relationship and the proper functioning of the legal system require the preservation
of confidences); Broun, supra note 1, at 796-97 (discussing loyalty concerns as one of
the considerations supporting the maintenance of the attorney-client privilege);
Note, Developments in the Law—Privileged Communication: Modes of Analysis: The Theories
and Justifications of Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1498 (1985)
[hereinafter Theories and Justifications] (attributing the attorney-client privilege to the
importance society places on both the attorney-client relationship and the codes of
ethics governing the relationship); Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at 1502
(noting that the original justification for the privilege was based on an individual’s
right to avoid self-incrimination and, alternatively, the attorney’s oath of loyalty to
the client).
31. E.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 87, at 346 (noting that the
strong tradition of advocacy would be outraged by examination of attorneys aimed at
uncovering client confidences).
32. E.g., Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 29, at 483; Theories and Justifications,
supra note 30, at 1481-82; see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 87, at
345-46 (noting that, although contemporary arguments suggest that privacy defines
and supports the attorney-client privilege, courts remain hesitant to adopt the privacy
rationale); Broun, supra note 1, at 790-96 (discussing how modern writers frequently
justify the existence of privilege protections based on privacy and endorsing such a
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Each of these justifications is consistent with the protections
afforded by the modern privilege, and each continues to receive
33
Indeed, each justification
scholarly recognition and support.
highlights an important interest—protecting against selfincrimination, facilitating maintenance of the trust relationship,
guarding the integrity of the adversarial system, and respecting
legitimate expectations of privacy and human dignity—that the
privilege ought to continue to serve. Thus, any discussion of the
adequacy of current privilege doctrine or reforms must include
consideration of these interests. Yet none of these justifications can
fully explain the modern privilege, which applies in criminal and civil
contexts, protects attorney-client communications made in and
outside of litigation, is generally unqualified, and affords protection
34
for both natural and corporate persons.
Rather, the widely accepted, overarching purpose for the modern
35
attorney-client privilege is utilitarian or instrumental.
The
predominant modern rationale for the privilege is that it fosters
client candor and full communication between attorneys and clients,
which produce social benefits that outweigh the privilege’s social
36
costs. The Supreme Court has unambiguously endorsed this view:
[The privilege’s] purpose is to encourage full and frank
view).
33. See, e.g., Broun, supra note 1, at 796 (discussing how commentators continue
to endorse privilege protections based on privacy and professionalism interests, and
indicating that the best arguments for the maintenance of privileges are those that
take into account instrumental as well as privacy, dignity, and loyalty considerations).
34. See John W. Gergacz, Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege: Cases Applying Upjohn,
Waiver, Crime-Fraud Exception, and Related Issues, 38 BUS. LAW. 1653, 1659 (1983)
(discussing why the attorney-client privilege cannot be based on notions of individual
privacy alone). For example, the privilege applies even in those civil matters in
which the right against self-incrimination is not implicated. Likewise, the privacy
rationale—at least one which views individual privacy as an end in itself—may not
extend to organizations, such as corporations. See Theories and Justifications, supra
note 30, at 1482 (discussing the uncomfortable fit between the privacy rationale and
privileges that extend to organizational clients).
35. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 87, at 344 (stating that the
utilitarian purpose became the primary rationale for the privilege in the eighteenth
century and continues to be the principal justification today); Bradford, supra note 9,
at 915 (stating that the desire to promote effective legal representation remains the
best explanation for the attorney-client privilege); Theories and Justifications, supra
note 30, at 1486-87 (characterizing the privilege’s utilitarian purpose as
predominant). As suggested above, however, the utilitarian and non-utilitarian
justifications are not irreconcilable. Indeed, recent commentary has suggested that
non-utilitarian concerns—including privacy and dignitary interests—can be
incorporated within a broad utilitarian framework by factoring these concerns into
any balancing of social benefits and costs. Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at
1504-07.
36. See Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 29, at 466 (stating that the goal of
fostering legal communication has remained the unchallenged justification for
attorney-client privilege since the mid-nineteenth century).
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communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal
advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or
advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the
37
client.

Correspondingly, without the attorney-client privilege, the
argument goes, clients would be deterred from making open and
38
candid disclosures to their attorneys. Absent reasonable assurance
that such disclosures could not be used against them later—via their
attorney’s testimony or otherwise—clients would be unwilling to
39
disclose embarrassing, unpleasant, or otherwise harmful facts.
In addition to serving the independent interests described above,
full client disclosure and the corresponding interchange between
attorney and client purportedly produce several social benefits. First,
full and frank communication is necessary for the provision of
40
effective legal representation. In the litigation context, for example,
attorneys otherwise would be deprived of information necessary for
the preparation and anticipation of claims and defenses, which would
41
harm both the client’s interests and the adversarial process. The
vindication of rights in, and overall efficacy of, our justice system
often depends on sound and adequate legal advice and assistance.
Outside the litigation context, candid interchange between attorney
and client is necessary to assess legal risks and consequences, and to
allow counseling in avoidance of risks, adverse consequences, and
42
litigation in our modern, complex regulatory regime.
37. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); see also Privileged
Communications, supra note 26, at 1502-03 (discussing the utilitarian justification for
the privilege and distinguishing it from right-based theories).
38. See Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at 1502-03 (stating that sound
legal advice both serves public ends and depends on full disclosure of information to
the attorney); see also Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1475 (noting that the
absence of the privilege may deter communications between an attorney and a
client).
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c (1998).
40. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 87, at 344.
41. See Geoffrey Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66
CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (1978) (stating that the attorney-client privilege is viewed as
indispensable to an attorney’s ability to prepare a case and effectively advocate);
Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at 1506 (discussing the importance of the
privilege in the litigation process, particularly given the complex and imposing array
of formalities and procedures).
42. See Hazard, supra note 41, at 1061 (arguing that the privilege is necessary to
the attorney’s function as confidential counselor in law on the theory that proper
advice only can be given if the client is free to make full disclosure); see also MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE R. 210 cmt. a (1942) (same); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note
19, § 87, at 344 (stating that expert legal advice is essential in structurally
complicated and detailed society).
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In addition, greater client candor and communication facilitates
43
ongoing compliance with the law. Legal rules are complex and factspecific in application; attorneys are better situated to appreciate the
meaning and effect of such rules and to determine whether or not
44
actions conform to these rules.
Moreover, legal compliance
enhances social welfare by furthering the underlying aims of the
45
law.
Yet, given the privilege’s potential social costs, even ardent
supporters of the utilitarian rationale—including the Supreme
46
Court—advocate construing the privilege narrowly.
Doctrinal
limitations, such as the crime-fraud exception, which seek to address
47
abuse of the privilege, are designed to reduce potential social harm.
Despite such limitations, because the privilege inhibits discovery of
relevant communications, it can create obstacles to ascertaining the
48
truth.
The significance of this adverse consequence is
indeterminate because the privilege protects only attorney-client
communications that arguably would not otherwise exist and does
49
not shield underlying information or facts from discovery. Still, the
43. See, e.g., GERGACZ, supra note 12, § 1.12 (stating that the privilege promotes
law-abiding behavior); Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at 1506-07 (stating
that the privilege promotes behavior that conforms to the law, because the law is so
complex, “people need the assistance of counsel to understand its dictates”). The
Supreme Court agrees with this view. See Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 392 (rejecting as too
narrow the “control group” test in part because the test threatens to hinder efforts of
corporate counsel to ensure their client’s compliance with the law).
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c (1998).
45. Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at 1507 (stating that the attorneyclient privilege furthers social good because, without the aid of an attorney’s advice,
laypeople may unknowingly break laws that they would have been willing to follow)
(footnote omitted).
46. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (stating that the
attorney-client privilege applies only where necessary to achieve its purpose because
the privilege has the effect of withholding relevant information from the fact-finder);
Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at 1504 (noting that utilitarian supporters of
the privilege generally argue for a narrow application by balancing easily observed
social costs with less concrete benefits).
47. E.g., Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 29, at 467 (stating that the existence of
the crime-fraud exception demonstrates a recognition that some values outweigh the
values advanced by protecting confidential relations).
48. See Bradford, supra note 9, at 914 (stating that the privilege represents a
tradeoff between effective legal representation and full discovery of relevant facts).
49. Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1477-78. In Upjohn, the Supreme
Court adopts the view that the privilege has little impact on ascertaining the truth.
449 U.S. at 395 (“Application of the attorney-client privilege to communications such
as those involved here, however, puts the adversary in no worse position than if the
communications had never taken place.”). The Court reasons that because the
privilege protects only communications, and not underlying facts or information, it
causes inconvenience for an adverse party but does not prevent discovery of the
truth. Id. at 395-96. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 68 cmt. c (1998) (stating that the evidentiary consequences of the privilege are
indeterminate because, if the behavioral assumptions supporting the privilege are
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privilege unquestionably imposes barriers to confrontation and
ascertaining facts by shielding attorneys from testifying and otherwise
disclosing relevant communications and, at times, shielding clients
50
from full examination. Indeed, the sheer volume of litigation over
privilege issues strongly suggests that adverse parties view access to
51
these communications as both useful and important.
Moreover, the litigation over the privilege itself constitutes a
significant transaction cost. Privilege disputes—particularly in large
and complex civil cases—can take months and even years to resolve,
and can consume enormous private and public resources. While I
have found no study estimating the actual cost of privilege disputes in
litigation, the aggregate cost of these battles is undoubtedly
52
enormous.
Although almost no one advocates abolishing the attorney-client
privilege in its entirety—indeed, it is too late in the game for that—
53
the utilitarian justification has its critics. Some argue that the costs
54
of the privilege outweigh the purported benefits in certain contexts,
55
For
and others question whether the benefits are in fact real.
example, scholars have questioned whether the corporate attorney-

well-founded, the evidence excluded by the privilege would not have come into
existence if not for the privilege); GERGACZ, supra note 12, § 1.15 (suggesting that the
costs of the privilege may be as speculative as its benefits); Functional Overlap, supra
note 12, at 1238 (discussing the results of Yale Law Journal survey, which found that
more attorneys believe that the evidence was otherwise available from another source
than those who believe that the privilege usually kept out otherwise unobtainable
evidence); Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at 1507-08 (stating that the
privilege keeps from the court only sources of information that would not exist but
for the inducement to communicate with attorneys that the privilege provides).
50. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c (1998)
(discussing evidentiary consequences of the privilege). For example, in some
circumstances, utilizing attorney-client communications to impeach may be the only
realistic way an adversary can demonstrate that the client is not being truthful.
51. Cf. Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1476 (noting that, if testimony
were an adequate substitute for privileged information, courts would have little
reason to compel disclosure).
52. This must be true, given the complexity of the privilege and the sheer volume
of litigation over both its doctrinal limitations and application. See, e.g., Rice, Evidence
Project, supra note 7, at 346 & n.16 (describing the privilege as complex and stating
that it has generated a body of federal case law that exceeds five thousand cases and a
similar body of state case law).
53. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 87, at 344-45 (discussing
the history of the controversy surrounding the privilege, including Jeremy Bentham’s
famous criticisms).
54. See, e.g., Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 29, at 470 (arguing for a qualified
privilege in certain circumstances because the interests served by the privilege are
outweighed by other interests).
55. Id. (questioning whether the privilege actually promotes attorney-client
communications); Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1472 (noting belief
among some evidence experts that privileges serve no important societal purpose).
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client privilege is necessary and whether it enhances social welfare.
Others may contend that the benefits of the privilege are too
57
speculative to justify the costs. In addition, judges and litigants,
faced with privilege-created obstacles in a particular piece of
litigation, may find the privilege’s harsh consequences unbearably
58
difficult to accept.
The fact that the benefits of the privilege are extrinsic and
speculative while the costs are intrinsic to the particular dispute in
which the privilege is asserted, combined with the sheer frequency of
privilege claims, assures that the privilege will remain controversial
and difficult to apply. Most judges, law makers, attorneys, and
scholars tend to agree that the privilege is useful and important, but
59
should be narrowly construed. There is far less agreement, however,
as to what exactly this means, either generally or in particular cases.
B. The Utilitarian Justification and Reasonable Certainty
The utilitarian justification for the attorney-client privilege is
premised on the assumption that providing protection for attorneyclient confidences will enhance client candor or, at a minimum,
60
foster greater attorney-client communication.
Although most
courts, practitioners, and commentators accept this assumption
61
outright, it is both disputed and empirically unverified. Skeptics
56. See, e.g., Paul R. Rice, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: Loss of Predictability
Does Not Justify Crying Wolfinbarger, 55 BUS. LAW. 735, 741 (2000) [hereinafter Rice,
Loss of Predictability] (questioning the utility of the privilege in the corporate
context); Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 29, at 473-76 (calling into question the
efficacy and necessity of the privilege in the corporate context). Others believe the
corporate privilege is justifiable. See GERGACZ, supra note 12, § 1.21 (noting that the
privilege is justifiable particularly in the corporate context because of the
corporation’s need for access to legal advice to ensure compliance with the law).
57. Cf. 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2291, at 554 (McNaughton rev. 1961 & Supp.
1990) (supporting the privilege, but conceding that its benefits are all indirect and
speculative, while its obstruction is plain and concrete).
58. See, e.g., Broun, supra note 1, at 780-81 (stating that courts’ distaste for the
exclusionary consequences of the privilege lead to rejection of new privileges and,
more often, narrow constructions of existing privileges).
59. See, e.g., Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of
the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 191, 197 (1989) (conducting a survey and
finding that attorneys, judges, and corporate officials generally responded favorably
to the privilege); Functional Overlap, supra note 12, at 1232 (discussing survey results
that indicate attorneys strongly support the privilege).
60. It is this candor or communication that produces, in turn, the social
benefits—better legal advice, more effective administration of justice, greater
compliance with the law, and other interests—that outweigh the social costs the
privilege inflicts.
61. See Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 29, at 470 (noting the existence of
continued academic debate); Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1474 (noting
lack of empirical data to support existence of either the privilege’s putative benefits
or costs).
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therefore remain, even though most aspects of the modern
privilege—including the corporate privilege—are almost certainly
here to stay. Despite the lingering controversy, the privilege cannot
enhance candor or communication if the protection it affords is
uncertain. Thus, for society to reap benefits from the privilege, it
must afford sufficiently certain protection for attorney-client
communications.
To promote greater candor and communication, privilege
protection must remove the disincentives for clients to speak freely
with their attorneys. Adherents to the utilitarian justification of the
attorney-client privilege rely on the “common sense” notion that
clients would be unwilling, or at least far more hesitant, to discuss
embarrassing, unpleasant, and otherwise harmful matters in detail
with their attorneys if such discussions could be used against the
62
client in a pending or later proceeding. Moreover, attorneys would
be reluctant to seek or allow full disclosure from clients if such
disclosures ultimately could harm the clients’ interests.
This greater willingness on the part of clients and attorneys to
engage in full and frank communications depends upon their belief
63
that the communications will be protected.
If either client or
attorney has significant doubts about the communication’s protected
64
status, each person will be less willing to engage in the interchange.
Thus, in order to enhance communications, the privilege must
provide protection that is sufficiently certain to allay client and
attorney concerns regarding future disclosure.
Courts and commentators adhering to the view that the privilege
promotes attorney-client candor and communication are virtually
65
unanimous in agreement on the need for a concrete privilege.
62. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 87, at 344 (stating that
utilitarian theory depends in part on the client’s belief that the attorney cannot be
compelled subsequently to divulge confidential information); GERGACZ, supra note
12, § 1.10 (stating that encouraging client candor is a valid purpose for the rule
although there are no “numbers” to prove that the privilege enhances candor); see
also Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1476 (indicating available data suggests
that most people would not communicate as freely and completely without a
privilege).
63. See Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1476-77 (arguing that, while
knowledge of the privilege may not necessarily encourage candor between attorney
and client, knowledge of the privilege’s absence may deter such candor).
64. See Broun, supra note 1, at 793 (postulating that the absence of a privilege
would make an attorney much less aggressive in seeking information, and that such
inhibition would adversely affect the quality of representation).
65. See, e.g., Eric P. Sloter & Anita M. Sorensen, Corporate Ethics—An Empirical
Study: The Model Rules, The Code of Professional Responsibility, and Counsel’s Continuing
Struggle Between Theory and Practice, 8 J. CORP. L. 601, 607 (1983) (arguing that the
attorney-client privilege is an effective legal tool only when the client and the
attorney are able to predict with reasonable certainty whether a communication is
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Indeed, the Supreme Court premised its decision in Upjohn largely on
the need for a predictable and certain privilege:
[I]f the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the
attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of
certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An
uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results
in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no
66
privilege at all.

Although some state courts have not accepted the Supreme Court’s
67
ultimate holding in Upjohn, state courts do not question the basic
premise that the privilege must be predictable in order to serve its
purposes. Many members of the legal community who seek reforms
in privilege law base their proposals on the need for greater
68
predictability and certainty.

likely to be privileged if later sought through discovery); Glen Weissenberger, Toward
Precision in the Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporations, 65 IOWA L. REV.
899, 918 (1979) (arguing that because a client’s view is prospective, the attorneyclient privilege must be reasonably predictable at the time of attachment, or else the
privilege fails to serve its intended purpose); Theories and Justifications, supra note 30,
at 1487 (noting that utilitarians commonly assert that the privileges must be easily
predictable in application to achieve the certainty necessary to modify the behavior
of communicators and thereby secure the supposed benefits of privilege law).
66. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981). Recently, the Court
reiterated the necessity of certainty in adopting an unqualified psychotherapist-patient
privilege. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996) (stating that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege would be eviscerated if the promise of
confidentiality were contingent upon a trial judge’s post hoc balancing of the relative
importance of a patient’s interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure).
67. See infra notes 218-21 and accompanying text (explaining that some states
reject Upjohn’s subject matter test and use a control group test to determine the
extent of attorney-employee corporate privileges).
68. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 9, at 944 (noting that the need for certainty and
predictability have never been the focus of attorney-client privilege cases predicated
on choice-of-law); Jack P. Friedman, Is the Garner Qualification of the Corporate AttorneyClient Privilege Viable After Jaffee v. Redmond?, 55 BUS. LAW. 243, 281 (1999)
(advocating abandonment of the balancing test for determining shareholder access
to privileged communications by corporate personnel); Amy Weiss, In-House Counsel
Beware: Wearing the Business Hat Could Mean Losing the Privilege, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 393, 394 (1998) (advocating for reform in the corporate context based on
greater certainty of privilege protections). Professor Bradford, for example, calls for
a territorial approach to conflicts determinations in the privilege setting because of
the unique need for predictability and certainty in this context. Bradford, supra note
9, at 943-44. He states that the attorney-client privilege encourages communications
between attorney and client only if both parties know at the time of their
communications whether the privilege will apply. Id. at 943. If the protection is
uncertain, attorney-client “communications will be chilled, and the purpose of the
privilege will be entirely defeated.” Id. He contends that choice-of-law questions in
the privilege area ought to be resolved differently than those in other areas because
of the “special need for uniformity, predictability and certainty.” Id. at 945.
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Almost all of the commentators who question the emphasis on
certainty are skeptics of the corporate privilege. Some commentators
within this group recognize the need for predictable privilege
protections outside the corporate context, but advocate a qualified
69
corporate privilege.
Skeptics of the corporate privilege offer a number of related
arguments for why the privilege does not or cannot enhance
communication and candor in the corporate setting, thereby making
privilege protections unnecessary. For example, some commentators
contend that the privilege is unnecessary because rational corporate
decision makers, faced with ongoing compliance obligations and
legal risks, have adequate incentives to seek legal advice and
maximize legal counsel’s effectiveness without the protection of the
70
privilege. Others contend that, even if the privilege fosters greater
interchange, it creates no incentive for corporate employees to be
71
more truthful with counsel. Critics further argue that the privilege
cannot enhance candor and communication within the corporate
structure because it belongs to the corporation, not the individuals
72
communicating with corporate counsel. Since employees have no
69. See Alexander, supra note 59, at 385-89 (noting that the existing limits to the
corporate privilege, the corporate privilege’s definitional uncertainty, and the need
for a qualified corporate privilege facilitate an adversary’s discovery); Attorney-Client
Privilege, supra note 29, at 470-87 (arguing that the distinctions between the “legal”
and “business” privileges justify the abandonment of any fixed privilege and the
creation of a qualified privilege in the corporate context).
70. See Alexander, supra note 59, at 273 (arguing that the very existence of
numerous corporate laws and regulations and the omnipresence of attorneys in
corporate affairs suggests that corporations will encourage open communications
with counsel in order to comply with the laws regardless of privilege); Rice, Loss of
Predictability, supra note 56, at 741 (arguing that corporate officers will not disregard
the corporation’s welfare and their own interests if the privilege is not maintained);
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 175 (1993) (concluding that the rational
corporation will risk candor to secure the needed legal advice); Attorney-Client
Privilege, supra note 29, at 473-74 (asserting that corporations will continue to seek
legal advice regardless of clear certainty or absolute rules of corporate privilege
because of their frequent, ongoing, legal needs); cf., e.g., Theories and Justifications,
supra note 30, at 1474 (discussing frequent attacks on the notion that existing
privileges actually encourage communications). In addition, some legal scholars
contend that intelligent attorneys would not place themselves in a situation of
weakness, whereby they could be surprised by information that would open their
clients up to unexpected liability. See Thornburg, supra, at 179-80 (discussing the
elimination of the corporate attorney-client privilege and the improbability that
attorneys would probe less thoroughly for information).
71. Cf. Rice, Loss of Predictability, supra note 56, at 741 (questioning whether
corporate employees are candid with attorneys about their own misdeeds).
72. As the client, the corporate entity owns the privilege. The privilege therefore
is controlled by the corporation’s decision makers, under the assumption that they
will fulfill their duty to act in the best interests of the corporation. Corporate
employees and other agents do not enjoy the benefits associated with the privilege.
See GERGACZ, supra note 12, § 1.20 (noting that, because the privilege belongs to the
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assurance that the corporation will not later waive the protection or
otherwise utilize the communications for its own purpose, the
protection that the privilege affords cannot induce employees to
73
communicate with counsel, even if otherwise reasonably certain.
Although I agree there are important distinctions between
corporate and individual clients, the skeptics understate both the
potential impact of the privilege on corporate decision makers and
the need for predictable privilege protections in the corporate
context. Corporate decision makers have strong incentives to seek
legal advice, but they would face strong, countervailing disincentives
in many circumstances if adversaries readily could gain access to
attorney-client communications. The specter of adverse parties using
such communications against corporate interests is more than
enough to make corporate decision makers and counsel forego
communications that otherwise may be beneficial in corporate
compliance and risk assessments. Indeed, faced with no privilege, or
a highly uncertain one, both decision makers and counsel would
discourage all but the most essential communications between
74
attorneys and corporate employees. Frankly, this conclusion seems
intuitive enough that I wonder if at least some of the skeptics accept
corporation, corporate employee communications cannot be encouraged by the
existence or lack of a privilege, but, more likely, by directives from a corporate
superior or senses of duty to the organization); Brian E. Hamilton, Conflict, Disparity,
and Indecision: The Unsettled Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
629, 646-47 (1997) (stating that, because the corporation and not the employee
retains the privilege, it is arguable whether application of the privilege in corporate
environments actually encourages employee candor and disclosure); Rice, Loss of
Predictability, supra note 56, at 740-42 (arguing that corporate employees are not
necessarily candid when properly informed that they are personally liable for their
misdeeds); Thornburg, supra note 70, at 173-74 (suggesting that the corporate
employee’s incentive for candor is limited by the fact that the privilege protects the
corporation and not the employee).
73. See, e.g., Rice, Loss of Predictability, supra note 56, at 741 (noting the possibility
that subsequent circumstances might lead a corporation to waive its privilege and
thereby destroy the protection that would otherwise inure to the benefit of the
employee). Furthermore, corporate counsel is free to disclose the information to
the employees’ superiors. Thus, corporate employees can never be certain that their
communications will remain confidential, and subject themselves to both internal
and external risks each time they communicate with corporate counsel. Id.;
Thornburg, supra note 70, at 174.
74. See GERGACZ, supra note 12, § 1.20 (contending that an uncertain corporate
privilege creates the specter of corporate attorneys being used by opponents to
prepare their cases, which will, in turn, create strong disincentives for management
to require corporate agents to communicate with counsel); cf. Alexander, supra note
59, at 271 (discussing how attorney-client privilege stimulates a business entity to
encourage employees to communicate openly with the company’s attorneys); Theories
and Justifications, supra note 29, at 1475 (stating that actual knowledge of the lack of a
privilege arguably would be a strong deterrent to communicating). Indeed, in the
absence of the privilege, attorneys would be viewed as a threat to the corporate
clients they serve. GERGACZ, supra note 12, § 1.20.
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the notion that some minimum level of certainty is necessary, but just
75
disagree as to the amount.
The skeptics are correct that the privilege is inherently less
predictable in the corporate context because an employee ultimately
has no assurance that the entity will protect the employee’s
communications, and corporate decision makers have no guarantee
that they will have the authority to control the privilege in future
76
proceedings. Yet an otherwise sufficiently certain privilege still can
enhance candor and communication within the corporate structure.
First, while the entity owns the privilege, in many circumstances the
entity, its decision makers, and its employees will have mutual
77
interests.
In addition, even if the privilege does not create an
incentive for lower-level employees to communicate with corporate
attorneys, decision makers will have incentives to promote such
78
communications and can compel employee cooperation.
Also,
while corporate decision makers always face the risk that they will not
control the entity’s privilege in the future, that risk alone does not
defeat the potential effectiveness of the privilege. As long as decision
makers can assess the risk that future decision makers will use
corporate-attorney communications against them, the assessed risk is
low, and the privilege’s protections otherwise are sufficiently certain,
75. For example, two of the commentators who argue that greater certainty is
unnecessary and, therefore, the corporate privilege could be qualified, seem to
acknowledge, at least implicitly, that some degree of predictability is needed. See
Alexander, supra note 59, at 385-89 (disputing the contention that the corporate
privilege depends on a high degree of certainty and arguing for a qualified
approach, but defending the qualified approach on the grounds that it may enhance
certainty and that the privilege rarely will be pierced); Attorney-Client Privilege, supra
note 29, at 470-87 (questioning the need for total certainty in privilege protections
and advocating a post hoc balancing approach to apply the privilege, although
implicitly recognizing that some level of certainty should be preserved).
76. For example, by the time of the litigation, the entity’s interests may have
changed, or the business may be under new management or the authority of a
bankruptcy trustee. Moreover, as discussed more fully in Part II.B, infra, in some
circumstances, shareholders may attain the right to access and use the
communications.
77. See, e.g., MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 189, at 343 (explaining that
the effects of corporate ownership of the privilege do not automatically result in
divergent interests between the corporation and the employee); Alexander, supra
note 59, at 262 (noting that most corporate executive employees assume that their
individual interests and the interests of the corporation are the same).
78. See GERGACZ, supra note 12, § 1.20 (stating that a policy of corporate candor
relates to and encourages a corporation’s use of its attorneys, and does not pertain to
an individual’s decision to communicate with an attorney). Cooperation does not
ensure candor, but, in addition to perceived mutual interests, employees may be
truthful to avoid discipline or because they believe it is the right thing to do.
Moreover, in many circumstances, employees will see no reason to avoid the truth,
because they will not know the legal implications of the information they
communicate to counsel.
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decision makers are likely to continue to encourage communications
79
with counsel.
Of course, the debate over the privilege’s effect on candor and
communication cannot be resolved definitively because the actual
80
impact of the privilege on participant behavior is unverifiable.
There have been a few attempts to seek empirical verification of the
81
effects of the privilege. Although most of these studies suggest that
attorneys and laypeople tend to believe the privilege helps to
enhance client candor or at least attorney-client communication in
82
both the corporate and individual contexts, this research ultimately
83
is inconclusive as to the privilege’s actual impact. Furthermore, the
79. At least one empirical study suggests that executives who are aware that the
entity owns the privilege still believe fairly strongly that the privilege promotes
candor. Alexander, supra note 59, at 251, 262.
80. Cf. GERGACZ, supra note 12, § 1.06 (asserting that inconclusive empirical
results do not diminish the long-held view that a person with assured confidentiality
will be less likely to hide certain facts).
81. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 59, at 193 (reporting the results of a survey of
corporate and legal professionals concerning the privilege); Sloter & Sorensen, supra
note 65, at 625 n.139 (noting responses of corporate managers to a bar query
regarding the correlation between certainty of confidentiality and the extent of
organizational cooperation with investigations); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking
Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 373-95 (1989) (discussing privilege studies);
Functional Overlap, supra note 12, at 1232 (discussing the results of a survey conducted
in 1961 by the Yale Law Journal); Paul R. Rice, Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: Study
Reveals Corporate Agents Are Uninformed; What They Don’t Know Can Destroy the Privilege,
ACCA DOCKET (1998), at http://www.acprivilege.com/articles/accorpstudy.htm.
82. See Alexander, supra note 59, at 232-33, 241-46 (discussing previous studies
and own survey results that indicate the privilege plays a role in enhancing candor
and communication in the corporate context); Sloter & Sorensen, supra note 65, at
625 n.139 (indicating that twelve out of fifteen high-level business executives stated
that “an assurance of confidentiality” by counsel would increase their willingness to
comply with an investigation); Zacharias, supra note 81, at 396 (admitting
confidentiality encourages client use of attorneys and client forthrightness, but
conceding the proposition may be overstated by proponents); Functional Overlap,
supra note 12, at 1232 n.38 (stating that 55 of 108 laypersons indicated that they
would be less likely to make full disclosure to an attorney in the absence of privilege,
and 90 out of 125 attorneys said that their clients’ awareness of the privilege
enhanced communications). Professor Alexander’s survey found that several other
factors besides the privilege promote candor and that trust and confidence in an
individual attorney was the most influential single factor. Alexander, supra note 59,
at 248. However, he noted that many respondents qualified their answers by noting
that the attorney-client privilege creates the environment in which this trust and
confidence exists. Id. at 248, 265-66.
83. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 59, at 260-70 (concluding that the survey’s
results ultimately were mixed on whether the privilege enhances candor in the
corporate context); Broun, supra note 1, at 793 (noting the paucity of empirical data
on the effect of the privilege in promoting the free flow of information within
protected relationships); Rice, Loss of Predictability, supra note 56, at 741 (noting that
his survey showed that thirty percent of corporate employees indicated they are not
candid with corporate counsel); Zacharias, supra note 81, at 352, 295-96 (analyzing
the Tompkins County study, in which seventy-two percent of the lawyers presented
with a specific hypothetical responded that they would disclose particular
information even though the relevant statute requires silence, cautioning against
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value of such studies is inherently limited. Generic questions to
attorneys, executives, and employees provide some useful insights,
but the extent to which the answers mirror real-world, contextspecific behavior is unknown.
And, because attorney-client
communications must remain confidential to preserve the privilege,
researchers cannot participate in, or gather information about, actual
84
attorney-client discussions.
Still, some skeptics argue that, given the current climate of
uncertainty, particularly in the corporate context, the fact that
significant attorney consultation and communication with clients
continues demonstrates either that the privilege is not needed or that
85
more certain privilege protections are unnecessary. I agree that the
privilege is highly uncertain, as I argue in Part II, but I disagree that
the current state of affairs proves that greater certainty is not needed.
First, we simply do not know the extent to which existing
86
uncertainties deter attorney-client communications. Moreover, this
argument presumes that corporate decision makers and attorneys are
aware of the extent of existing uncertainties. Yet one of the
consistent findings in the aforementioned surveys is how little
corporate executives, other laypeople, and attorneys understand the
87
scope and, more importantly, limitations of the privilege. Indeed,
some of the misunderstandings in particular support the conclusion
that executives, employees, and attorneys speak freely because they

over-reliance on the study, and conceding its limitations); Functional Overlap, supra
note 12, at 1236 (indicating on the one hand, that most laypeople were misinformed
or uninformed about the privilege, but on the other hand, that most believe that
without the privilege, full disclosure would be deterred); Theories and Justifications,
supra note 30, at 1474 (stating that although the benefits of privileges have not been
verified, there is no reason to assume that they are small).
84. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 87, at 345 (admitting the
difficulty of empirical study of the privilege).
85. See, e.g., Rice, Loss of Predictability, supra note 56, at 741 (noting that the
increased unpredictability of the corporate privilege has not led to a reduction in
legal advice); Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 29, at 473-76 (critiquing “the
certainty argument” and questioning the need for the privilege in the corporate
context).
86. Again, this cannot be quantified. Some attorneys with whom I have spoken,
including in-house counsel, suggest that they avoid certain communications with
corporate personnel out of concern that such communications ultimately will not be
privileged.
87. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 59, at 249 (summarizing survey results that
demonstrate few in corporate hierarchy know that privilege belongs only to
corporations); Rice, Loss of Predictability, supra note 56, at 741-42 (finding that
corporate personnel know little about the limits of privilege protection); Zacharias,
supra note 81, at 394 (noting pervasive client misunderstanding of confidentiality);
Functional Overlap, supra note 12, at 1236 (finding that most laypeople are
misinformed about the privilege).
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believe the communications will remain confidential.
If these
misunderstandings are as widespread as the studies suggest, then the
prevailing uncertainty does not refute the widely held assumption
that significant uncertainties in privilege protections, if known to
89
decision makers and attorneys, would deter communications.
All of this makes a fairly straightforward point: while there are
lingering doubts about the impact of the privilege, particularly in the
corporate context, the privilege is of little use unless the protection it
provides is predictable enough to convince clients, corporate
decision makers, and their attorneys that their communications will
not be disclosed in the future. An uncertain privilege, if known to
attorneys and clients, cannot promote client communication and
candor or any of the resulting benefits. Moreover, such uncertainty,
which either deters attorney-client communication or allows
unforeseen disclosure of such communications, also harms the other
interests—avoiding self-incrimination, respect for privacy and dignity,
facilitating professionalism and loyalty—that the privilege serves.
Because the privilege—including the corporate privilege—is here
90
to stay in one form or another, ensuring that the protection it
affords is predictable must be a priority for courts and policy makers.
This true particularly in light of the privilege’s extraordinary costs;
we may never be able to verify whether the social benefits of the
privilege outweigh its social and transaction costs, but we know that
we cannot achieve such benefits without sufficiently certain
protections.
88. See, e.g., Rice, Loss of Predictability, supra note 56, at 741-42 (concluding that
one of the most significant reasons why corporate employees continue to speak with
corporate attorneys is their mistaken belief that the privilege will protect them);
Zacharias, supra note 81, at 396 (attributing clients’ reliance on confidentiality to
attorneys who overstate the scope of confidentiality or who close their eyes to client
misperception of confidentiality’s limits).
89. Skeptics may counter that the corporate privilege depends on such ignorance
because employees would not communicate with corporate attorneys if they knew
that the corporation owned the privilege. Professor Rice states that one of the most
significant reasons why corporate employees continue to speak with corporate
attorneys is their mistaken belief that the privilege will protect them and their
communications. Rice, Loss of Predictability, supra note 56, at 741-42. As discussed
previously, however, this may not always be the case, and, even if lower level
employees resist, corporate decision makers can compel cooperation. See supra note
87 and accompanying text. The ignorance of corporate decision makers and
attorneys is more important than that of lower level employees. If those who control
the entity knew how uncertain the privilege is, they would be discouraged from
facilitating or allowing communications with counsel.
90. See Alexander, supra note 59, at 275 (noting that suggestions of abolishing the
corporate privilege would be “heresy”). Even Professor Rice, who is among the most
persuasive critics of the corporate privilege, has not advocated that it be abandoned.
See Rice, Evidence Project, supra note 7, at 346-47 (including the corporate privilege
within a proposed privilege rule).
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Given that sufficient certainty is necessary, the more vexing issue is
how much certainty is sufficient. There is no general agreement on
the level of certainty that is required to ensure the privilege is
91
effective. Indeed, many practitioners and judges assume or believe
92
that current privilege protections are sufficiently certain, while many
commentators—including myself—contend that they are not.
Also, assuming that the privilege can promote attorney-client
candor and communication, the level of certainty required most
likely varies by client and circumstance. Some clients may be
unwilling to engage in full and frank communications with their
attorneys unless they are absolutely certain the communications will
not be subject to disclosure later. No privilege regime will satisfy this
group, since—given the inherent complexity of aspects of privilege
doctrine and the corresponding possibility of erroneous
applications—absolute certainty is unachievable. Other clients may
be willing to communicate openly with their attorneys with minimal
assurance that their communications will be protected. Most clients
probably fall between these two extremes; for them, sufficient
certainty exists when the benefits of communication outweigh the
risk of future disclosure multiplied by the resulting harm of such
93
disclosure. This calculation will depend on the circumstances—the
perceived benefit of a particular communication and how
embarrassing or harmful the communication is likely to be if
disclosed.
Thus, the level of certainty that is sufficient to promote client
candor and communication cannot be delineated with precision, nor
can it be generalized for all clients and all circumstances. But, more
certainty is better than less, as long as other competing values—such
as preventing the use of the privilege to facilitate crimes—are not
94
sacrificed.
Policy makers therefore should strive to ensure the
91. See supra notes 69 and 75 (discussing how some commentators believe that
the existing privilege or even a qualified corporate privilege may be certain enough
to enhance candor and communication).
92. See supra note 85 (calling into question the need for attorney-client privilege
in the corporate context).
93. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 59, at 247-48 (suggesting clients engage in a
cost-benefit analysis in determining whether and how to communicate information
to attorneys).
94. By advocating greater certainty, I am not suggesting that the scope of the
privilege should be expanded or given its broadest interpretation. Indeed, I agree
with some commentators that the protection may be too broad in some contexts.
There are strong social policies in favor of various limitations and exceptions, which
always must be considered in fashioning privilege doctrine. See Clark v. United
States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933) (recognizing the need for conditions or exceptions in
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highest level of certainty achievable, while recognizing that the
competing interests at stake will require some doctrinal complexity,
and that no legal doctrine, including privilege law, is entirely
predictable or without nuances in application. This level of certainty
would maximize the potential benefits of the privilege.
Moreover, while seeking the highest level of certainty achievable,
policy makers should be unsatisfied with any regime that does not at
least provide what I call “reasonable certainty.” As a general matter,
reasonable certainty is lacking if a competent attorney well-versed in
95
privilege law cannot predict with substantial accuracy, at the time of
an attorney-client communication, whether the communication will
be immune from future disclosure, assuming the communication is
kept confidential and the client does not knowingly and voluntarily
waive the protection. Although the goal of the privilege is to
promote client communication, we should evaluate the certainty of
privilege protections from the perspective of a competent attorney
well-versed in privilege law, not the client. Attorneys are responsible
for, and capable of, assessing how likely it is that particular
communications will be protected, given the existing legal landscape,
96
and then relating this assessment to the client. Reasonable certainty
will allow the attorney to counsel the client as to the benefits and risks
of the communication, and potentially foster fuller and franker
communication when the attorney determines that the
communication is safe from disclosure.
Similarly, privilege protections ought to be actually reasonably
certain to the competent, well-versed attorney, not merely apparently
reasonably certain.
The appearance of certainty in privilege
protections may be sufficient to induce some clients and attorneys to
engage in full and frank communication, even if the protections are
97
98
uncertain. Indeed, as discussed previously, if the privilege is as
the privilege where the policies supporting it run afoul of other social policies).
Nevertheless, legal policy makers must determine the appropriate scope of the
privilege and then ensure that the protection it affords is certain.
95. I cannot delineate “substantial accuracy” with precision, but it is fair to say
that fifty percent accuracy falls far below this standard while ninety percent accuracy
probably satisfies it.
96. Cf. Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1477 (stating that the behavior
of professionals, including attorneys, is more significantly affected by the privilege
than the behavior of nonprofessionals because the professional is more likely to
know about and act upon applicable privilege law). Of course, attorneys may fail to
educate their clients adequately. See Zacharias, supra note 81, at 396 (finding that
client reliance on confidentiality may be attributable to an attorney’s exaggeration of
the scope of confidentiality or the attorney’s choice to ignore client misperception of
confidentiality’s limits).
97. See Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1489 (suggesting that the
appearance of certainty may be enough to encourage communication).
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uncertain as other commentators and I argue, the extent to which
the privilege enhances candor and communication today often may
be attributable to the fact that many attorneys and their clients
believe that privilege protections are more certain than they actually
99
are. In fact, a regime that provides only apparently certain privilege
protections may be superficially appealing: it encourages attorneyclient communications while allowing judicial and other decision
makers to provide access to such communications once the privilege
100
is challenged.
Yet policy makers should not be satisfied with apparent certainty.
Although apparent certainty promotes some candor and
communication, it is both unseemly and counterproductive. By
promoting ultimately unprotected communications, such a regime
actually facilitates adversaries’ use of attorney-client communications,
and hence, the attorney-client relationship, against the client.
Apparent certainty therefore renders legal assistance less effective,
defeating one of the primary social benefits greater client candor and
101
communication are supposed to produce.
Similarly, the mere
appearance of certainty will promote attorney-client communications
that, if ultimately unprotected, will harm the other social interests
that the privilege serves: criminal defendants may unknowingly
incriminate themselves, an adversary’s use of the attorney against
client may irreparably damage their relationship of trust and
confidence, and disclosure of the communications may defeat the
102
client’s legitimate expectation of privacy.
Apparent certainty also
leads to a troublesome dichotomy: unwitting or poorly advised clients
will communicate more—and more than they should—with their
attorneys, while the privilege will not promote candor and
communication between well-advised clients and their attorneys.
98. See supra note 68 and accompanying text; see also infra Part II.
99. See Rice, Loss of Predictability, supra note 56, at 741-42 (arguing that whatever
success the corporate privilege may have had is attributable at least in substantial part
to the mistaken beliefs of corporate officers and employees); see also supra notes 87-88
and accompanying text (same).
100. See Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 29, at 469-73 (suggesting that allowing a
reasonable balancing of interests post hoc is better than providing absolutely certain
privilege protections); Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1489 (accepting as
sufficient the mere appearance of certainty to encourage communication).
101. See Alexander, supra note 59, at 214 (arguing that an attorney who is called
on to testify to a client’s damaging admission is disqualified from serving as trial
advocate, and such disqualification both interferes with the client’s freedom to
choose counsel and delays the progress and efficacy of litigation).
102. Cf. Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1488 (suggesting that apparent
certainty, on the one hand, will not encourage those who recognize the uncertainty
to communicate, while on the other hand, will allow judges to manipulate the
uncertainty to reach arbitrary results).

GLYNN.PRINTER.DOC

2002]

12/4/2002 1:29 PM

FEDERALIZING PRIVILEGE

85

Thus, despite its initial appeal, apparent certainty actually harms the
interests the privilege is supposed to serve and produces unsavory
results that policy makers should not tolerate.
In addition, apparent certainty increases transaction costs.
Misperceptions about the privilege will lead to unwarranted
assertions of the privilege and, hence, more litigation. Likewise,
when privilege doctrine is unclear or undefined, both sides have a
strong incentive to litigate the privilege, further increasing expenses.
Finally, the appearance of certainty cannot last forever when
protections are, in fact, uncertain. Eventually, courts, commentators,
and practitioners will become aware of the actual level of uncertainty,
103
a phenomenon that has been building over the last two decades.
And, because appearances can cut both ways, attorneys and clients
who become aware of various uncertainties in privilege doctrine may
view privilege law as a whole, as uncertain, and be deterred from
communicating, even if some protections are in fact fairly certain.
In conclusion, the ultimate benefits of the privilege are in dispute,
but the essential precondition for realization of any such benefits is
clear. To promote candor and communication, privilege protections
must be sufficiently certain to assure that clients and attorneys can
fairly predict whether their communications will be subject to later
disclosure. Since absolute certainty is not attainable, policy makers
should seek to ensure that privilege doctrine provides at least
reasonably certain protections, thereby allowing well-versed,
competent attorneys, and hence their clients, to assess accurately
whether various communications will be protected.
II. THE LACK OF REASONABLE CERTAINTY
In order for privilege protections to be reasonably certain to a
competent attorney looking forward from the time of the
communication, the protections must satisfy at least three conditions.
First, the scope of the protection that the privilege affords must be
clear: confusing, ambiguous, or flexible privilege standards do not
offer predictable protection. Second, reasonably certain protections
must be generally—or at least predictably—applicable. The attorney
must have confidence that protections will apply regardless of the
forum—state, federal, or nonjudicial—and the nature of the
proceeding or substantive claims that ultimately give rise to assertion
of the protections. Finally, privilege protections remain wholly
uncertain if they are qualified or otherwise subject to post hoc
103. See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 87.
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104

abandonment or revocation.
The current privilege regime fails to satisfy each of these
conditions in many circumstances. There is a substantial amount of
confusion over a number of fundamental aspects of the attorney105
client privilege. Indeed, there are numerous, lingering ambiguities
106
In
and unresolved doctrinal issues within particular jurisdictions.
addition, there is no guarantee that the privilege protections afforded
in one jurisdiction, forum, or type of proceeding will apply in
107
another.
To the contrary, there is no generally applicable set of
privilege rules and, perhaps surprisingly, limited convergence on key
aspects of attorney-client privilege doctrine. These significant interjurisdictional conflicts in the law, combined with varying and often
unpredictable governing choice-of-law principles, result in uncertain
protections. Moreover, modern business, litigation, and conflict
resolution practices make it increasingly difficult for an attorney to
predict, at the time of a communication, whether the allegedly
privileged status of the communication will be challenged in a
particular state or federal court, in a proceeding governed by state or
federal privilege law, or in a nonjudicial forum, such as arbitral,
regulatory, or congressional proceedings.
Finally, in many
circumstances, privilege protections are tentative or qualified:
substantive privilege doctrine sometimes allows decision makers to
override, abrogate, or ignore privilege protections, while at other
times, attorneys or their clients waive the privilege permanently by
involuntary disclosure or by stumbling into one of the traps for the

104. See Berger, supra note 1, at 275 (finding troublesome lower federal courts’
endorsement of a qualified privilege, which permitted the court to find, on balance,
that disclosure should be ordered). The Supreme Court has emphasized the need
for absolute privilege protections that are not subject to a post hoc balancing of
interests or values. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996) (holding that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege would be eviscerated if made contingent upon a
judge, after the fact, weighing the relative importance of a patient’s interest in
privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure). Indeed, to the extent privilege
doctrine allows individual judges or decision makers to ignore protections in given
circumstances, those protections become wholly unreliable and, hence, uncertain.
See Functional Overlap, supra note 12, at 1245 (recognizing that discretionary privilege
protections would cause uncertainty and that the full disclosure objective therefore
would be “deeply undercut”). I therefore disagree with those commentators and
courts that suggest that a qualified privilege that allows judges to balance competing
interests post hoc can be reconciled with the purposes of the modern privilege. See
supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing commentators who have advocated
for a qualified corporate privilege).
105. See Broun, supra note 1, at 786 (stating that most unresolved issues relating to
testimonial privileges invoked in federal courts surround the attorney-client privilege
rather than other privileges).
106. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
107. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
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unwary lurking below the surface of apparent protection.
Thus, the protections that the modern privilege affords often are
uncertain. The story of the uncertainty in today’s privilege most
appropriately begins in the early 1970s, when Congress had a real
opportunity to provide national leadership on privilege doctrine but
109
chose not to act. Congress had its reasons for not taking the lead a
quarter century ago, but, in hindsight, its inaction ultimately was a
major cause for the current, intolerable state of privilege doctrine.
Since then, continuing disagreements among state and federal
jurisdictions, judicial inattention, flawed judicial policy making, and
changing economic, litigation, and dispute resolution practices have
110
contributed to the problem.
A. How We Got Here:
The Federal Rules of Evidence and State Privilege Law
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, the
federal courts had no single set of evidence rules. Evidentiary
privileges, including the attorney-client privilege, were creatures of
state and federal common law. In 1972, after years of discussion, the
Supreme Court promulgated the Federal Rules of Evidence pursuant
111
to the Court’s authority under the Rules Enabling Act. These rules
were then submitted to Congress for tacit approval or explicit
112
rejection.
As originally proposed, Article V of these rules would have codified
113
These rules would have provided for nine
the law of privileges.
specific privileges including the attorney-client privilege, waiver of
privilege by voluntary disclosure, protection of privileged matters
disclosed under compulsion, and prohibition of negative inferences
114
drawn from a party’s assertion of privilege. Proposed Federal Rule

108. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.c.
109. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 169, at 216-20 (describing
congressional refusal to codify a federal privilege law, preferring instead that the
privilege be guided by the common law and applicable state law); see also discussion
infra Part II.A.
110. See discussion infra Part II.A-C.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power to
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure, and rules of evidence for cases in
the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof)
and courts of appeals.”), repealed by Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act
of 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1994) (retaining the original language of the Rules
Enabling Act); see also Broun, supra note 1, at 772-79 (discussing the history of the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence).
112. Broun, supra note 1, at 772.
113. FED. R. EVID. art. V (Proposed Draft 1972).
114. Id. at 502-13.
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of Evidence 501 would have provided that only those privileges set
forth in Article V could be recognized by federal courts, thereby
115
explicitly superseding contrary state and federal common law.
Congress, however, displaying rare interest in the proposed rules
116
and the rule-making process, rejected Article V in its entirety. The
proposed privilege rules proved too controversial for a number of
reasons. In the wake of the Watergate scandal, Congress did not look
fondly upon proposed Rule 509, which redefined—and arguably
expanded—the scope of the secrets of state and official information
117
privileges.
In addition, Article V narrowed some common-law
privileges and omitted others, such as the physician-patient, spousal
118
communications, and journalistic privileges.
Perhaps most importantly, however, various commentators,
members of Congress, and a former Supreme Court Justice expressed
concern that the proposed privilege rules—and the governing state
and federal standards that they were designed to replace—were
119
substantive in nature.
Indeed, despite the Advisory Committee’s

115. Id. at 501.
116. Indeed, the proposed testimonial privileges contained in Article V almost
doomed the entire set of evidence rules. See Broun, supra note 1, at 772-77
(describing the opposition to the draft rules from various judicial, academic, and
civic commentators, who particularly criticized the proposed rules on privilege).
This was the first time Congress exercised its retained power to revise evidentiary and
procedural rules proposed by the Supreme Court. Committee on Federal Courts, supra
note 10, at 148-49.
117. FED. R. EVID. 509 (Proposed Draft 1972); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note
12, § 169, at 214; Broun, supra note 1, at 776-77; see also S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 6
(1974) (stating that the focus of congressional disagreement regarding Rule 509 was
whether the rule was or was not merely codifying existing law with respect to state
and official information privileges).
118. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 169, at 214; Broun, supra note 1, at
776. A related criticism offered by some commentators was that Article V would
eliminate the ability of courts to formulate new privileges if the circumstances
warranted. See Broun, supra note 1, at 776 (noting the opposition from the academic
community to the proposed elimination of the judiciary’s ability to create new
privileges).
119. See, e.g., Broun, supra note 1, at 774 (discussing such criticisms of Article V,
including Former Justice Goldberg’s criticism that the privilege rules were rulemaking incursions into substantive matters); Committee on Federal Courts, supra note
10, at 150-52 (discussing the pervasive effect of privilege rules on the substantive
behavior of citizens); Arthur J. Goldberg, The Supreme Court, Congress, and Rules of
Evidence, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 667, 681-84 (1974) (arguing against Article V because
of its implications for substantive rights); see also Paul Carrington, Learning from the
Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295, 299-300 (1994) (stating
that, at the time Congress considered the proposed rules, there were concerns about
the displacement of state privilege rules, which were “too substantive” in nature);
Jack B. Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 370-73 (1969) (discussing the independent
substantive impact of privilege rules and arguing that state privilege rules therefore
should apply in cases predicated on state substantive law).
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120

and the Supreme Court’s contrary view,
Article V’s critics
contended that evidentiary privileges reflected substantive policy
121
judgments regarding and regulating certain relationships.
Therefore, the argument continued, unlike other types of evidentiary
rules designed merely to facilitate reliability in the fact-finding
process, the proposed Article V rules could not be viewed as
122
procedural in nature.
Thus, according to the critics, evidentiary
privileges were not appropriate subjects for judicial rule making
under the Rules Enabling Act because judicially-crafted rules may not
123
“abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.” Moreover,
124
contrary to the views of the Advisory Committee, the rules’ critics
believed that because the proposed privileges would have applied
even in diversity cases and other cases in which state law supplied the
rules of decision in federal court, they would offend the principles
120. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-74 (1965) (holding that Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and its progeny do not preclude application of a
federal rule that was promulgated by Congress in accordance with its constitutional
mandate to create rules governing the practice of federal courts); see also Goldberg,
supra note 119, at 678-84 (describing the viewpoint of the Supreme Court and the
Advisory Committee).
121. See sources cited supra note 119.
122. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 6-7 (noting the controversy surrounding the
codification of privilege as superceding substantive state law); MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 175, at 263 (stating that privilege law seeks to
implement policies which are wholly extrinsic both to the litigation and the factascertaining policy underlying most evidence law). Former Supreme Court Justice
Goldberg opposed Article V because of the substantive nature of privilege rules,
stating that the rules of privilege represent “real changes in the substantive rights
and duties of persons throughout the country.” Goldberg, supra note 119, at 669.
123. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970), repealed by Judicial Improvements and Access to
Justice Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1994); Committee on Federal Courts, supra note
10, at 151-52; see also S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 8 (describing concerns about the
substantive nature of privilege protections and indicating that some commentators
believed that the law of privilege should be a subject for the legislative rather than
rule-making process). Former Justice Goldberg best summarized these reasons for
opposition to the privilege rules:
The reason rules of privilege are substantive for both the Rules Enabling Act
and the Erie doctrine is that they are designed to protect independent
substantive interests that the state has regarded as more significant than the
free flow of information. Thus, their intrinsic objective is to protect
communications that the state deems inviolate.
The substantive nature of rules of privilege can be more clearly seen when
contrasted with other rules of evidence. Most evidentiary rules, including
the admission and exclusion of evidence, examination of witnesses, judicial
notice, competency of witnesses and relevance, are designed to facilitate the
fact-finding process. Rules of privilege, however, do not help elicit the truth.
Rather, they impede the truth-seeking process in order to serve extrinsic
social policies.
Goldberg, supra note 119, at 682-84.
124. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 169, at 216 (summarizing the
Advisory Committee’s view that privileges were appropriate subjects of rule making
by the Supreme Court, and that the Erie doctrine did not prevent such rule making).

GLYNN.PRINTER.DOC

90

12/4/2002 1:29 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
125

[Vol. 52:59
126

embodied in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins and federalist values.
Congress ultimately decided that, if codified privilege rules were to
be adopted for the federal courts, it, rather than the judiciary, should
127
adopt them.
Nevertheless, Congress chose not to replace the
proposed privilege rules. Rather, Congress opted to enact new
Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which provides as follows:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof
shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State
law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be
determined in accordance with State law.128

The legislative history of Rule 501 makes clear that Congress’s
rejection of Article V did not constitute a disapproval of specific
129
privileges. Rather, Congress left federal privilege law where it had
found it.

125. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
126. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 6 (noting congressional dissatisfaction with
the policy of the Court’s rule because it contravened the result many legal scholars
deemed mandated by Erie in which the Court required application of state
procedural law in civil actions where the underlying issues were governed by
substantive state law); Broun, supra note 1, at 775 (expressing displeasure at the
proposed codification of federal privilege law that would ignore state privilege law,
particularly in diversity cases); Committee on Federal Courts, supra note 10, at 151
(noting critics’ contention that federalist principles underlying the Erie doctrine
supported the continued application of state privilege rules); Note, Development in the
Law—Privileged Communication: I. Introduction: The Development of Evidentiary Privileges
in American Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1467 (1985) (discussing how Erie objections
and federalist values supported application of state privilege law in diversity cases).
See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, §§ 169, 175 (explaining in detail
why privilege law implicates the Erie doctrine and discussing Congress’s concerns
with regard to Erie). In 1969, Judge Weinstein wrote that Congress should consider
limiting privilege rules to federal question cases precisely for this reason. Weinstein,
supra note 119, at 373-74. He discussed different treatment for privileges because
privilege rules are designed to make an “independent substantive impact.” Id. at 370.
127. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 169, at 213-20 (discussing the
legislative history of the privilege rules). Indeed, the original Federal Rules of
Evidence were statutory. See S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 5 (stating that Congress delayed
the effective date of the evidence rules so that it had time to review them in detail).
128. FED. R. EVID. 501.
129. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 169, at 215; see also S. REP. NO. 931277, at 6-10 (continuing to recognize the existence of privileges despite controversy
as to their scope).
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Rule 501 embodies two congressional choices that have
significantly affected the application and development of the law of
privilege in federal courts. First, Congress decided that state law
governing privileges should continue to apply in civil cases in federal
130
court in which state law supplies the rules of decision. Thus, there
is not a single law of privilege that governs civil cases in federal court:
federal privilege law governs federal question cases and, as later
clarified by the courts, cases with federal and state claims, while state
131
privilege law governs in diversity cases.
Second, Congress left
formulation of federal privilege rules in the hands of the courts,
stating that privileges shall continue to be governed by the common
132
law.
Unlike virtually all other areas of federal evidence law,
privileges—their recognition, limitations, and application—would
continue to evolve through the common-law process. How much
freedom federal courts should exercise in recognizing new and
133
modifying established privileges remains unresolved.
Arguably, Congress’s decision to enact Rule 501 rather than
specific privilege rules also has had a profound effect on the
development of privilege law in the states. Since Congress enacted
the Federal Rules of Evidence, state evidentiary law has become far
134
Yet,
more uniform, as many states have followed the federal lead.
because Congress chose not to codify rules governing the attorneyclient and other privileges, there has been no clear federal model for
the states to follow. Some states have adopted the original or revised
135
versions of Uniform Rule of Evidence 502, which governs the
136
However, few of these jurisdictions have
attorney-client privilege.
130. FED. R. EVID. 501.
131. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 177, at 280-81 (discussing postRule 501 authority asserting that federal privilege doctrine governs when there are
federal and state claims in a single action).
132. FED. R. EVID. 501.
133. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressed its reluctance to recognize new
privileges. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (stating that although it
has the authority to develop new rules of privilege, it is not inclined to exercise this
authority expansively). But see Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996) (recognizing
the psychotherapist-patient privilege).
134. See Broun, supra note 1, at 789-90 (stating that, since the Federal Rules of
Evidence were enacted, thirty-nine states have adopted evidence rules based on
them); Berger, supra note 1, at 256 (discussing the trend toward codification
following adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
135. UNIF. R. EVID. 502; see supra note 19 (setting forth Rule 502).
136. Uniform Rule 502 was originally based on the attorney-client privilege rule
proposed to Congress, but was subsequently amended in 1986 and 1999. UNIF. R.
EVID. 502 (amended 1986 & 1999), 13A U.L.A. 150-59 (2000 & Supp. 2002);
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 75, at 313; Broun, supra note 1, at 799
n.191. Sixteen states and Puerto Rico have adopted all or part of Original Uniform
Rule 502, UNIF. R. EVID. 502 (1974), and seven states have adopted all or part of
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adopted either version of Uniform Rule 502 in its entirety.
Many
others have maintained their own statutory or common-law privilege
138
While various jurisdictions have borrowed from the
regimes.
federal common law in interpreting their privilege rules, there is less
uniformity in the attorney-client privilege area than in most other
139
areas of evidence law.
Thus, Congress’s decision not to act
affirmatively in the privilege area has affected the development of
140
privilege law across jurisdictions.
After the original Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted,
Congress amended the Rules Enabling Act to provide for future
141
changes to these rules through the rule-making process.
Interestingly, however, Congress expressly exempted privileges,
stating that any rule “creating, abolishing, or modifying an
evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by

Revised Uniform Rule 502, REV. UNIF. R. EVID. 502 (amended 1986).
137. For example, only six states that have adopted Original Uniform Rule 502,
UNIF. R. EVID. 502 (1974), also have adopted the rule’s definition of “representative
of the client.” Action in Adopting Jurisdiction, 13A U.L.A. 150-59 (2000)
(identifying Alaska, Arkansas, Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and
Oklahoma). Other states either omit the definition or have modified it. Id.
(reporting Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska,
North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming omit the definition, while
Idaho, Mississippi, and Oregon have modified the definition). Similarly, among the
states that have adopted Revised Uniform Rule 502, REV. UNIF. R. EVID. 502
(amended 1986), only Texas has adopted verbatim the rule’s definition of
“representative of the client.” Id.
138. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 75, at 313. New York, for example,
has resisted adopting a general code of evidence for more than 100 years. Broun,
supra note 1, at 801. Instead, New York has a statute that recognizes the privilege,
but the statute provides no details on elements, limitations, or application. N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 4503 (Consol. 2002). Also following its own path, the New Mexico Supreme
Court, which has promulgated a modified version of Original Uniform Rule 502,
UNIF. R. EVID. 502 (1974), has declared that legislatively-enacted privileges are invalid
under the New Mexico Constitution. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 551 P.2d
1354, 1357 (N.M. 1976).
139. See supra notes 1, 134 and accompanying text.
140. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 76, at 313-14.
[T]he failure of Congress to enact specific rules of privilege for the federal
courts effectively precluded any immediate prospect of substantial national
uniformity in this area. It is arguable that, in light of the strength and
contrariety of views which the subject generates, hope for such consensus was
never realistic. In any event, the present form of Federal Rule of Evidence 501
perpetuates a fluid situation in the federal law of privilege and affords the states
little inducement to adopt identical or similar schemes of privilege. The
variegated pattern of privilege in both federal and state courts, described below,
thus seems likely to remain the case for the foreseeable future.
Id.
141. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072(a) (1994) (providing a procedure for delivering proposed rules for
congressional consideration).
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142

Act of Congress.”
This exception for privileges reflects Congress’s
continuing view that any codification of evidentiary privileges is
Congress’s own prerogative rather than that of the Supreme Court.
Ironically, as a result, the actual development of federal privilege
doctrine is left to the common law, which resides in the hands of the
143
Supreme Court and lower federal courts.
B. Conflicts and Confusion in Attorney-Client Privilege Law
In the quarter century since Rule 501 was enacted, Congress has
addressed or referenced the attorney-client privilege—or privileges
144
more generally—only in a few specific contexts. Congress has made
no attempt to codify a law of attorney-client privilege, either
preemptively or for the federal courts. A lack of attention on the part
of both Congress and the Supreme Court has left unaddressed widely
diverging applications of the law of privilege and resultant substantial
uncertainty. At the most general, doctrinal level, there is much
consensus among federal and state courts with regard to the attorney145
client privilege.
For example, all jurisdictions—whether they have
adopted one of the versions of Uniform Rule of Evidence 502 or
not—cling to the same basic elements, recognize the crime-fraud
exception, require the person asserting privilege to demonstrate its
application, and adhere to some form of the subject matter waiver
146
doctrine.
Not far below this superficial level of agreement,
142. Id. § 2074(b).
143. Cf. Berger, supra note 1, at 276.
If the limitation on rule-making rests on a separation of power rationale as
well as the perception that privileges affect primary conduct and should be
subjected to empirical fact-finding and legislative accountability, then
Congress’ action in passing [this limitation] and approving the formulation
in Rule 501 is tantamount to locking the barn after first having arranged to
turn over the key to a horse thief.
Id.
144. See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1806(a)
(2001 & Supp. 2002) (stating that the communications otherwise privileged do not
lose their privileged character simply because they are subject to electronic
surveillance pursuant to or in violation of the restrictions on such surveillance
contained in the act); I.R.C. § 7525(a)(1) (2002) (extending attorney-client privilege
protections to communications between taxpayers and federally authorized tax
practitioners); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4)
(2000) (ensuring protection of intercepted but otherwise privileged wire, oral, or
electronic communications).
145. According to one leading treatise, the statement of the scope of the privilege
contained in Revised Uniform Rule of Evidence 502 (1986), see supra note 19, is now
generally accepted. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 87, at 347.
146. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 87, at 368-69, 380-81 (stating
that it is well-settled both that the privilege belongs to the client and that the
privilege does not protect communications made in furtherance of a crime or fraud);
GERGACZ, supra note 12, § 5.16 (noting wide acceptance of subject matter waiver
rules).
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however, looms an extraordinary amount of inter-jurisdictional
conflict and intra-jurisdictional confusion. Indeed, given the current
state of privilege law, application of the privilege in any given case is
likely to be ad hoc. An examination of developments in the federal
and state courts since 1975 reveals this stark reality.
1.

The lack of Supreme Court leadership
As the final and only national arbiter of federal common law, the
Supreme Court holds the potential for clarifying the law of privilege
in federal criminal cases and civil cases involving federal questions.
Yet the Supreme Court has shown little interest in the attorney-client
or other privileges. Prior to 1975, the Court rarely addressed the
privilege: in a smattering of decisions, the Court recognized the
existence of the privilege, its purpose, and occasionally addressed
147
Since 1975, when
some more specific aspects of its contours.
Congress expressly directed the courts to continue to develop the
common law of privilege, the Supreme Court has confronted
testimonial privilege questions only a few times, and the attorneyclient privilege even fewer; indeed, the Court has directly addressed
attorney-client privilege issues only five times in the last quarter
148
century.
149
In Fisher v. United States, the Court’s first post-Rule 501 decision
discussing the attorney-client privilege, the Court addressed only the
narrow issue of when papers in the possession of the client’s attorney
150
are obtainable by a summons directed to the attorney. The Court
held that the summons was enforceable against the attorney only if
the papers in question were obtainable by summons from the
151
152
client. Given that the papers were not otherwise privileged, the
Court did not address other aspects of attorney-client privilege
doctrine.
The Court’s most important and controversial discussion of the
attorney-client privilege followed Fisher. In Upjohn Co. v. United
153
States, the Court held that the attorney-client privilege protects
confidential communications between a corporation and its counsel,
although it recognized that the artificial nature of the corporate
147. See generally Brian Sheppard, Jr., Annotation, Views of United States Supreme
Court as to Attorney-Client Privilege, 159 A.L.R. FED. 243 (2000) (discussing the Court’s
less than comprehensive treatment of the attorney-client privilege).
148. See infra notes 149-86 and accompanying text.
149. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
150. Id. at 404-05.
151. Id. at 405.
152. Id. at 414.
153. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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entity creates complications.
Specifically, the Court addressed
whether communications to Upjohn’s corporate counsel by
corporate employees outside the corporation’s “control group” may
155
be privileged.
The Court held in the affirmative, rejecting the
position taken by the court below that the privilege applies only to
communications to counsel by employees in a position to control, or
take a substantial part in, a decision that the corporation may make
156
on the advice of counsel. Thus, the Court found that the privilege
applies to communications from mid-level and even lower-level
157
employees to counsel.
In rejecting the “control group” approach, the Court reasoned that
the test overlooks the fact that lower level employees can, by their
actions within the scope of their employment, embroil the
158
corporation in serious legal difficulties. The Court also noted that
the control group test frustrates the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant information
by employees to corporate counsel seeking to render legal advice to
159
the corporate client.
Moreover, the Court stated that the narrow
approach threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel
160
to ensure the client’s compliance with the law.
Finally, the Court
161
rejected the control group test as difficult to apply in practice.
Indeed, the Court emphasized the need for a test that provides some
level of predictability, declaring that an uncertain privilege “is little
162
better than no privilege at all.”
Based on this reasoning, the Court held that the employee
communications at issue were privileged because they were made to
corporate counsel at the direction of the employees’ superiors in
order to secure legal advice, the communications concerned matters
within the scope of the employees’ corporate duties, and the
employees were aware that they were being questioned so that the
163
corporation could obtain legal advice.
Nevertheless, despite
emphasizing the need for certainty, the Court refused to articulate a
general rule for determining which employee communications to

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 389-90.
Id. at 390.
Id.
Id. at 391.
Id.
Id. at 392.
Id.
Id. at 393.
Id.
Id. at 394.
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164

corporate counsel are privileged. Thus, although the Court clearly
indicated that the control group test is too narrow, it did not offer an
alternative analytical approach. As discussed in more detail below,
Upjohn has failed to end the confusion regarding the application of
the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context, nor has the
165
decision gained universal adherence in state courts.
166
Five years later, in Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub,
the Court again confronted the privilege in the corporate setting, this
167
time in the context of a bankrupt corporation. Rather than address
the scope of protection, the Court tackled the issue of who is entitled
168
to assert and then waive the privilege on behalf of the corporation.
For solvent corporations, the power to waive the privilege on behalf
of the entity rests with the corporation’s management, usually its
169
officers and directors.
When control of the corporation passes to
new management, this authority to waive the privilege passes along
170
with it.
The Court held that this principle applies when a
corporation enters bankruptcy: the bankruptcy trustee assumes the
powers of the previous management and therefore gains the
171
authority to waive the entity’s privilege.
Weintraub, however,
provided no additional guidance on when the corporate privilege
attaches in the first place, or who has the authority to assert or waive
the privilege in other contexts.
172
In its 1989 decision in United States v. Zolin, the Supreme Court
discussed the evidentiary and procedural requirements for
establishing the applicability of the crime-fraud exception to the
173
attorney-client privilege.
The crime-fraud exception prevents
clients from using the privilege to shield from disclosure otherwise
privileged communications when those communications are made
for the purpose of furthering or facilitating the commission of a
174
fraud or crime.
The Court first stated that trial courts may test a
proponent’s claims of privilege through an in camera review of the
164. See id. at 396 (declining to comment on a broader rule because the Court
only decides issues before it and because the attorney-client privilege is best left to a
case-by-case review).
165. See infra notes 217-23 and accompanying text.
166. 471 U.S. 343 (1985).
167. Id. at 345.
168. Id. at 348.
169. Id. at 348-49.
170. Id. at 349.
171. Id. at 353.
172. 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
173. Id. at 565-72.
174. Id. at 562-63. The Court had first recognized the crime-fraud exception in
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933).
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allegedly privileged documents.
Turning to the crime-fraud
exception specifically, the Court held that a court should engage in
an in camera review of the allegedly privileged communications only
if the party opposing the privilege on the crime-fraud ground
demonstrates a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief
by a reasonable person that an in camera review may reveal evidence
176
that the exception applies.
Finally, the Court held that the
threshold showing to obtain an in camera review may be satisfied by
using any relevant evidence that a court has not adjudicated to be
177
privileged.
The Court’s discussion in Zolin provides some guidance to lower
federal courts confronting opposition to claims of privilege based on
the crime-fraud exception. Like Upjohn, however, Zolin left many
questions unanswered. For example, the Court specifically stated
that it would not decide questions relating to the quantum of proof
178
necessary to establish applicability of the crime-fraud exception.
179
Moreover, as discussed below, Zolin offered no guidance on what
constitutes a communication made for the purpose of furthering a
180
fraud.
181
Finally, in Swidler & Berlin v. United States, the Court recently
resolved the narrow but ongoing dispute over whether the privilege
182
survives the death of the client. The Court held that the privilege
does survive the client’s death, concluding that survival is the better
rule after surveying various authorities and emphasizing, as it did in
183
Upjohn, the need for certainty in privilege protections.
Thus, since Rule 501 was enacted, the Court has rarely addressed
the privilege. When it has, it either has addressed a relatively narrow
184
185
question or has taken on larger doctrinal issues with little in the
175. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 556-57.
176. Id. at 572.
177. Id. at 575.
178. Id. at 563 & n.7 (noting that the question presented for review was narrow,
and thus, the case was “not the proper occasion to visit” the question of evidentiary
threshold).
179. Infra Part I.B.2.b.
180. See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 563-64 (focusing instead on the type of evidence that
can be used to prove such an accusation).
181. 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
182. See id. at 402 (applying the privilege to communications between White
House Counsel Vincent Foster and his attorney nine days before Foster committed
suicide).
183. See id. at 407-09 (noting that a client might fear posthumous disclosure just as
much as disclosure during the client’s lifetime). Most notably, the Court rejected the
invitation to allow federal courts to balance ex post the purposes against the need for
access to the communications in criminal matters. See id. at 409 (noting that such
balancing would introduce substantial uncertainty into the privilege’s application).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 178-80 (discussing the Court’s decision in
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way of detail or guidance for lower federal courts. The Supreme
Court’s inattention to the privilege doctrine is particularly ironic,
since, as previously discussed, the Court has reiterated several times—
in Upjohn, Jaffee, and Swidler & Berlin—that certainty is necessary to
186
foster the aims of the privilege.
2.

Intra- and inter-jurisdictional conflicts and confusion
Intra- and inter-jurisdictional conflicts and confusion in the law of
the attorney-client privilege are rampant. Indeed, it would be
impossible to discuss all of the ways in which privilege law is
unresolved or disputed in the courts. However, by focusing on a few
areas of ambiguity and disagreement, I hope to demonstrate the
depth and scope of the problem. The areas of confusion and dispute
fall into three general categories: (1) the basic elements of the
187
188
privilege; (2) the crime-fraud exception; and (3) the ways in
which the privilege protections may be waived, abandoned, or
189
ignored.
Although most of the discussion focuses on inter-jurisdictional
conflicts, many jurisdictions have not resolved these issues
190
internally.
Indeed, the foregoing review of the Supreme Court’s
privilege decisions shows how few issues have been resolved
191
More generally, these issues
definitively in the federal system.
receive limited appellate attention because privilege determinations
usually occur at the discovery stage of litigation, and hence are
192
interlocutory.
Thus, in most federal circuits and most state court
Zolin).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 181-83 (discussing the Court’s decision in
Swidler).
186. See supra notes 66, 183 and accompanying text.
187. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
188. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
189. See infra Part II.B.2.c.
190. See infra Part II.B.2.a-c. In addition, although many of the cases cited are
federal cases (because federal district court opinions are more likely to be published
than decisions from lower state courts), those in which jurisdiction is based solely on
diversity jurisdiction apply state privilege law. 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4512 (2d ed. 1987).
191. See supra Part II.B.1. Many jurisdictions, moreover, have not resolved
definitively the scope of the corporate privilege. See infra notes 217-23 and
accompanying text. A brief review of the various and conflicting approaches of
Pennsylvania state and federal courts cited below provides some indication of how
unclear the privilege is within specific jurisdictions. See infra notes 199-200 and
accompanying text.
192. Indeed, given that privilege is a defense to discovery and not just
admissibility, privilege determinations often occur even earlier in the litigation than
many other evidence determinations. The major exception is the subpoena
enforcement action, in which the entire controversy involves whether to compel
disclosure. See generally 9 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 45.04
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systems, privilege determinations are rarely subject to immediate
193
In addition, unless privilege decisions are appealed
appeal.
immediately, they are likely to evade appellate review because most
cases are resolved before final judgment, and if not, some privilege
194
issues may be mooted once “the cat is out of the bag.” Definitive
appellate resolution of lingering controversies, therefore, is often
195
elusive.
a.

The elements of the privilege

As most commonly articulated, the attorney-client privilege
protects confidential communications between the client and
attorney made for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal
196
advice.
Although this statement appears straightforward, each
(3d ed. 1999) (discussing procedures and standards for receiving and complying
with subpoenas).
193. In the federal courts and most state court systems, an order or other action of
the trial court is not appealable unless it satisfies the “final judgment rule,” or one of
its narrow exceptions. See generally Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion:
Discretionary Review of Interlocutory Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 182-202 (2001)
(discussing the final judgment rule and its various, narrow exceptions). Virtually all
of the federal system privilege determinations made during discovery are appealable
only in extremely rare circumstances: (1) when the district court certifies the
question for immediate review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and the circuit court
accepts such review; (2) when the circuit court grants a of mandamus; or (3)
pursuant to the doctrine in Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918), when the party
seeking to prevent discovery is a third-party intervener. See Glynn, supra, at 192-202
(discussing the various exceptions to the final judgment rule). The Third Circuit has
held that orders denying protection for allegedly privileged communications are
appealable as a matter of right under the collateral order doctrine. See Bacher v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 211 F.3d 52, 53-55 (3d Cir. 2000) (reaffirming In re Ford Motor Co.,
110 F.3d 954, 957-64 (3d Cir. 1997)). However, other circuits have expressly rejected
this extension of the doctrine, and the remaining circuits and the Supreme Court
are not likely to adopt the Third Circuit’s view. See Glynn, supra, at 215-16 & n.154
(citing cases and discussing the Third Circuit view). The only other avenue to
immediate appeal as a matter of right is for the person (party or nonparty) resisting
discovery to refuse to abide by an order to compel and subject himself or herself to
contempt. Id. at 190 n.55. As a practical matter, however, few persons are willing to
subject themselves to contempt and its corresponding risks.
194. See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d at 963 (stating that, even if an
appellate court decides to “send the case back for re-trial without use of the
protected materials,” that would not be enough to remedy a breach of
confidentiality); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Turner & Newall, P.L.C., 964 F.2d
159, 164-65 (2d Cir. 1992) (granting mandamus review to address concerns about
application of the privilege by lower courts in part because few privilege decisions are
reversed on appeal and, in the particular case, the benefit of confidentiality would be
lost but for an immediate appeal); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 825 F.2d 231,
234 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding privilege issues were moot after disclosure of those
materials to a grand jury because “the cat has been out of the bag” and there was no
effective relief the appellate court could grant).
195. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 72, at 633-40, 645-46 (discussing jurisdictions in
which the scope of the corporate privilege has not been definitively resolved).
196. E.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE
UNDER THE RULES § 5.13 (2d ed. 1999); see also supra notes 134-39 and accompanying
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element continues to produce controversy.
The modern trend is toward a privilege covering all confidential
197
Some courts,
communications between the attorney and client.
however, continue to insist that the privilege does not apply to
communications from the attorney to the client, except to the extent
198
that those communications would reveal confidences of the client.
For example, seeking to apply Pennsylvania privilege law, a federal
district court in the Third Circuit recently adopted the narrower view,
199
rejecting a contrary view contained in dicta from the Third Circuit.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, like many others, has yet to resolve
200
this issue. Other courts have limited the privilege to attorney
text (noting variety among states of versions of the privilege).
197. See, e.g., Byrd v. State, 929 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Ark. 1996) (stating that the
attorney-client privilege extends to statements made by the attorney and the client,
and includes “self-initiated attorney communications intended to keep the client
posted on legal developments and implications”) (quoting Jack Winter, Inc. v.
Koratron Co., 54 F.R.D. 44, 46 (N.D. Cal. 1971)); Titmas v. Superior Court, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 803, 808 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“The attorney-client privilege covers all forms
of communication, including transactional advice and advice in anticipation of
threatened litigation . . . .”); Spectrum Sys. Int’l Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 581 N.E.2d
1055, 1060 (N.Y. 1991) (stating that “the privilege is not narrowly confined to the
repetition of confidences that were supplied to the lawyer by the client.”); Harris v.
State, 56 S.W.3d 52, 60 (Tex. App. 2001) (explaining that the statements and advice
that an attorney gives to the client are just as protected as the statements that the
client makes to the attorney); State ex rel. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Canady,
460 S.E.2d 677, 687 n.13 (W. Va. 1995) (stating that it is irrelevant whether the
attorney or client made the communication, or whether the communication was
written or oral); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 185, at 323-24 (stating that
some courts extend the privilege to legal advice given by the attorney, regardless of
whether it would reveal a confidential client communication, and noting the trend
among courts to recognize that the privilege is “a two-way privilege covering all
confidential communications between the attorney and the client in the course of
legal representation”); see also Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: Continuing
Confusion About Attorney Communications, Drafts, Pre-Existing Documents, and the Source of
the Facts Communicated, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 967, 973-79 (1999) [hereinafter Rice,
Continuing Confusion] (discussing the trend more generally, and criticizing courts for
extending the privilege beyond its traditional boundaries).
198. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. UCB Films P.L.C., No. 95C 6351, 1998 WL
703647, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1998) (holding that communications from an
attorney to a client are privileged if the statements would reveal the essence of
confidential communications by the client); Fed. Elec. Comm’n v. Christian
Coalition, 178 F.R.D. 61, 66 (E.D. Va. 1998) (stating that the privilege extends to
attorney communications to the client if those communications reveal client
confidences); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 185, at 323 (discussing similar
cases); Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra note 197, at 973-79 (discussing additional
similar cases).
199. See Coregis Ins. Co. v. Law Offices of Carole F. Kafrissen, P.C., 186 F. Supp. 2d
567, 574 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (rejecting the more lenient approach adopted in dicta by
the Third Circuit in In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 965 n.9 (3d Cir. 1997)); see
also Garvey v. Nat’l Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 167 F.R.D. 391, 395 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(finding that a communication from an attorney must be based on confidential
information received from the client in order to be privileged).
200. Compare, e.g., Nelson v. Himes, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 748, 749 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.
1973) (stating that the privilege only attaches to a client’s communications to an
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communications that reveal client confidences or responsive legal
201
Thus, there are lingering doubts over the fundamental
advice.
question of whether and when communications from an attorney to a
client that do not reveal client confidences are privileged. This is no
small matter, particularly in ongoing attorney-client relationships in
which attorneys often give legal advice that cannot be traced to
specific client requests or communications.
In addition, there is an enormous amount of confusion over when
202
communications satisfy the confidentiality requirement.
Generally
speaking, courts require privilege claimants to demonstrate that
203
confidentiality was anticipated, accomplished, and preserved.
The
significant uncertainties surrounding preservation of confidentiality
204
are addressed below in the discussion of various waiver doctrines.
Whether the privilege initially attaches, however, depends on
whether the client intended to keep the communication confidential
205
and took steps to maintain such confidentiality.
There is much
attorney), with Northampton Borough Mun. Auth. v. Remsco Ass’n, 22 Pa. D. & C.3d
541, 550 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1981) (privilege attaches to an attorney’s communications
only “where the very purpose of the privilege would be contravened by disclosure”),
and City of Shamokin v. W. End Nat’l Bank, 22 Pa. D. & C.3d 232, 234 (Pa. Ct. Com.
Pl. 1982) (stating that it has always been assumed that the privilege attaches to
attorneys’ communications, to the extent they are based on confidential facts
provided by the client). Pennsylvania’s Superior and Supreme Courts have provided
no recent guidance to resolve this disparity. See also S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Deason,
632 So. 2d 1377, 1382 (Fla. 1994) (noting an unresolved divergence of views between
the “narrow view” and the “broad view” of attorney-client privilege).
201. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 68 F.3d 193, 197 (7th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the privilege applies only to legal advice and does not apply more
generally to attorney communications with the client that do not reveal client
confidences); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. United States Dep’t of the Air Force, 566 F.2d
242, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that the federal courts do not extend the attorneyclient privilege to attorney communications except when based on confidential
information of the client); Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equip. Corp., 757 A.2d 14,
18-19 (Conn. 2000) (holding that a communication from an attorney to a client on a
matter of fact is not privileged “unless it were shown to be inextricably linked to the
giving of legal advice”) (quoting Ullmann v. State, 647 A.2d 324, 332 (Conn. 1994));
see also Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra note 197, at 975-76 & n.30 (discussing
additional cases with similar holdings).
202. See infra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
203. See Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Indirect Recognition of Limited
Waiver, ACCA DOCKET (Apr. 2000), at http://www.acprivilege.com/articles/
docket7.html (arguing that the requirement of confidentiality imposes heavy costs
on the litigation process). In another article, Professor Rice argues that there is little
logic in the courts’ requirement that attorney-client communications remain secret
in order to preserve the privilege. Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding
Concept of Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L. REV. 853, 856-57 (1998)
[hereinafter Rice, Eroding Confidentiality].
204. See infra Part II.B.2.c.
205. See, e.g., Sherry L. Talton, Mapping the Information Superhighway: Electronic Mail
and the Inadvertent Disclosure of Confidential Information, 20 REV. LITIG. 271, 288-89
(2000) (noting the courts typically focus on such efforts, as well as the parties’
reasonable expectations of privacy).
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disagreement over what this actually means.
For example, courts have not agreed on the privileged status of
drafts of documents that the client submits to an attorney for legal
advice but ultimately intends to disclose to the public or third
206
parties.
Some courts have suggested that the client’s intent to
disclose some version of the content of the draft means that the
207
privilege never attaches. Other courts have held that those portions
of the draft that do not appear in the final, published version are
208
Still other courts disagree, treating the entire draft—
privileged.
including portions that ultimately appear in the final version—as a
confidential communication between an attorney and client that was
209
never intended to be published.
The implications of this
206. Compare, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d 342, 354-55 (4th Cir.
1994) (holding that, where a client retains an attorney for the purpose of advice on
publication, drafts are not privileged), with State ex rel. Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan
& Arnoff, L.L.P. v. City of Rossford, 746 N.E.2d 1139, 1144-45 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000)
(holding information appearing in draft bond documents privileged, except that
information which was later released to the public).
207. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1358 (4th Cir. 1984)
(finding irrelevant the fact that no prospectus was ever actually issued, because the
information given to the attorney was to assist in preparing the prospectus for public
circulation); Heidelberg Harris, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., No. 95-C-0673, 1996
WL 732522, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 1996) (holding that the privilege does not protect
the draft of a contract where no attorneys were involved in the communication);
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 143 F.R.D. 611, 618 (E.D.N.C. 1992)
(holding that draft patent applications are not privileged); see also Abramian v.
President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., No. 93-5968-C, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 598, at
*9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 29, 2001) (holding attorney-client privilege inapplicable to
draft versions of a report that Harvard intended to release to the public); Gordon v.
Newspaper Ass’n of Am., No. LF-768-3, 2000 WL 14693, at *7 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 5,
2000) (ordering the production of all preliminary drafts and communications
“necessary to the preparation” of a non-privileged letter), vacated in part on other
grounds, No. LF-768-3, 2000 WL 140602, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 4, 2000); Rice,
Continuing Confusion, supra note 197, at 999-1000 (citing additional cases).
208. See, e.g., In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1987) (concluding that the
privilege is not waived for communications not disclosed in the final draft); Brossard
v. Univ. of Mass., No. 961036, 1998 WL 1184124, at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 29,
1998) (finding drafts privileged, but ordering the production of “segregable portions
of drafts which are identical to the final versions of the same documents” that were
previously released); State ex rel. Benesch, 746 N.E.2d at 1144-45 (holding information
appearing in draft bond documents privileged, except that information which was
later released to the public). Several courts have followed the approach taken in von
Bulow. See Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra note 197, at 1003-05 (discussing von
Bulow and its progeny).
209. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1037 (2d
Cir. 1984) (reasoning that the confidentiality of drafts is not waived when the client
sends the final document to another party because the client intended to maintain
confidentiality of drafts in sharing them with attorneys); In re Kidder Peabody Sec.
Litig., 168 F.R.D. 459, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that a client may intend to
permit the release of the final version of a document without waiving the right to
keep confidential all communications with the attorney prior to the finalization of
the document); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94-C-897,
1995 WL 557412, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 1995) (concluding that an attorney’s drafts
of documents are privileged if they are created as part of confidential
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disagreement are enormous given the number and variety of
documents—prospectuses, press releases, contracts, product
instructions, warnings, and advertisements—clients have attorneys
210
review prior to disclosure.
Similarly, some courts have held that oral or written
communications from an attorney or client are not privileged if the
211
underlying information communicated is not confidential.
Other
courts have disagreed, adopting the traditional and better view that
the privilege protects confidential communications, even if the public
or third parties know some of the underlying information conveyed
212
in those communications.
Like the confusion over drafts, this
communications concerning legal advice); Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equip.
Corp., 757 A.2d 14, 26 (Conn. 2000) (finding a preliminary draft of environmental
report to be submitted to state was protected by the attorney-client privilege because
consultant’s engagement letter contemplated strict confidentiality); Tompkins Indus.
v. Warren Tech., Inc., 768 So. 2d 1125, 1125-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (finding
that a draft letter that the plaintiff sent to counsel for advice before sending it to the
defendant was covered by the attorney-client privilege); Kobluk v. Univ. of Minn.,
574 N.W.2d 436, 443 (Minn. 1998) (holding that certain communications can
remain confidential even if the facts communicated are later disclosed); Va. Elec. &
Power Co. v. Westmoreland-LG & E Partners, 526 S.E.2d 750, 755 (Va. 2000)
(concluding privilege attached to a draft letter sent to counsel for legal advice on
whether it should be mailed); see also Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra note 197, at
1003-04 (arguing that written drafts should be afforded the same protections as the
oral communications in von Bulow).
210. See, e.g., Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra note 197, at 1001 (“To conclude
that the disclosure of an attorney’s final written product, after a series of exchanges
with the client, results in the loss of all privilege claims for all prior exchanges would
destroy the privilege protection in a large percentage of instances where legal
assistance is rendered.”).
211. See, e.g., Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 618-19 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (denying
attorney-client protection to portions of letters from the IRS Office of Chief Counsel
to field personnel because the letters contained legal conclusions based on
information gathered from taxpayers); United States v. Billmyer, 57 F.3d 31, 37-38
(1st Cir. 1995) (holding that the privilege does not attach to facts communicated
from an attorney to a client where the client—a criminal defendant—chose to make
this same information available to the government prosecutor); Burke v. Tenn.
Walking Horse Breeders’ & Exhibitors Assoc., App. No. 01A01-9611-CH-00511, 1997
Tenn. App. LEXIS 378, at *29 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 1997) (“The privilege applies
only to the extent that the attorney’s communications to a client were specifically
based upon a client’s confidential communication or would otherwise, if disclosed,
directly or indirectly reveal the substance or tenor of a confidential
communication.”); see also Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra note 197, at 979-82
(discussing decisions in which courts have (erroneously) found that communications
are not privileged because of the public nature of the facts contained within the
communications).
212. See, e.g., Montgomery County v. Microvote Corp., 175 F.3d 296, 303-04 (3d
Cir. 1999) (holding that documents containing attorney-client communications are
privileged even though attorney and client thought processes and findings were
known to third parties); Ippoliti v. Town of Ridgefield, No. CV 990337600S, 2000
Conn. Super. LEXIS 2020, at *13-14 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2000) (stating that a
communication from attorney to client solely regarding a matter of fact may be
privileged only if it is “inextricably linked” to rendering legal advice); A.W.
Chesterton Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 96-4871, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 16, at *4-5
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dispute has implications for an enormous number of attorney-client
communications.
It is often unclear how far the circle of confidentiality extends and
how guarded the attorney and client must be with their
communications. For example, some courts have held that attorneyclient communications are not confidential if persons other than the
attorney and client—including agents, close advisors, or relatives—
are present, unless these persons are indispensable or otherwise
213
necessary to facilitate the communications. Other courts have been
214
less restrictive.
Moreover, largely because the scope of the
corporate privilege remains unresolved, as discussed below, it is
(Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2001) (declaring that factual portions of a privileged
communication are themselves privileged); Stout v. Christie, Manson & Woods Int’l,
Inc., 681 N.Y.S.2d 19, 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (finding that legal consultations
regarding the estate of Andy Warhol that included “incidental, not otherwise
privileged matters,” were covered by attorney-client privilege); Spectrum Sys. Int’l
Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (N.Y. 1991) (stating that the presence
of non-privileged information in an otherwise privileged communication does not
destroy attorney-client privilege for the entire document); see also Rice, Continuing
Confusion, supra note 197, at 982-83 (criticizing courts for failing to recognize that the
privilege focuses on the communication, and is not affected by the facts). Professor
Rice summarizes why courts that have found otherwise have failed to recognize the
distinction between communications and information:
The privilege focuses on the communication. It is not concerned with, and
does not affect, the facts within the communication, as the facts exist outside
the box. The privilege does not bestow an independent protection on such
information, and the information’s nature (factual or technical) or status
(public or private) does not affect the privilege. The information does not
have to be confidential for the communication in which it is incorporated to
be confidential, and therefore, privileged.
Id. at 982-83. Professor Rice likewise states that the source of the information
contained within the communication is irrelevant. Id. at 985.
213. See, e.g., Nat’l Educ. Training Group, Inc. v. Skillsoft Corp., 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8680, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1999) (finding no confidentiality in the notes
of an associate at a board meeting in which the board discussed legal advice of its
counsel because the associate’s presence at the meeting was not necessary and thus,
New York’s narrow agency exception did not apply); In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790,
794 (Ill. 1988) (finding no confidentiality because communications were made in the
presence of the client’s mother and fiancé); State v. Rhodes, 627 N.W.2d 74, 85
(Minn. 2001) (privilege does not attach when a client makes statements to an
attorney in the presence of a spouse); People v. Osorio, 549 N.E.2d 1183, 1186 (N.Y.
1989) (holding that presence of co-defendant as translator for defendant’s
communications with attorney destroyed the privilege because codefendant was not
present for the purpose of building a joint defense with defendant).
214. See, e.g., Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 849 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that
the presence of client’s father did not destroy the privilege); State v. Blacknall, 760
A.2d 1151, 1153 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000) (holding that the privilege extends
to any agent of either the attorney or the client, including necessary intermediaries);
Rosati v. Kuzman, 660 A.2d 263, 266-67 (R.I. 1995) (finding that the presence of
adult client’s parents at meeting with attorney did not waive attorney-client
privilege); Hoffman v. Conder, 712 P.2d 216, 216-17 (Utah 1985) (holding that the
appropriate standard is whether the presence of a third party is “reasonably
necessary,” and, therefore, finding that the presence of a nurse did not destroy
privilege).
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unclear when communications widely dispersed within an
215
organization or revealed to agents or consultants are privileged.
Indeed, courts have differed significantly on what steps a client must
take to preserve the confidentiality of the privilege—and prevent
eavesdropping—to
satisfy
the
intent
and
maintenance
216
requirements.
In addition, two decades after Upjohn, there continues to be
enormous confusion and disagreement regarding the identity of the
217
client in the corporate or organizational setting.
Some states have
declined to follow the Supreme Court’s lead in Upjohn, and continue
to adhere to the control group or modified control group test for
determining who within the corporate structure constitutes the

215. See infra notes 217-22 and accompanying text (discussing disagreement
regarding the identity of the client in the corporate context); see also Edward C.
Brewer, III, The Ethics of Internal Investigations in Kentucky and Ohio, 27 N. KY. L. REV.
721, 763-64 (2000) (discussing how the Upjohn principle may extend to nonemployee agents in certain situations, but cautioning that this view is not universally
shared).
216. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that
clients seeking to preserve the privilege must treat the communications “like jewels”
and that, short of court-compelled disclosure or other extraordinary circumstances,
the court will not engage in an analysis of degrees of voluntariness); Suburban Sew
‘N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 260 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (finding a
failure to maintain confidentiality after adverse party found otherwise privileged
documents in trash dumpster); Floyd v. Coors Brewing Co., 952 P.2d 797, 808-09
(Colo. Ct. App. 1997) (adopting an ad hoc approach that considers several factors
when determining whether an alleged inadvertent disclosure constitutes a waiver of
privilege), overruled on other grounds, 978 P.2d 663 (Colo. 1999); Blumenthal v.
Kimber Mfg., Inc., 795 A.2d 1288, 1291 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001) (finding that the
attorney-client privilege is sacrosanct and cannot be waived unless a party knowingly
and intentionally waived it); In re Reorganization of Elec. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 681
N.E.2d 838, 841 (Mass. 1997) (requiring reasonable precautions to prevent
eavesdropping); Commonwealth v. Petty, No. SUCR 95-10524, 1995 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 42, at *3-4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 1995) (finding that the burden of
demonstrating a socially recognized expectation of privacy in the location where the
communication took place rests with a defendant); Trilogy Communications, Inc. v.
Excom Realty, Inc., 652 A.2d 1273, 1275-76 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994) (adopting
the liberal approach, whereby privilege cannot be waived through inadvertence);
Goldsborough v. Eagle Crest Partners, Ltd., 838 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Or. 1992)
(adopting a strict approach under which intent to waive privilege may be inferred by
disclosure, even if inadvertent); see also infra notes 251-54 and accompanying text
(discussing inadvertent disclosure doctrine). At least one state supreme court has
held that the mandatory presence of a deputy at the trial preparations of a defendant
in police custody waives the attorney-client privilege as to communications between
the defendant and defendant’s counsel. Haworth v. State, 840 P.2d 912, 918 (Wyo.
1992), habeas corpus granted sub nom. Haworth v. Shillinger, 852 F. Supp. 961 (D. Wyo.
1994), aff’d, 70 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1995).
217. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 72, at 654 (concluding, after surveying
disparate state approaches prevailing after Upjohn, that there is tremendous
uncertainty and inconsistent application); Thornburg, supra note 70, at 166
(discussing the uncertainty in whether a communication to corporate counsel will be
privileged).
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218

client. Other states have affirmatively adopted Upjohn or what
219
appears to be a similar “subject matter” approach. Still others have
adopted subject matter approaches more narrow than that suggested
220
in Upjohn. Most states have yet to resolve this issue definitively—by
statute, rule, or supreme court opinion—although lower court
opinions within these jurisdictions tend to apply some form of the
221
subject matter test.
Moreover, because Upjohn held that the
privilege must extend beyond the control group to lower level
employees, but did not articulate a test for determining which
communications by such employees would be protected, there is a
substantial amount of inconsistency in how federal and state courts
interpret and apply Upjohn and the subject matter approach to
analyzing communications between employees and corporate
222
counsel. Also, the debate continues to rage over whether and when
218. See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250, 254-58
(Ill. 1982) (adhering to the control group test and rejecting Upjohn). Besides
Illinois, a number of states—including Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, New
Hampshire, Oklahoma, and South Dakota—have adopted statutory or rule-based
formulations of the control-group test based on Uniform Rule 502. See REV. UNIF. R.
EVID. § 502 (amended 1986), 13 U.L.A 150-59 (Supp. 2002); see also Hamilton, supra
note 72, at 633-40, 644-45 (discussing states’ statutory and common-law treatment of
the privilege when dealing with corporate clients).
219. Some states—including Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Kentucky, North
Dakota, Oregon, Texas, and Vermont—have adopted Upjohn or a subject matter test
that appears to conform to its teachings. A compilation of these states’ statutes,
rules, and case law is on file with the author. See also Hamilton, supra note 72, at 63341 (discussing states’ statutory and common-law treatment of the privilege in the
corporate setting). As of 2001, only Texas has expressly adopted the Revised Rule
502(a)(2) (1986) and its broad subject matter test, which defines “representative of
the client” as one who has the authority to obtain legal services; act on the legal
advice rendered; or, “for the purpose of effectuating legal representation for the
client, makes or receives a confidential communication while acting in the scope of
employment for the client.” UNIF. R. EVID. 502; see also id. & cmt. 150-59 (describing
treatment of the rule and variations in jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform
Rules of Evidence).
220. See, e.g., S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Deason, 632 So. 2d 1377, 1383 (Fla. 1994)
(adopting a subject matter test but requiring that the communications of lower-level
employees with attorneys be at the direction of a corporate supervisor); Chadbourne,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 388 P.2d 700, 709-10 (Cal. 1964) (applying a subject matter
test that covers only communications within an employee’s duties and requires an
intent on a part of the initial communicator); see also Hamilton, supra note 72, at 64144 (discussing the California, Florida, and Utah modified subject matter
approaches).
221. See Hamilton, supra note 72, at 633-40, 645-46 (reporting that fourteen states
had adopted the subject matter test).
222. Although an exhaustive discussion of the subtle and not so subtle distinctions
between approaches in different state and federal jurisdictions is beyond the scope of
this article, others already have provided detailed accounts of these disparate views.
See generally Alexander C. Black, Annotation, Determination of Whether a Communication
is from a Corporate Client for Purposes of the Attorney-Client Privilege–Modern Cases, 26
A.L.R.5TH 628 (1995) (summarizing disparate approaches to the attorney-client
privilege in federal and state courts); RICE, supra note 14, § 4.11 (providing specific
state examples of attorney-client privilege law); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note
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former employees may reveal or discuss corporate confidences with
223
outsiders.
Similarly, there is much conflict over who is entitled to control—
and, hence, choose to preserve or waive—the privilege on behalf of
the corporate client. For example, courts disagree over whether and
when corporate decision makers can assert the privilege with regard
to communications with corporate counsel in an action brought
against the decision makers or on the corporation’s behalf by

12, § 189, at 344 (discussing the split in authority in the wake of Upjohn); Michael L.
Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context, 28 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 473 (1987) (discussing the long history of the corporate attorneyclient privilege and exploring why the proper scope of the privilege has been so
problematic); Thornburg, supra note 70, at 166 (discussing the uncertainty in
whether a communication to corporate counsel will be privileged). By way of
example, Alexander Black, in addition to summarizing the various state court
approaches, discussed the disparate approaches in federal courts in the wake of
Upjohn:
The courts in many pre-Upjohn cases, including the leading subject matter
test cases, took the view that a communication is the corporate client’s if it
concerns matters within the scope of the communicator’s employment and
is made at the direction of a corporate supervisor, and some post-Upjohn
cases have continued to apply that test. Other courts require only that the
communication concern matters within the scope of the communicator’s
employment. One court has held that a privileged communication must
concern matters within the scope of either the communicator’s duties or
the duties of the communicator’s subordinate. Another court has held that
a communication is the corporate client’s if it is made at the direction of
the communicator’s corporate superior. A court has held that a privileged
communication must concern matters within the scope of the
communicating employee’s employment and must concern information
necessary for legal decision making. According to another court, a
privileged communication must concern matters within the scope of the
communicator’s employment and the employee must be aware that
information is provided for the purpose of obtaining legal advice for the
corporation. Another court has held that a privileged communication
must relate to the communicating employee’s duties and must be at the
corporation’s behest, and that the employee must know that the
communication was made for purposes of obtaining legal advice. One
court has held that a communication is the corporate client’s if it advises
corporate personnel who can act on the advice or provides necessary
information to corporate counsel. Other or unspecified criteria were used
in a few cases to find communications privileged or not privileged.
See Black, supra, at 628 (cross-references and corresponding citations omitted).
223. See, e.g., Charles A. Weiss, Lawyers Bypassing Lawyers, 2 LITIG. 42, 43-44 (2002)
(identifying the controversy and examining the arguments asserted on each side);
Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: Does the Corporation’s Privilege Protect
Communications Between Corporate Counsel and Former Employees?, ACCA DOCKET (June
2000) (same), at http://www.acprivilege.com/articles/docket9.htm; Mark A.
Buchanan, Ex Parte Contacts with Former Employees: An Update on Rule 4.2 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 28 THE BRIEF 48, 49 (Winter 1999) (same).
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shareholders. In the leading case, Garner v. Wolfinbarger, the Fifth
Circuit set out various criteria for abrogation of the privilege in a
226
derivative action. Yet some state courts and federal district courts in
other circuits have rejected or questioned Garner’s approach, and
227
commentators also have criticized the decision.
To add to the
confusion, federal courts disagree as to whether the Garner approach
or “fiduciary duty exception” should apply in individual shareholder
228
actions.
Similarly, courts have differed on how to treat privilege
224. See infra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
225. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
226. See id. at 1104 (holding that shareholders can gain access to the
communications by demonstrating “good cause” for the information, which includes
demonstrating the bona fides of their claim, the percentage of shareholders
represented, and their need for the information).
227. See, e.g., Milroy v. Hanson, 875 F. Supp. 646, 651 (D. Neb. 1995) (declining to
follow Garner because it had not been adopted by the Eight Circuit); Lefkowitz v.
Duquesne Light Co., Civ. A. Nos. 86-1046, and 86-2085, 1988 WL 169273, at *6 (W.D.
Pa. June 14, 1988) (rejecting Garner because “a hasty resort to Garner concepts will
confuse who corporate counsel’s clients realistically are, and ignore the genuine
need of management in the ordinary course [of] confidential communication and
advice”) (quoting Shirvani v. Capital Investing Corp., 112 F.R.D. 389, 391 (D. Conn.
1986)); Nat’l Football League Props., Inc. v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893,
897 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that California courts have refused to carve out a
shareholder exception to the statutory attorney-client privilege applicable to
corporations); Hoiles v. Superior Court, 204 Cal. Rptr. 111, 114-15 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) (refusing to pierce the privilege based on Garner in the closely held corporate
context because the exception is not statutory); Agster v. Barmada, 43 Pa. D. & C.4th
353, 363 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1999) (stating that Garner’s approach to shareholder
litigation, in which the attorney-client privilege may be pierced for good cause
shown, is inconsistent with Pennsylvania case law’s application of the privilege);
Broun, supra note 1, at 786-87 (citing federal cases and commentators); Fredrick R.
Ball, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Director and Shareholder Litigation, 89 ILL. B.J. 537,
537 (2001) (stating that the scope of the privilege varies dramatically from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction depending on whether state or federal law applies, and
how willing the court is to pierce the privilege); Paul J. Sigwarth, It’s My Privilege and
I’ll Assert It if I Want To: The Attorney-Client Privilege in Closely-Held Corporations, 23 J.
CORP. L. 345, 352-55 (1998) (discussing Garner and its progeny, the confusion that
followed, and critical commentary); Brewer, supra note 215, at 770-72 (discussing
state and federal courts’ differing views on Garner). See generally Friedman, supra note
68, at 281 (criticizing Garner and questioning its viability after Jaffee).
228. Compare Ward v. Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d 780, 786 (5th Cir. 1988)
(applying Garner to non-derivative shareholder actions but stating that in such
actions a showing of good cause is subject to a more “careful scrutiny”), and Picard
Chem. Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Perrigo Co., 951 F. Supp. 679, 687 (W.D. Mich.
1996) (agreeing with the Sixth Circuit that Garner does not only apply to shareholder
derivative actions, and stating that “[t]he fact that shareholder-plaintiffs seek
recovery for themselves may only render their motives more suspect than if they
bring a derivative action.”) (citing Fausek v. White, 965 F.2d 126, 131 (6th Cir.
1992)), and In re Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 92 Civ. 9076 (GLG), 1993
WL 760214, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1993) (following the approach of the Fifth and
Sixth Circuits), with Cox v. Adm’r, United States Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386,
1416 (11th Cir. 1994) (declining to follow Garner because the plaintiffs sought
damages for their personal benefit, at the expense of the Union rather than on
behalf of the Union), and Weil v. Inv./Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d
18, 23 (9th Cir. 1981) (limiting Garner to shareholder derivative suits because “[t]he
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claims in disputes between directors of closely held corporations.
Moreover, some jurisdictions now extend the fiduciary duty
exception to other contexts in which the person seeking to prevent
disclosure owes a fiduciary duty to the person seeking access to the
230
communications,
while other jurisdictions have resisted this
Garner plaintiffs sought damages from other defendants [on] behalf of the
corporation, whereas Weil [sought] to recover damages from the corporation for
herself and the members of her proposed class.”), and Milroy v. Hanson, 875 F.
Supp. 646, 651 (D. Neb. 1995) (stating that Garner “has no applicability where the
plaintiff stockholder asserts claims primarily to benefit himself, particularly where
such claims will undoubtedly harm all other stockholders if successful.”); see also Rice,
Loss of Predictability, supra note 56, at 736 (citing cases that disagree on the use of the
privilege in the corporate context); Friedman, supra note 68, at 281 (citing cases that
support the abandonment of the balancing test on the corporate context); Sigwarth,
supra note 227, at 355, 366-67 (discussing the various contexts in which Garner has
been applied).
229. Compare Carnegie Hill Fin., Inc. v. Krieger, No. 99-CV-2592, 2000 WL 10446,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2000) (holding that a corporation may not assert the attorneyclient privilege against former officers and directors), and Gottlieb v. Wiles, 143
F.R.D. 241, 247 (D. Colo. 1992) (stating that present board of directors could not
assert privilege against a former director because the situation is analogous to one
where parties with a common interest retain the same attorney, but when they later
become adverse, neither is allowed to claim privilege), and Harris v. Wells, No. B-89391 (WWE) & B-89-482 (WWE), 1990 WL 150445, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 5, 1990)
(defendant-director could not claim privilege against other plaintiff-directors), and
Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Cordant Holdings Corp., Nos. 13911 & 14595, 1996 WL
307444, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 4, 1996) (holding under Delaware law that “a
corporation may not assert the attorney-client privilege against its own directors to
deprive them of access to information discussed at board meetings, including legal
advice furnished to the board,” during the directors’ tenures), and Kirby v. Kirby,
Civ. A. No. 8604, 1987 Del. Ch. LEXIS 463, at *18 (Del. Ch. July 29, 1987) (stating
that privilege cannot be invoked against a corporation’s own directors because
directors should be “treated as the ‘joint client’” when they receive legal advice for
the corporation), with Milroy, 875 F. Supp. at 649-50 (finding that a dissident director
is not management and, therefore, cannot pierce the attorney-client privilege if it
would conflict with the will of management), and Lane v. Sharp Packaging Sys., Inc.,
640 N.W.2d 788, 813 (Wis. 2002) (concluding that, based on the reasoning in Milroy
and the entity rule, the plaintiff’s status as a former director does not allow him to
waive the privilege, or preclude the defendant’s board of directors from asserting the
privilege against him); see also Sigwarth, supra note 227, at 357-64 (discussing cases in
which courts have treated such privilege claims differently).
230. See, e.g., Fortson v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, 961 F.2d 469, 475
n.5 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that general partners owed appellants a fiduciary duty
and, therefore, cannot assert the privilege against the appellants); Lawrence v. Cohn,
No. 90 Civ. 2396 (CSHMHD), 2002 WL 109530, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2002)
(applying the fiduciary exception in the trustee-beneficiary context without recourse
to the Garner “good cause” test); Wessel v. City of Albuquerque, 48 Fed. R. Serv.3d
349, 351 (D.D.C. 2000) (applying fiduciary exception in suit brought by nonunion
employees against a union); Nellis v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 144 F.R.D. 68, 71 (E.D. Va.
1992) (applying fiduciary exception in suit by union members against union for
breach of fair representation duty); Ferguson v. Lurie, 139 F.R.D. 362, 365 (N.D. Ill.
1991) (considering the “good cause” factors of Garner after finding that general
partners have a fiduciary obligation to the limited partners in limited partnerships);
Martin v. Valley Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 140 F.R.D. 291, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (applying
the fiduciary exception in the trustee-beneficiary context without recourse to the
Garner “good cause” test); Dome Petroleum Ltd. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of
Wis., 131 F.R.D. 63, 68-69 (D.N.J. 1990) (applying the Garner exception to an insured
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231

expansion.
Yet another substantial disagreement exists over when
communications are made for the purpose of obtaining or providing
legal advice, particularly when the client may be seeking business or
232
other nonlegal advice in addition to legal advice.
This
and an excess insurer subrogee); Wash.-Balt. Newspaper Guild v. Wash. Star Co., 543
F. Supp. 906, 909 (D.D.C. 1982) (applying the fiduciary exception in the trusteebeneficiary context without recourse to the Garner “good cause” test); Donovan v.
Fitzsimmons, 90 F.R.D. 583, 586 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (finding that corporate
shareholders, as well as pensioners and potential recipients of fund assets, need
access to information to determine whether a fiduciary is exercising authority as
contemplated); Metro. Bank & Trust Co. v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc.,
No.Civ.A.18023-NC, 2001 WL 1671445, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2001) (explaining
that the Garner doctrine has been extended so that limited partners can access the
corporation’s privileged communications); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Rutledge & Co., No.
Civ.A.15539, 1999 WL 66528, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 1999) (extending fiduciary
exception to limited partnership as long as there is “mutuality of interest” between
limited and general partners and showing of “good cause”); see also Rice, Loss of
Predictability, supra note 56, at 736-37 (discussing Garner and various “fiduciary duty
exception” cases, including partnership, trust, union, and shareholder divorce
cases).
231. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court, 990 P.2d 591, 596 (Cal. 2000)
(holding that a trustee may assert the attorney-client privilege against trust
beneficiaries); Smith v. Laguna Sur Villas Cmty. Ass’n, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 321, 324 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2000) (refusing to carve out a fiduciary exception because “courts ‘do not
enjoy the freedom to restrict California’s statutory attorney-client privilege based on
notions of policy or ad hoc justification.’”) (quoting Wells Fargo Bank, 990 P.2d at
596); First Union Nat’l Bank v. Turney, No. 1D00-2803, 2001 WL 1485659, at *11
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2001) (refusing to decide whether Florida has a fiduciary
exception to the attorney-client privilege); Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 924-25
(Tex. 1996) (declining to adopt fiduciary exception approach).
232. For example, some courts require that the particular communication be
“primarily” or “predominately” of a legal character. See, e.g., Stephenson Equity Co.
v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., No. 99 CIV 113951RWS, 2002 WL 59418, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
16, 2002) (stating that the privilege does not attach because, although reports
investigating insurance claims on behalf of insurance company were prepared by
attorneys, such reports were prepared “as part of the regular business of the
company” and therefore were not of a primarily or predominately legal character);
Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 170 F.R.D. 481, 484 (D. Kan. 1997) (holding
that a communication must be predominated by legal advice to be protected);
Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 357, 364 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing
Spectrum Sys. Int’l Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (N.Y. 1991)); Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 692 N.Y.S.2d 384, 385 (App. Div.
1999) (holding that defendants are not protected by the attorney-client privilege
because the communications pertained mainly to commercial concerns, and were
not primarily of a legal character), leave to appeal dismissed, 726 N.E.2d 483 (N.Y.
2000); cf. Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equip. Corp., 757 A.2d 14, 25 (Conn. 2000)
(adopting an approach that resonates with the “primarily” or “predominately” legal
approach by applying the privilege where the communications at issue are
“inextricably linked” or “necessary” to the giving or obtaining of legal advice). Other
courts apply a “but for” test: the claimant must demonstrate that the communication
with counsel would not have been made but for the client’s need for legal services.
See, e.g., Reich v. Hercules, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 367, 373 (D.N.J. 1994) (finding that the
claimant failed to show that the materials in question were prepared in a manner
other than the ordinary course of business, and that the communication would not
have occurred but for the client’s need for legal advice) (quoting First Chicago Int’l
v. United Exch. Co., 125 F.R.D. 55, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)); Doe v. Archdiocese of the
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disagreement is most pronounced in the in-house counsel context,
since in-house attorneys often serve multiple roles within the business
and the potential for abuse of the privilege may be greater in this
context because businesses often funnel many communications and
233
proposals through in-house attorneys. Although the American Bar
Association and some courts have taken the position that in-house
counsel should not be subjected to stricter privilege standards than
234
outside counsel,
other state and federal jurisdictions have
Catholic Church of Miami, 721 So. 2d 428, 429 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (listing the
“but for” requirement as one of five criteria that needs to be established in order to
be entitled to privilege) (citing S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Deason, 632 So. 2d. 1377,
1383 (Fla. 1994)). But see In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 966 (3d Cir. 1997)
(applying the “for the purpose of securing legal advice” test broadly by allowing the
assertion of the attorney-client privilege over communications at a Policy and
Strategy Committee meeting that included both legal and business decisions, so long
as the business decisions were reached after the committee examined the legal
implications of doing so). One federal circuit court has taken the view that, once a
matter is committed to an attorney, it is presumptively for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice and, therefore, within the privilege absent a clear showing to the
contrary. In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 938 (8th Cir. 1994); see also United States v.
Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1501 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that when a person hires an
attorney for advice, regardless of the subject of the advice, there is a rebuttable
presumption that the attorney is hired to give legal advice, but the presumption is
rebutted when the attorney was hired without reference to his knowledge and
discretion in the law) (citations omitted); Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus., Ltd., No.
93.C.4899, 1996 WL 288511, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 1996) (holding that a
communication between a corporation and its attorney concerning whether and how
the corporation should make a variety of employment and legal decisions was
privileged); In re Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 170 B.R. 331, 354 (S.D. Ohio 1994)
(holding that there is a prima facie assumption that a communication committed to
an attorney was sought for the sake of legal advice). In many circumstances, courts
have been vague about when mixed legal and business advice is protected. See, e.g.,
Leonen v. Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. 94, 98-99 (D.N.J. 1990) (appearing to apply a
“but for” test, while at the same time asserting that “the court’s inquiry is focused on
whether ‘the communication is designed to meet problems which can fairly be
characterized as predominately legal.’”) (quoting Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D.
198, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)); Mark C. Van Deusen, Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege for
In-House Counsel When Negotiating Contracts: A Response to Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. GAF
Manufacturing Corp., 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1397, 1398 (1998) (stating that courts
have failed to articulate clearly when the privilege protects communications
containing mixed legal and business advice).
233. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 68, at 394, 398-400 (discussing the role of in-house
counsel and the potential for abuse that have led some courts to take a dim view of
the privilege in the in-house context); Van Deusen, supra note 232, at 1398
(discussing the precarious status of communications with in-house counsel). This is
no small matter, since, according to an American Bar Association publication, over
ten percent of attorneys serve as in-house counsel. Barry F. McNeil, Internal Corporate
Investigations: Conducting Them, Protecting Them, 1997 A.B.A. SEC. OF LITIG. REP. 120.
234. See Weiss, supra note 68, at 394 (stressing the importance of in-house
attorneys being able to communicate freely with their clients); see also Weeks, 1996 WL
288511, at *2 (asserting that the attorney-client privilege is not vitiated when an
attorney weighs business considerations in rendering legal advice); Note Funding
Corp. v. Bobian Inv. Co., No. 93 Civ. 7427 (DAB), 1995 WL 662402, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 9, 1995) (holding that, because it is common for commercial entities to use
attorneys who have training and experience in analyzing “alternative business
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scrutinized in-house communications more strictly.
Moreover,
those courts that apply a stricter standard to communications
between clients and in-house counsel apply varying standards, some
236
of which provide little meaningful guidance.
strategies,” a corporation can assert attorney-client privilege over communications to
an attorney that encompass both legal and commercial considerations); In re
Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 170 B.R. at 354-55 (holding that an attorney’s tax
planning advice was legal advice and, therefore, communications relating to this
advice were covered by the attorney-client privilege, regardless of whether the
attorney also weighed business considerations in giving the advice).
235. See generally United States v. Chevron Corp., No. C-94-1885 SBA, 1996 WL
264769, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 1996) (refusing to assume that all communications
to in-house counsel are primarily related to legal advice because in-house counsel
usually are involved in a company’s business decisions); S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Deason, 632 So. 2d 1377, 1383 (Fla. 1994) (subjecting a corporation’s attorney-client
privilege claims to a heightened level of scrutiny to hinder the corporation’s attempts
to cloak information with the privilege and avoid discovery).
236. For example, some courts require that the party seeking protection of
communications between in-house counsel and the party demonstrate that the
communications are primarily legal or made for the primary purpose of seeking or
providing legal advice. E.g., Andritz Sprout-Bauer, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 174 F.R.D.
609, 633 (M.D. Pa. 1997); Harmony Gold U.S.A., Inc. v. FASA Corp., 169 F.R.D. 113,
115 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Chevron Corp., 1996 WL 264769, at *3; Kramer v. Raymond
Corp., Civ. No. 90-5026, 1992 WL 122856, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 1992); N.C. Elec.
Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 110 F.R.D. 511, 514 (M.D.N.C.
1986); Sicpa Holdings S.A. v. Optical Coating Lab., Inc., Civil Action No. 15129, 1996
WL 636161, at *9 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 1996); Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 540
N.E.2d 703, 706 (N.Y. 1989); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 385. Of
course, these standards are vague; it is difficult to discern when communications
involve primarily legal advice, and how to determine the primary purpose of the
communications. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 68, at 398-400 (discussing and criticizing
these standards in part because they fail to explain when communications will be
sufficiently legal in nature). Other courts have limited the in-house counsel privilege
more severely to circumstances in which in-house attorneys are acting solely in a
“professional legal capacity.” See, e.g., Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., No.
1:98-CV-726, 2001 WL 1818698, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001).
Where . . . in-house counsel appears as one of many recipients of an
otherwise business-related memo, the federal courts place a heavy burden
on the proponent to make a clear showing that counsel is acting in a
professional legal capacity and that the document reflects legal, as opposed
to business, advice.
Id.; Andritz Sprout-Bauer, Inc., 174 F.R.D. at 633 (stating that the privilege only applies
when an attorney is acting in the role of legal advisor, not business advisor or
corporate administrator); Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. G.A.F. Roofing Mfg. Corp., No. 93 CIV
5125 (RPP), 1996 WL 29392, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1996) (explaining that the
communications from in-house counsel to management involve difficult fact specific
questions); Chevron Corp., 1996 WL 264769, at *4 (holding that there must be a clear
showing that in-house counsel was giving advice in a professional legal capacity); Lee
v. Engle, Nos. Civ.A.13323 & Civ.A.13284, 1995 WL 761222, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 15,
1995) (stating that the privilege only applies to advice given by an attorney in a
professional legal capacity); Evans v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 541 S.E.2d 782, 791
(N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that in-house counsel for an insurance company is not
protected by the privilege unless acting as a legal advisor at the time of the
communication). Still others have adopted modified subject matter tests, allowing
privilege claims where communications are made in the course of seeking legal
services and, indeed, would not have been made but for contemplation of such
services, as long as other aspects of the subject matter test is satisfied. See, e.g., Deason,
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There are countless other differences among jurisdictions
regarding the scope of the attorney-client privilege and lingering
237
Thus, while the basic
unresolved issues within jurisdictions.
elements of the privilege are largely undisputed, there is enormous
conflict over what the basic elements actually require.
b.

The crime-fraud exception

The crime-fraud exception is the most significant exception to the
238
attorney-client privilege. This exception, like the privilege itself, is
usually justified in utilitarian terms: society would incur harm if the
privilege protected attorney-client communications that assist clients
239
in furthering a crime or perpetrating a fraud.
Like the privilege
itself, the scope of the exception is unresolved.
The Supreme Court recognized the crime-fraud exception in Clark
240
v. United States, stating that the law will not help any client who asks
an attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a
241
fraud. Under Clark’s articulation of the exception, a party seeking
632 So. 2d at 1382-83 (explaining that the subject matter test, which potentially
extends to communications of al employees and not just officers, adds a condition to
corporate privilege that more completely addresses the problems in corporate
cases); see also Leonen v. Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. 94, 98-99 (D.N.J. 1990)
(appearing to apply a “but for” test); cf. Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 147 F.R.D.
270, 272 (S.D. Ga. 1993) (adopting the modified subject matter test, articulated in
Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977), which allows
protection by the attorney-client privilege over a corporation’s communications that
were made for the purpose of securing legal advice, so long as other prongs of the
test are also met); Marriott Corp. v. Am. Acad. of Psychotherapists, Inc., 277 S.E.2d
785, 792 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (concluding that Diversified’s modified subject-matter
test “best strikes an appropriate balance”).
237. For example, there is continuing confusion over the application of the
privilege when the client discloses non-privileged, pre-existing documents to the
attorney during the course of a communication. See Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra
note 197, at 989-95 (reviewing cases and suggesting an (appropriate) analysis). In
addition, there is much debate over the proper scope of the “joint defense” or
“common interest” doctrines, addressing protection of communications shared
among a group of parties with common interests. E.g., John J. Faley, Jr. & Valerie K.
Frias, The Corporate Joint-Defense Privilege: For Defense Lawyers, a Shield or a Sieve?, 1 BUS.
CRIMES BULL. 3 (Feb. 2002). There is also continuing controversy over whether and
when the identity of the client is privileged. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19,
§ 90, at 360-63.
238. There are other exceptions, including the “common interest,” breach of duty
(by attorney or client), and attestation exceptions. See generally MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, §§ 196-1 98, at 374-79 (reviewing breach of duty, claim
through decedent client, and attorney as attesting witness exception). Although
these exceptions arise less frequently than the crime-fraud exception, they are not
free from controversy. Id.
239. See, e.g., Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at 1508-10 (discussing why,
from a utilitarian perspective, attorney-client communications intended to further a
crime or fraud should not be privileged).
240. 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
241. Id. at 15.
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otherwise privileged communications must make a prima facie
showing that the client sought the attorney’s advice or representation
242
Thus, the
for the purpose of furthering wrongful conduct.
Supreme Court’s test requires a showing of wrongful intent, or
243
knowingly wrongful behavior, on the part of the client.
As
discussed above, the Court then provided in Zolin that trial courts
should engage in an in camera review of the allegedly privileged
communications if those opposing the privilege on the crime-fraud
ground demonstrate a factual basis adequate to support a good faith
belief by a reasonable person that an in camera review may reveal
244
evidence to establish the claim that the exception applies.
Although all jurisdictions recognize this exception, they differ on
both its application and scope. For example, Zolin never clarified the
quantum of proof required to vitiate the privilege, and since then,
245
courts have articulated disparate standards. Moreover, some lower
federal courts and courts in other jurisdictions have abandoned
Clark’s requirement that the party seeking discovery make such a
showing of client intent—namely, that the client consulted an
attorney for the purpose of committing or furthering a crime or
246
fraud.
These courts have simply required a showing of a crime or
242. Id.
243. Id.; see also Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at 1512 (discussing how
many courts have “scrupulously follow[ed]” the Clark requirement of a prima facie
showing that the client intentionally sought the advice to perpetuate a crime).
244. See sources cited supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
245. See, e.g., Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equip. Corp., 757 A.2d 14, 31 (Conn.
2000) (finding that a court may abrogate the privilege under the crime-fraud
exception only when the court finds there was probable cause to believe that the
privileged communications were made with the intent to perpetrate and further a
civil fraud); Am. Tobacco Co. v. State, 697 So. 2d 1249, 1256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1997) (holding that the party opposing the privilege based on the crime-fraud
exception must produce evidence of fraud beyond a preponderance of the evidence,
and the party asserting the privilege must then give the court a reasonable
explanation for the communications or conduct in order to keep the privilege);
Stidham v. Clark, 74 S.W.3d 719, 726-27 (Ky. 2002) (stating that Zolin’s disclaimer
regarding the requisite quantum of proof “can only mean that lower federal courts
are free to fashion other and better tests than the ‘prima facie case’ standard to
overcome a claim of privilege,” a preponderance of evidence test); Purcell v. Dist.
Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 676 N.E.2d 436, 439 (Mass. 1997) (applying the
preponderance of the evidence standard, but stating that the court retains discretion
to conduct an in camera review if the facts support a reasonable belief that the review
would establish that the exception applies). Compare United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d
1495, 1503 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that government must submit evidence that, if
reasonably believed, would establish elements of an ongoing violation), and Haines v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 95-96 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that a party seeking
discovery under the exception must present evidence that, if believed, would be
sufficient to support a finding in its favor on each element of the privilege), with
United States v. Davis, 1 F.3d 606, 610 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that a party seeking
discovery need only demonstrate something “giv[ing] color” to the crime or fraud).
246. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (adding that
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fraud and a nexus or relationship between the crime or fraud and the
247
potentially privileged matters. By removing the intent requirement,
248
this approach, which has received some criticism, vastly expands the
potential scope of the exception. In addition, courts are in conflict
over whether the crime-fraud exception applies to statements made
in furtherance of intentional torts other than fraud. In the federal
system, for example, two circuit courts have held that the exception
should not extend beyond criminal or fraudulent activities, while a
249
number of other courts have reached contrary conclusions.
requiring a greater showing creates administrability concerns); X-Corp v. Doe, 805 F.
Supp. 1298, 1307 (E.D. Va. 1992) (expressing hope that the approach would prevent
use of privilege to shield information learned collaterally during representation).
247. See, e.g., Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 814-15 (stating a court must find only some
relationship between the privileged communication and the prima facie violation to
defeat the privilege); X-Corp, 805 F. Supp. at 1307 (holding a communication falls
within the crime-fraud exception if it merely “reflects” an ongoing or future illegal
scheme); People v. Superior Court (Bauman & Rose), 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 734, 741 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995) (stating that, in order for the crime-fraud exception to apply, the
party opposing privilege must establish a prima facie case of fraud and a “reasonable
relationship” between the fraud and the communication between attorney and
client) (citing Cunningham v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins., 845 F. Supp. 1403, 1412-16 (S.D.
Cal. 1994) (crime-fraud exception applied to allegedly privileged letter because
insurance company established a prima facie case for finding that the letter was
reasonably related to a future or on-going fraud)); Privileged Communications, supra
note 26, at 1512 & n.64 (citing cases in which courts have applied the crime-fraud
exception to work-product doctrine).
248. See John J. Mulderig et al., Tobacco Cases May Be Only the Tip of the Iceberg for
Assaults on Privilege, 67 DEF. COUNS. J. 16, 26-27 (2000) (noting potential for
application of exception to privileged and work product documents unrelated to
crime or fraud); Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at 1513 (describing
application of a reduced standard as particularly troubling where clients face
ambiguous or complex laws, which are more readily violated despite good-faith
attempts to comply).
249. Compare Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1551 (10th Cir. 1995)
(holding that crime-fraud exception is limited to legal advice in furtherance of a
crime or fraud and, under Oklahoma and federal law, the exception does not extend
to tortious conduct generally), and Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 455 F.2d 337,
342 (5th Cir. 1972) (declining to take the further step of also excepting the
commission of a tort from the privilege), and Ferrara & DiMercurio, Inc. v. St. Paul
Mercury Ins. Co., 173 F.R.D. 7, 13 (D. Mass. 1997) (refusing to extend the exception
to unfair and deceptive trade practice claims), with In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230,
234 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (applying the exception to other intentional torts, in addition
to crimes and fraud), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Swidler & Berlin v. United States,
524 U.S. 399 (1998), and Sprague v. Thorn Am., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1372 (10th Cir.
1997) (holding that the privilege does not extend to communications where there is
sufficient evidence that the communication was made to enable or aid in a crime or
tort), and Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 357, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(recognizing that the crime-fraud exception applies to intentional torts “moored in
fraud” and does not require actual fraud), and In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding that attorney-client communications are made in
furtherance of a “crime, fraud, or other misconduct” when the evidence shows a
pervasive and systematic plan to destroy evidence), and Coleman v. Am. Broad. Cos.,
106 F.R.D. 201, 209 (D.D.C. 1985) (indicating willingness to expand the scope of
crime-fraud exception but finding extension not warranted in this case because the
party alleging the misconduct failed to make a prima facie showing that such
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Waiver and post hoc qualification

At the time of the attorney-client communication, attorneys and
their clients obviously do not intend to waive the privilege. However,
the likelihood that the client may waive or mistakenly waive the
privilege, or might otherwise be denied protection for initially
privileged communications must be part of an attorney’s assessment
of how safe attorney-client communications will be from compelled
250
disclosure.
Thus, even if the elements of the privilege and the
parameters of its exceptions were clear, which they are not, the
protection that the privilege affords would still be highly uncertain if
there exist unpredictable or unforgiving waiver rules or other
doctrines that make application uncertain and which might strip
otherwise protected communications of their privileged status.
Unfortunately, the current regime is riddled with such unpredictable
doctrines.
First, although some courts are forgiving with regard to inadvertent
disclosures of attorney-client communications, other courts are not.
Indeed, there is lingering disagreement over whether and when an
inadvertent disclosure of privileged communications to an adversary
251
or third party constitutes a waiver of the privilege.
A few courts
have suggested that waiver occurs regardless of the circumstances of
the disclosure, including situations in which no blame can be
252
attached to either the attorney or the client.
Most have looked at
misconduct occurred), and Diamond v. Stratton, 95 F.R.D. 503, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(holding that there is an exception to the attorney-client privilege for
communications made in furtherance of intentional torts other than fraud, namely,
in this case, intentional infliction of emotional distress).
250. But see Zacharias, supra note 81, at 365-66 (suggesting that flexible exceptions
in fact may not affect client decisions whether or not to communicate with counsel).
251. See Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1483 (8th Cir. 1996) (discussing the federal
courts’ disparate approaches to inadvertent waiver); see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 19, § 93, at 372 (stating that opinions in the area have been divergent);
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 202, at 401 (same); Talton, supra note 205,
at 290-95 (discussing the disparate views of inadvertent waiver doctrine); Ken M.
Zeidner, Note, Inadvertent Disclosure and the Attorney-Client Privilege: Looking to the Work
Product Doctrine for Guidance, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1318-19 (2001) (outlining the
divergent approaches to inadvertent disclosures in the federal courts).
252. See In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that clients
seeking to preserve the privilege must treat the communications “like jewels” and
that, short of court-compelled disclosure or other extraordinary circumstances, the
court will not engage in an analysis of degrees of voluntariness); FDIC v. Singh, 140
F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 1992) (applying a strict rule); see also United States v. Ryans,
903 F.2d 731, 741 n.13 (10th Cir. 1990) (appearing to adopt the strict view); New
York v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV.A.98-1233 (CKK), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7684, at *9
(D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2002) (holding that disclosure of otherwise-privileged materials
waives the privilege, regardless of whether the disclosure was unintentional); Int’l
Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 449-50 (D. Mass. 1988)
(holding that, even after inadvertent disclosure, information is no longer
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the circumstances of the disclosure or have applied multi-factor tests
in determining whether inadvertent production was careless or
253
Still others have been
unreasonable enough to constitute waiver.
far more forgiving, concluding that waiver occurs only when attorneys
or clients have voluntarily disclosed confidential communications, or
have been reckless or extremely careless in guarding against
254
disclosure.
In addition, the state and federal courts are split over whether a
client’s voluntary sharing of privileged communications with
confidential regardless of the disclosing party’s intention and that the adequacy of
the precautions taken to avoid such disclosure is immaterial). Compare Ares-Serono,
Inc. v. Organon Int’l B.V., 160 F.R.D. 1, 10 (D. Mass. 1994) (explaining that the strict
rule ensures that attorneys will “more diligently” protect the secrecy of patent
applications), with Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 287, 292
(D. Mass 2000) (declining to adopt the strict rule, which effects a waiver of the
privilege regardless of the disclosing party’s inadvertence or intent, and instead
adhering to a “middle test,” which takes into consideration the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the inadvertent disclosure of privileged communications,
such as whether adequate steps were taken to ensure a document’s confidentiality).
253. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 186 (2d Cir. 2000)
(adopting a case-by-case fairness approach); Gray, 86 F.3d at 1484 (adopting—
purportedly under Missouri law—the “middle of the road approach,” which takes
into account a number of factors to determine whether unintentional disclosures
constitute waiver); Alldread v. Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1434 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating
that waiver must be determined on a case-by-case basis); Parkway Gallery v. Kittinger,
116 F.R.D. 46, 50 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (applying a five-factor test including
consideration of the reasonableness of precautions taken to prevent disclosure, the
number of inadvertent disclosures, the extent of the disclosure, delays in rectifying
disclosures, and the overriding interests of justice); Lois Sportswear U.S.A., Inc. v.
Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying a four-factor test
which includes consideration of reasonable precautions taken, the scope of
discovery, the amount of time to correct the error, and the extent of disclosure); see
also Broun, supra note 1, at 787-88 (adding that federal courts also are divided on
whether privilege applies to communications from an attorney to a client).
254. See, e.g., Desai v. Am. Int’l Underwriters, No. 91 Civ. 7735, 1992 WL 110731, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1992) (holding that there is no inadvertent waiver in the
absence of extreme carelessness); Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753
F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that the privilege is not waived unless
disclosure was intentional and knowing); Helman v. Murry’s Steaks, Inc., 728 F.
Supp. 1099, 1104 (D. Del. 1990) (finding no waiver where counsel’s actions did not
constitute more than simple negligence); Blumenthal v. Kimber Mfg., Inc., 47 Conn.
Supp. 378, 381-82 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001) (stating that the privilege is “sacrosanct”
and a party cannot waive it without a knowing and intentional act); Chrysler Corp. v.
Sheridan, No. 227511, 2001 WL 773099, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. July 10, 2001)
(holding inadvertent disclosure does not waive the privilege); State v. Blacknall, 760
A.2d 1151, 1155 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000) (concluding that inadvertent
statements by independent investigator, characterized as the result of “mere
negligence or misfortune,” did not waive defendant’s privilege because investigator
was not aware that statements were privileged) (quoting Trilogy Communications,
Inc. v. Excom Realty, Inc., 652 A.2d 1273, 1273 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1994)); Doe
v. Maret, 984 P.2d 980, 986 (Utah 1999) (stating that Utah courts will not find a
waiver of the privilege if the disclosure was voluntary or excusably inadvertent); see
also KL Group v. Case, Kay & Lynch, 829 F.2d 909, 919 (9th Cir. 1987) (assuming
that, under both California and Hawaii law, an inadvertently disclosed document was
still privileged because disclosure was not voluntary).
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government agencies or independent auditors waives the privilege
absolutely, or only as to the agency or auditor with which the
255
This “limited waiver” doctrine is
information was shared.
unresolved in most jurisdictions, since few appellate courts have
256
addressed the issue.
Courts also have disparate views on the scope of the “at-issue,”
“issue injection,” or “implied waiver” doctrine. In essence, this
doctrine removes otherwise privileged communications from the
scope of the protection when a party proffers a claim or defense in
257
litigation that puts such communications at issue.
Yet courts have
adopted various approaches to determining when communications
258
An increasing number of
are implicitly waived by issue injection.
courts have adopted a narrow view of “at issue” waiver, finding that
the exception applies only where the attorney’s advice is directly
259
placed at issue as an essential element of the claim.
A majority of
jurisdictions adhere to a somewhat broader approach to the
exception, requiring the party asserting the privilege to undertake
255. Compare United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 686 (1st Cir.
1997) (rejecting limited waiver), and Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214,
1220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding absolute waiver), and In re Martin Marietta Corp.,
856 F.2d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 1988) (rejecting limited waiver), and Fid. & Cas. Co. of
N.Y. v. Mobay Chem. Corp., 625 N.E.2d 151, 157 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (rejecting
limited waiver for documents previously turned over to the United States Attorney),
and People v. Calandra, 467 N.Y.S.2d 141, 143 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (rejecting limited
waiver except when the right to assert the attorney-client privilege in subsequent
proceedings is specifically reserved at the time of the disclosure), with Diversified
Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1977) (adopting limited waiver
approach), and Danielson v. Superior Court, 754 P.2d 1145, 1147 & n.1 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1987) (following Diversified Industries in adopting limited waiver of physicianpatient privilege, and noting that Arizona analyzes physician-patient privilege and
attorney-client privilege similarly). See also Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: Does
Sharing Privileged Communications With Government Agencies Waive the Privilege
Protection?, J. AM. CORP. COUNS. ASS’N (Mar. 2000) (discussing the split in authority on
the limited waiver doctrine).
256. RICE, supra note 14, § 9:87.
257. See T. Maxfield Bahner & Michael L. Gallion, Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege
Via Issue Injection: A Call for Uniformity, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 199, 200 (1998) (describing
issue injection as one of two subcategories of implied waiver).
258. See Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Lyons, 10 P.3d 166, 171 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000)
(discussing the conflicting approaches to at-issue waiver in federal and state courts);
Bahner & Gallion, supra note 257, at 201-06 (tracing the various ways in which courts
have applied the at-issue exception). See also cases cited infra note 259.
259. E.g., Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 864 (3d
Cir. 1994); Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 142 F.R.D. 408, 415-16 (D.
Del. 1992); Ex parte State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 794 So. 2d 368, 374-75 (Ala. 2001);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 13 P.3d 1169, 1179 (Ariz. 2000); Smith v.
Kavanaugh, Pierson & Talley, 513 So. 2d 1138, 1145-46 (La. 1987); Aranson v.
Schroeder, 671 A.2d 1023, 1030 (N.H. 1995); Lyons, 10 P.3d at 173; Mueller v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 31 Pa. D. & C.4th 23, 35-36 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1996); see also
Bahner & Gallion, supra note 257, at 204-05 (referring to this approach as the
“anticipatory waiver test” and citing cases).
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some affirmative action making the privileged information relevant
260
to the dispute and vital to the opposing party’s defense. In a third,
related approach, some courts balance the necessity of discovering
protected information against the importance of the interests served
261
by maintaining the attorney-client privilege. Still other courts have
applied the doctrine in a more draconian fashion, finding an
automatic waiver of the privilege when a party’s assertion of a claim,
counterclaim, or affirmative defense raises an issue to which a
262
privileged communication is merely relevant.
Likewise, courts have not reached agreement on the scope of
“subject matter waiver.” Subject matter waiver is a form of implied
waiver that allows the party attacking the privilege to seek all
privileged communications on a particular topic once one privileged
263
communication on the subject matter has been disclosed.
Some
courts limit the doctrine to circumstances in which a party uses
privileged communications strategically in litigation as a “sword,”

260. E.g., Pyramid Controls, Inc. v. Siemens Indus. Automations, Inc., 176 F.R.D.
269, 272 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975); State
ex rel. Stovall v. Meneley, 22 P.3d 124, 142 (Kan. 2001); State v. Roeder, 636 N.W.2d
870, 876 (Neb. 2001); Ward v. Graydon, Head & Ritchey, No. CA2001-03-038, 2001
Ohio App. LEXIS 5340, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2001); S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Pub.
Util. Comm’n, 784 P.2d 1373, 1378-79 (Cal. 1990); Pappas v. Holloway, 787 P.2d 30,
36 (Wash. 1990); see also Paramount Comm., Inc. v. Donaghy, 858 F. Supp. 391, 395
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding no waiver but suggesting that waiver will occur if privileged
information is used to “bolster” an essential claim); Bahner & Gallion, supra note
257, at 202-04 (1998) (stating that this view is favored by a clear majority of courts
and citing numerous cases).
261. E.g., Greater Newbury Clamshell Alliance v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 838 F.2d
13, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1988); Afro-Lecon, Inc. v. United States, 820 F.2d 1198, 1205 (Fed.
Cir. 1987); Sedco Int’l, S.A. v. Cory, 683 F.2d 1201, 1206 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing
Hearn, 68 F.R.D. at 581); Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1268 (D.C. Cir.
1981), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Moore v. Black Panther Party, 458 U.S. 1118
(1982); Darius v. City of Boston, 741 N.E.2d 52, 59 (Mass. 2001); see also Zenith Radio
Corp. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (declining to decide
between applying the Hearn test and the balancing test, but noting that a substantial
showing of need is required to overcome privilege under either test); Bahner &
Gallion, supra note 257, at 202 (referring to this approach as the “balancing test” and
citing cases).
262. E.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 53 F.R.D. 260,
262 (W.D. Okla. 1979); Ghana Supply Comm’n v. New Eng. Power Co., 83 F.R.D.
586, 593-94 (D. Mass. 1979); Indep. Prods. Corp. v. Loew’s Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266, 277-79
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); see also People v. Ullery, 984 P.2d 586, 589 (Colo. 1999) (finding
Colorado’s statutory waiver of physician-patient privilege for pleas of not guilty by
reason of insanity extends to waiver of attorney-client privilege as well); People v.
Edney, 350 N.E.2d 400, 403 (N.Y. 1976) (automatic waiver of attorney-client privilege
when defendant asserts an insanity defense); State v. Bonds, 653 P.2d 1024, 1036
(Wash. 1982) (defense team’s mental health expert not covered by attorney-client
privilege when defendant raises an insanity defense); Bahner & Gallion, supra note
257, at 201 (referring to this approach as the “automatic waiver rule” and citing
cases).
263. In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1987).
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while seeking to utilize the privilege as a “shield” to prevent access to
264
Other
other communications regarding the same subject matter.
courts, however, construe the doctrine more broadly, finding waiver
in circumstances in which a party has revealed some but not all
privileged communications on a particular subject matter, even if the
party revealed those communications outside the litigation context or
265
gained no strategic advantage from disclosure. Indeed, some courts
have stated that careless but inadvertent disclosure of privileged
communications waives the privilege for all communications on the
266
same subject.
Moreover, courts disagree on the fundamental question of whether
the attorney-client privilege provides absolute or qualified protection.
The privilege provides absolute and unqualified protection if,
assuming communications fall within its scope and are otherwise not
waived, a court or other decision maker cannot disregard the
protection based on a post hoc balancing of policies, interests, or
267
268
harms.
In Swidler & Berlin, the Supreme Court made clear that
the federal attorney-client privilege is absolute, rejecting the
government’s argument that, in the criminal context, a court ought
to balance the policies supporting the privilege against the need for
269
the information. Other courts that have addressed the issue tend to
270
agree, but there are significant exceptions. Courts in some
264. See, e.g., id. (refusing to extend subject matter waiver to circumstances in
which the initial disclosure was made extrajudicially and without prejudice to the
opposing party); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, No. M8-85, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2927, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1997) (stating that a complete subject matter waiver
applies when a party seeks to use the privilege selectively, as both a sword and a
shield in litigation).
265. See Browne of N.Y. City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 485 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (stating that, where a party has voluntarily disclosed some but not all
privileged communications on a subject, the privilege is waived as to that entire
subject, and the opposing party need not demonstrate prejudice or that the
privileged communications were put at issue in the litigation).
266. See, e.g., Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 883-84
(1st Cir. 1995) (finding that waiver premised on inadvertent disclosure is deemed to
encompass all other communications on the same subject) (citing Weil v.
Inv./Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24-25 & n.13 (9th Cir. 1981)).
267. See cases cited infra note 271.
268. 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
269. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 407-09 (1998). In Jaffee v.
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), the Court rejected similar calls for a qualified
psychotherapist-patient privilege. See id. at 17-18 (noting the importance of privacy
to effective psychotherapy and stating that allowing for post-communication
balancing of patient’s need for confidentiality with the need for disclosure would
render the privilege useless).
270. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court, 990 P.2d 591, 594-96 (Cal. 2000)
(stating that California courts are bound by statutes delineating the attorney-client
privilege and may not abrogate the privilege for policy or other reasons); Pub. Serv.
Co. v. Lyons, 10 P.3d 166, 170-71 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000) (refusing to engage in ad hoc
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jurisdictions—including Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey—
expressly reserve the authority to balance interests at the time the
privilege is asserted, and have, in certain circumstances, allowed
discovery of otherwise privileged materials based on the need for the
materials in the particular litigation or based on other policy
271
interests.
C. Choice of Law and Privilege
Because there is no single law of privilege, and because there are
significant doctrinal differences between jurisdictions, potential for
conflicts in governing standards exists whenever more than one
jurisdiction may have an interest in the claimed privilege. The most
prominent example is the circumstance in which the attorney-client
communications sought to be protected occurred in one state, while
the suit in which the protection is sought proceeds in another state,
and the two jurisdictions treat the privilege differently in some
272
relevant respect.
A coherent choice-of-law regime would have no effect on the
uncertainty created by either intra-jurisdictional confusion regarding

waiver analysis or rule making); Mueller v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 31 Pa. D. &
C.4th 23, 31 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1996) (rejecting need-based arguments and stating
that, in Pennsylvania, the attorney-client privilege is absolute).
271. See, e.g., Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 357, 365 (E.D.N.Y.
1996) (recognizing that, under New York law, the privilege is not absolute, and
ordering disclosure in part because of the “compelling public policy interest” in
protecting public health); Leonen v. Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. 94, 100 (D.N.J. 1990)
(noting that the party seeking to pierce the privilege must show, under New Jersey
law, the relevance and materiality of the communications, a legitimate need to
obtain the communications, and that the substance of the communications is not
available through other means) (citing In re Kozlov, 398 A.2d 882, 887 (N.J. 1979));
Cloutier v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. CV 900278184S, 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS 593
at *5-6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 1998) (discussing previous Connecticut decisions
allowing a balancing of interests in the criminal context and extending this approach
to the context of a bad faith claim against an insurer); see also McGranahan v. Dahar,
408 A.2d 121, 125-39 (N.H. 1979) (stating that the attorney-client privilege may not
be absolute where there is a compelling need for the information but finding no
compelling need under the instant circumstances); Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d
544, 555-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (holding that a third party can compel disclosure
of privileged information by showing a reasonable possibility of the occurrence of a
continuing or future crime likely to result in serious bodily injury or death). Some
states allow or require attorneys to disclose client confidences in certain
circumstances, such as to prevent a future crime that is likely to result in serious
injury or death. See Henderson, 962 S.W.2d at 557.
272. Professor Bradford indicates that there may be other jurisdictions with an
interest in applying their privilege law, including, for example, the interest of the
state where the underlying cause of action arose, the state in which the client is
domiciled, and the state in which the attorney practices. See Bradford, supra note 9,
at 913. There are added complexities when subpoenas for documents or deposition
testimony are issued in jurisdictions outside the forum.

GLYNN.PRINTER.DOC

122

12/4/2002 1:29 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:59
273

the privilege or vertical conflicts between state and federal law.
Nevertheless, a uniform approach to choice-of-law doctrine that
produces predictable outcomes at least would address the corrosive
effect that inter-jurisdictional conflicts have on reasonable certainty.
Yet, like the underlying substantive law governing privilege,
jurisdictions take divergent approaches to selecting which privilege
rules apply. The regime as a whole affords little, if any, predictability
to attorneys and their clients, attempting to determine—at the time
of a potential communication—whether the communication will be
protected.
In his 1991 article, Professor Bradford discusses six methods that
courts have employed or commentators have suggested for making
horizontal, that is, state to state, choice-of-law determinations where
274
potentially interested jurisdictions have conflicting privilege rules.
Two of these approaches almost always result in application of the
275
forum’s privilege law.
Courts adhering to choice-of-law principles
set forth in the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws tend to apply
the privilege law of the forum state because they view privilege as a
276
question of evidence or procedure to be resolved by forum law. In
addition, the few courts that have applied a public policy analysis to
conflicts in privilege law have decided that public policy favors forum
277
law.
273. As discussed previously, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and interpretive case
law essentially supply vertical choice-of-law rules for privileges in federal court. See
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 177, at 280-81 (discussing post-Rule 501
authority that has taken the position that, when there are federal and state claims in
a single action, federal privilege doctrine governs). Federal privilege law applies in
federal question cases, federal criminal cases, and cases in which both state and
federal law supply the rules of decision. Id. State privilege law applies in diversity
cases. Id. However, there is no corresponding, consistently-applied, vertical choiceof-law regime in state courts. One commentator has suggested that state courts
ought to apply federal privilege law in cases in which the underlying claims concern
areas of strong federal interest. See Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Federalism and Federal Rule of
Evidence 501: Privilege and Vertical Choice of Law, 82 GEO. L.J. 1781, 1832-36 (1994)
(discussing the growing federal interest in regulating the attorney-client privilege
because of the growth of federal litigation and federal regulation in various fields
and suggesting that the implication is that federal privileges should apply
preemptively even in state court when the dispute involves federally regulated
activity).
274. Bradford, supra note 9, at 915-16. In determining the applicable state law of
privilege in diversity cases, federal courts look to the forum state’s choice-of-law rules
pursuant to Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Man. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941).
275. Bradford, supra note 9, at 916-18.
276. See id. at 916-17 (noting that procedure is always determined by the forum
law under the Second Restatement test, where “procedure” and “evidence” are
defined broadly) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 596, 597
(1934)).
277. See id. at 917-18 (noting that, because courts using the public policy approach
have not set guidelines, policy interests are always strong enough to justify
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Other courts apply multi-factored interest or relationship tests.
Some of these courts apply an interest analysis, focusing on the policy
278
Under this approach,
interests underlying the laws of each case.
courts usually apply the law of the state in which the communications
occurred, although their reasoning is often far from clear. Other
courts apply the “most significant relationship” test set forth in
279
section six of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws. Section
six does not define “most significant relationship,” but rather lists a
number of factors that a court should consider in determining which
280
law to apply. Still other courts apply Professor Leflar’s five choice281
These considerations are (1) predictability
of-law considerations.
of results, (2) maintenance of the interstate and international order,
(3) simplification of the judicial task, (4) advancement of the forum’s
governmental interests, and (5) application of the better rule of
282
law. Although the first four of Leflar’s considerations are similar to
factors listed in section six, courts following this approach often
283
emphasize the last consideration—the “better rule of law.”
Finally, section 139 of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws
contains a section specifically addressing choice of privilege law,
although this approach had not been widely adopted at the time
284
Professor Bradford published his article.
Section 139 provides as
follows:
application of the forum law).
278. Id. at 919-32.
279. Id. at 932-39.
280. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1969). The factors
courts consider in making the determination are (a) the needs of the interstate and
international systems; (b) the relevant policies of the forum; (c) the relevant policies
of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue; (d) the protection of justified expectations; (e)
the basic policies underlying the particular field of law; (f) certainty, predictability,
and uniformity of result; and (g) ease in the determination and application of the
law to be applied. Id.
281. Bradford, supra note 9, at 941-42 (citing generally Robert A. Leflar, ChoiceInfluencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966); Robert A.
Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1584
(1966)).
282. Id.
283. See id. at 942 (noting that Leflar, unfortunately, provided no guidance for
determining which rule of law is the better rule, and, accordingly, courts have simply
chosen the rule of law originating within the court’s own jurisdiction).
284. Some courts had utilized this approach prior to 1991. See, e.g., Anas v.
Blecker, 141 F.R.D. 530, 531-32 (D. Fla. 1992) (noting that other courts had utilized
section 139 to resolve choice-of-law questions regarding privileges); Consolidation
Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250, 252 (Ill. 1982) (discussing how the
lower court had applied section 139 and applied forum privilege law rather than the
law of Wisconsin). Section 139 has received more attention since then, although
courts often refer to it and then apply a standard “most significant relationship”
analysis.
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(1) Evidence that is not privileged under the local law of the state
which has the most significant relationship with the
communication will be admitted, even though it would be
privileged under the local law of the forum, unless the admission of
such evidence would be contrary to the strong public policy of the
forum.
(2) Evidence that is privileged under the local law of the state
which has the most significant relationship with the
communication but which is not privileged under the local law of
the forum will be admitted unless there is some special reason why
285
the forum policy favoring admission should not be given effect.

Application of section 139, absent one of the exceptions, results in
286
The exceptions
the selection of the law that favors disclosure.
contained in the two subparts of section 139 provide little guidance
on when a court should otherwise opt for the stronger privilege law.
Indeed, Professor Bradford suggests that these exceptions are
sufficiently subject to manipulation that courts may simply revert to a
287
forum preference rule.
Moreover, these exceptions are supposed
288
to be applied only in “rare” circumstances.
Professor Bradford details, persuasively, the flaws in all of these
289
approaches. Choice-of-law rules that always result in the choice of
the forum’s privilege law fail to foster certainty because attorneys and
clients often cannot predict, at the time of the communication, the
290
forum in which the privilege may need to be asserted. The multifactored interest and relationship approaches likewise do not
produce predictable outcomes, provide little concrete guidance to
285. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 (1969).
286. See Bradford, supra note 9, at 939 (noting that, under each of the subparts of
the test, evidence is admitted unless admission violates “strong” forum policy).
287. Id. at 941 (noting that, if forum policy considerations are deemed broad
enough, a state court can always apply its own law).
288. See Christopher F. Dugan, Foreign Privileges in U.S. Litigation, 5 DETROIT C. L.J.
INT’L L. & PRAC. 33, 38 (1996) (stating that, absent some strong public policy or
special reason, section 139 favors a policy of wide admissibility).
289. Professor Bradford explains why the existing approaches to privilege conflicts
foster uncertainty:
Forum law rules are inherently unpredictable; attorney and client usually do
not know when they communicate what the forum will be. Interest analysis,
the most significant relationship test, section 139 of the Second Restatement,
and the better law approach all require post hoc judgments concerning the
weight of state policy interests. Such tests are inherently uncertain, more
than one alternative is often logically justifiable, and attorney and client
cannot reasonably predict which law any given court will choose. Thus, a
flexible approach like interest analysis might achieve better results in
particular cases, but only at the expense of the policies the attorney-client
privilege was meant to serve.
Bradford, supra note 9, at 945-46.
290. Id. at 945.
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291

courts, and are easily manipulated.
Similarly, section 139 fosters
uncertainty because, not only is the forum fortuitous, but the
approach is subject both to the least protective doctrine and to
exceptions, which, if applied, are as unwieldy as the other balancing
292
approaches.
In response, Professor Bradford proposes a territorial rule: where
there is a conflict between attorney-client privilege doctrines, the
court should apply the law of the jurisdiction in which the attorney
293
involved in the communication practices.
He contends that this
approach is the best way to enhance certainty and predictability in
294
application of privilege law in the context of conflicts. Professor
Bradford’s approach also is superior to approaches that default to the
rule of the forum because it recognizes the true nature of the
privilege: it provides substantive protection of extra-judicial
295
communications designed to serve extrinsic interests.
Despite its potential appeal, no court has explicitly adopted
296
Professor Bradford’s proposal. To the contrary, since 1991, courts
have continued to apply the foregoing, troublesome approaches to
297
choosing among conflicting privilege doctrines.
291. Id. at 945-46.
292. Id.; see also Russell J. Weintraub, The Silver Anniversary of the Second Conflicts
Restatement: “At Least, To Do No Harm”: Does the Second Restatement of Conflicts Meet the
Hippocratic Standard?, 56 MD. L. REV. 1284, 1305 (1997) (criticizing section 139).
293. See Bradford, supra note 9, at 948-49 (noting that the forum in which the
communication takes place, the state in which the attorney practices, and the state of
the client’s domicile are all options, but that these options could conflict in any given
case).
294. Id.
295. See id. at 948 (noting that the privilege is intended to foster open
communication between attorneys and clients).
296. Two courts have mentioned Professor Bradford’s territorial approach but
have not adopted it. VLT Corp. v. Unitrode Corp., 194 F.R.D. 8, 16 n.4 (D. Mass.
2000); Rivera v. Periodicos Todo Bayamon, Nos. 108 & 113, 1997 WL 43202, at *3
(D.P.R. June 23, 1997).
297. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 200 F.R.D. 401, 405 (N.D.
Ill. 2001) (holding that local Illinois law governs the attorney-client privilege);
Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 357, 363 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (purporting
to apply New York choice-of-law rules to hold that New York’s “greater interest”
requires application of New York privilege law because the plaintiffs were from New
York and the defendant sold, marketed, and advertised its products in New York); In
re Best Lock Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 16281, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 175, at *2022 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2000) (holding, pursuant to the “most significant relationship”
test, that Delaware law on the accountant-client privilege applies largely because the
party seeking privilege protection chose to incorporate in Delaware); Lee v. Engle,
C.A. No. 13323, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 149, at *17 (Del. Ch. Dec. 15, 1995) (choosing
Delaware rather than Illinois law on the accountant-client privilege after finding that
Delaware had the most significant relationship to the communications despite the
fact that accountants practiced in Illinois); Barnes v. Confidential Party, 638 So. 2d
283, 289 (Miss. 1993) (applying the “center of gravity” approach and finding that
Georgia law of privilege applied based on greater contacts with the underlying
dispute, even though the privilege issues surfaced in a dispute over depositions taken

GLYNN.PRINTER.DOC

126

12/4/2002 1:29 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:59

D. Extrajudicial Proceedings
Although controversy swirls around the attorney-client privilege,
the discussion tends to focus only on state and federal courts’
298
treatment of the privilege doctrine and privilege claims.
A few
scholars, however, have criticized members of Congress for failing to
299
respect privilege claims by persons appearing before them, and
after some earlier controversy, there also seems to be consensus that
300
Yet,
the privilege generally applies in federal agency proceedings.
beyond these particular settings, there has been little in-depth
discussion of the application of privileges in most nonjudicial
settings, including arbitral, administrative, and legislative
proceedings. Until now, no one has discussed the overall impact of
the availability of these nonjudicial fora on the certainty of the
attorney-client privilege.
This question, however, is becoming
evermore important because an increasing number of adversarial
proceedings are occurring outside of the traditional courtroom
301
setting.
from a Mississippi resident in Mississippi); Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643,
647 (Tex. 1995) (holding that the most significant relationship test applies in
determining which state’s privilege law applies); cf. Tartaglia v. Paul Revere Life Ins.
Co., 948 F. Supp. 325, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying, in a subpoena enforcement
action, New York privilege law after undertaking a relationship or contacts analysis,
but limiting that analysis, appropriately, to the subpoenaed party and its confidential
communications).
298. Cf. Glenn A. Beard, Congress v. the Attorney-Client Privilege: A “Full and Frank”
Discussion, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 119, 121-36 (1997) (describing as “sporadic” debates
over the application of the privilege to the congressional context).
299. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Rich, Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Congressional
Investigations, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 145, 145-46, 170-72 (1988) (discussing Congress’s
refusal to recognize the privilege and arguing that Congress should be bound by the
privilege and should enact legislation accordingly); James Hamilton, The AttorneyClient Privilege and Congress, ABA J. SEC. LITIG., Winter 1986, at 3 (criticizing the view
in Congress that the attorney-client privilege is applicable in congressional
investigations at the discretion of the investigating sub-committee and discussing
examples of when Congress has refused to recognize the privilege); see also Beard,
supra note 298, at 121-36 (recognizing that Congress has the authority to exercise its
discretion in determining whether to respect the privilege, but advocating that it
adopt procedural rules to govern that discretion).
300. See, e.g., United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336
(1915) (holding that the Interstate Commerce Commission could not examine
confidential communications between the railroad and its attorneys); Civil
Aeronautics Bd. v. Air Trans. Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 318, 319 (D.D.C. 1961) (holding
that, when an agency has the power to compel testimony, the privilege nevertheless is
applicable, unless there is a statutory directive to the contrary); Gene A. Petersen,
Attorney-Client Privilege in Internal Revenue Service Investigations, 54 MINN. L. REV. 67, 6870 (1969) (concluding that the privilege remains available in federal agency
proceedings); Rich, supra note 299, at 168 (noting that the privilege is generally
respected in federal agency proceedings).
301. See Allen Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the 1990s, 46
ADMIN. L. REV. 75, 75 (1994) (discussing the growing number of administrative law
judges and stating that there are well over a million administrative matters or cases a
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The first issue is whether the privilege even applies in these
nonjudicial settings. Again, the legal community seemingly agrees
302
that federal agencies must respect the privilege, and many federal
agencies must resort, in any event, to subpoena enforcement actions
303
in federal court to compel disclosure.
In addition, some state
statutes and courts have made clear that privilege protections apply in
304
state administrative and agency proceedings.
Similarly, some
leading arbitral organizations, including the American Arbitration
Association (“AAA”), the National Association of Securities Dealers
(“NASD”), and the Center for Public Resources (“CPR”) Institute for
Dispute Resolution have adopted rules providing that the privilege
305
applies in their proceedings.
Yet, in other settings, the status of the privilege is far from clear.
Members of Congress, for example, have refused to honor attorney-

year); Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as “Litigation Lite”: Procedural and Evidentiary Norms
Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1290-1303 (1998)
(tracing the recent, dramatic growth of litigation alternatives and forms of ADR,
including binding arbitration).
302. See sources cited supra note 300.
303. See Mobil Exploration & Producing United States, Inc. v. Dep’t of Interior,
180 F.3d 1192, 1200 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that administrative subpoenas are not
self-executing, and, therefore, require an order of the federal district court
compelling disclosure); see also In re Ramirez, 905 F.2d 97, 98 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing
cases suggesting that a party wishing to challenge the enforceability of an
administrative subpoena should refuse to comply with the subpoena and await an
enforcement action by the issuing agency in federal district court).
304. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4503(a) (Consol. 2002) (making clear that the privilege
applies in administrative and legislative proceedings); Squealer Feeds v. Pickering,
530 N.W.2d 678, 683-84 (Iowa 1995) (assuming that the attorney-client privilege
applies in agency proceedings); S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 784 P.2d 1373,
1376-77 (Cal. 1990) (holding that, absent a statutory provision to the contrary, the
privilege applies against state agencies); Davis v. Sarasota County Pub. Hosp. Bd., 480
So. 2d 203, 205 (Fla. App. 1985) (concluding that the privilege applies in agency
proceedings). The Model State Administrative Procedure Act provides that
privileges relating to evidence apply equally to agencies.
MODEL STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 4-212(a) (1981).
305. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION R. 33(c) (1999) (Am. Arbitration Ass’n)
(providing that principles of privilege apply to arbitration conducted under
association rules); National Association of Securities Dealers, NASD Notice to Members
99-90, para. II.B (Nov. 1999) (recognizing objections to production of documents
based on “an established privilege”); INST. ARBITRATION R. 11.2 (1997) (Ctr. for Pub.
Res.) (calling for application of attorney-client privilege and the work-product
protections); see also James H. Carter, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Arbitration,
CURRENTS, Winter 1996/1997, at 15 (discussing the formal recognition of the
application of privileges in some arbitration proceedings and how the few courts that
have reached the issue have suggested that it should be honored). Moreover, parties
can include a provision in the arbitration agreement making clear that the privilege
will apply. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION R. 1 (noting that parties may amend the
rules applicable to them under rules by agreement); UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 3(a), (c)
(2001) (providing for liberal application of privilege principles in arbitrations and
mediations conducted under the Act, but allowing for parties to agree otherwise).
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306

client privilege claims.
In other jurisdictions, it is uncertain
whether privilege doctrine applies in some administrative and
307
legislative proceedings. Indeed, although rarely discussed by courts
and commentators, some state agencies and administrators insist that
308
the privilege cannot be asserted against them.
The reluctance of
state agencies and administrators also is evident in state court
309
decisions requiring compliance with state privilege law.
Federal
agencies have shown similar reluctance to respect the confidentiality
310
of privileged communications, as have arbitral tribunals, which are
311
not governed by arbitration rules recognizing the privilege.
Even when privilege protections extend to these proceedings as a
formal matter, the scope of the protection is left undefined. For
example, various state statutes and arbitration rules simply provide
312
that the privilege applies, without articulating what the privilege is.
Thus, nonjudicial decision makers, like judges, must decide which
privilege doctrine to apply before determining whether the privilege
protects the particular communications at issue. These decision
makers are left to choose among conflicting approaches between
jurisdictions and courts, and to decide for themselves, when the law is
unclear, how to balance properly the competing interests in defining
the scope of protection, and whether to accept various arguments for
306. See Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 193 F.R.D. 73, 77-79 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(describing how a member of Congress released to the public documents that the
tobacco defendants maintained were privileged, while the litigation over the status of
the documents continued).
307. Cf. Iowa Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 206 F.R.D. 630, 642 (S.D.
Iowa 2001) (advising that courts should carefully scrutinize assertions of privilege
that would reduce the effectiveness of legislatively-mandated administrative
investigations); United States v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 420, 430 (N.D. Ill. 1972)
(similarly suggesting privilege may be relaxed or waived where administrative
agencies pursue investigations under legislative authority).
308. I have been unable to locate commentary precisely on this point.
Nevertheless, anecdotally I am aware of at least one circumstance in which a party
encountered such a refusal by a state agency.
309. See cases cited supra note 304.
310. See, e.g., Brune, supra note 2 (noting the Justice Department’s recently
promulgated rule allowing government agents to monitor conversations between
post-September 11 detainees and their attorneys); Petersen, supra note 300, at 69
(discussing the Civil Aeronautics Board’s reluctance to recognize the privilege in
proceedings before it).
311. E.g., Evan J. Spelfogel, New Trends in the Arbitration of Employment Disputes, ARB.
J., Mar. 1993, at 6, 13 (stating that the attorney-client and work-product privileges are
not always viewed as binding in arbitral fora); Carter, supra note 305, at 15 (noting
that, before the American Arbitration Association’s adoption of a privilege rule, the
association had found that some arbitrators had ruled that the privilege does not
apply in arbitral proceedings).
312. E.g., COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION R. 33(c) (1999) (Am. Arbitration Ass’n)
(providing for the application of principles of privilege, but only referring loosely to
“confidential communications”); MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 4-212(a) (1981)
(lacking a privilege definition).
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313

waiver or qualification.
This situation creates an enormous amount of uncertainty.
Attorneys and clients often cannot predict at the time of the
communication the forum—judicial or nonjudicial—in which they
may have to assert the privilege. Even if they recognize the possibility
of having to assert the privilege in a nonjudicial forum, it is often
314
unclear whether the decision maker will recognize the privilege. If
governing rules or law mandate recognition of the privilege, the
decision maker is left to decide the scope of protection. Many of
these decision makers must make such determinations without the
benefit of legal training, legal assistance, or extensive briefing. And,
in many circumstances, judicial review of privilege decisions is
315
unavailable or severely limited, such as in the arbitration context.
In other contexts, resort to the courts may be impossible as a
practical matter.
Thus, as nonjudicial forms of dispute resolution grow in
importance, the unpredictability of privilege protections grows with
them. In many jurisdictions, this reality has largely eluded privilege
316
policy makers or is simply outside their control.
E. Today’s Uncertain and Unpredictable Privilege
Once the three previous subsections are considered together, the
largely uncertain and unpredictable nature of the attorney-client
privilege emerges. There is little Supreme Court leadership on
privilege doctrine, significant inter- and intra-jurisdictional
uncertainties and confusion in substantive privilege doctrine, and
differing and unreliable choice-of-privilege-law principles. The
conflicts and confusion in privilege doctrine are not relegated to the
outer edges; rather, many of the disputes address issues lying at the
heart of the protection. In addition, it is becoming harder for
attorneys and clients to predict at the time of the communication the
313. See Spelfogel, supra note 311, at 13 (characterizing arbitrators as “piercing
with respect to privileges,” and willing to forgo the deference to privilege protections
that might otherwise be accorded in judicial fora).
314. See, e.g., id.; Symposium, New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Symposium on Arbitration
in the Securities Industry (November 21, 1994), 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1505, 1563-64 (1995)
(statement of John Peloso) (questioning whether arbitrators recognize and correctly
evaluate privileges and suggesting a tendency on the part of arbitrators to err on the
side of allowing discovery).
315. See Laurie A. Kamaiko, Reinsurance Arbitrations, 557 PRAC. L. INST. LITIG. 201,
281 (1997) (discussing how the availability of a judicial remedy for parties in
arbitration is unclear).
316. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984) (determining that,
despite a state’s desire to provide judicial review of discovery decisions in arbitration,
states are preempted from doing so by the Federal Arbitration Act).
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fora—judicial or otherwise—in which clients ultimately may seek
privilege protection.
And it gets worse. The uncertainty is magnified by the fact that,
once allegedly privileged communications are revealed, they may lose
the benefit of the privilege, even if the court’s decision to compel
disclosure in the first proceeding was erroneous or the protection
afforded by the original forum is weaker than protections available in
317
other fora.
To illustrate, when a party asserts the privilege
unsuccessfully, the asserting party must disclose those
318
communications to the adverse party.
At that point, the
319
As a formal matter,
communications are no longer confidential.
this occurrence calls into question whether the party may assert in
later proceedings that the communications are confidential,
320
particularly if the content is available to the public.
Some courts
have held that parties can no longer claim privilege if, as a practical
matter, third parties or the public know of the allegedly privileged
321
communications.
Moreover, even if a party’s legal right to claim
317. See, e.g., FDIC v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 1992) (finding no
privilege with respect to document disclosed to opposing counsel); Duplan Corp. v.
Deering Milliken Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1162 (D.S.C. 1974) (rejecting the
contention that waiver of the attorney-client privilege requires intentional
relinquishment); Underwater Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549
(D.D.C. 1970) (finding that an inadvertently disclosed document loses privilege
protection when “[i]t’s confidentiality was breached thereby destroying the basis for
the continued existence of the privilege”); Clark v. State, 261 S.W.2d 339, 342-43
(Tex. Crim. App.) (stating that telephone operator may testify to the contents of an
otherwise privileged telephone conversation heard by eavesdropping), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 855 (1953). Again, in many circumstances, there will be no opportunity to
appeal the decision prior to the disclosure. See supra note 193 and accompanying
text.
318. See generally 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at 550-54
(McNaughton rev. 1961) (discussing disclosure and attorney-client privilege).
319. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 317.
320. See, e.g., In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that matters
disclosed in public are not confidential and thus lose their privileged status); see also
Genentech, Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1416-18 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (holding that, where a party has been found to have waived the privilege
inadvertently through careless procedures, the privilege is gone and cannot be
asserted in another forum). But see Leonen v. Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. 94, 99-100
(D.N.J. 1990) (refusing to recognize waiver where opposing side actually had
possession of privileged documents that had been produced previously pursuant to a
court order). And, of course, nonmutual issue preclusion may bar the party from
further litigating the issue of privilege, if the first privilege decision has merged into
a final judgment. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 324-29 (1979)
(permitting the use of nonmutual issue preclusion by allowing stockholders to
preclude a corporation and its officers and directors from relitigating issues
previously decided in an action by the Securities and Exchange Commission).
321. Cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 825 F.2d 231, 234 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding
privilege issues were moot after disclosure of those materials to a grand jury because
“the cat has been out of the bag” and there was no effective relief the appellate court
could grant); see also Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 193 F.R.D. 73, 74-75 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
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privilege is not lost upon compelled disclosure, the cat is out of the
bag: the confidences are no longer secret, and, in complex litigation,
adversaries in later proceedings may have gained the benefit of
knowing such confidences whether or not those communications will
322
be admissible at trial.
Thus, a single judge, administrative law
judge, arbitrator, commissioner, or legislator may destroy privilege
protections permanently. This is particularly troubling given that
erroneous privilege decisions are more likely while privilege law
remains unclear.
I am not suggesting that privilege protections are never certain
enough to promote client candor and communication. Again, many
attorneys and their clients probably believe, mistakenly, that their
323
communications are absolutely safe from disclosure, and some
clients may be willing to speak freely with attorneys even in the face
of substantial uncertainty. Also, in some circumstances, parties can
take steps to reduce the uncertainty. For example, one can reduce
the uncertainty arising from inter-jurisdictional conflicts by including
forum selection clauses in agreements that may someday be the
324
subject of litigation.
In addition, other doctrines, including the
work product doctrine, may provide additional layers of protection
325
for some communications.

(affirming and incorporating the magistrate judge’s order denying defendant’s
motion to suppress). Prior to the New York decision, a Minnesota court ordered
disclosure of 37,000 documents that the defendants claimed to be privileged. Id. at
74. While the Minnesota decision was stayed, members of Congress who subpoenaed
the documents released them onto the Internet, over defendants’ objection. Id. at
77. The magistrate judge overseeing discovery in the New York case denied the
defendants’ motion to suppress discovery, stating that “to the extent th[e] disclosure
might inhibit candid attorney-client communications, that inhibition already has
occurred.” Id. at 82. The district judge then affirmed, noting that a court “should
not blind itself in the investigative stage of an important litigation to critical facts
known to the world.” Id. at 74. While the court left until trial the unresolved
questions of admissibility, the court suggested that it would look to other factors—
probative force, necessity, and cumulativeness—in making admissibility
determinations. Id. at 75.
322. Cf. In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 964 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that the
court could send the case back for re-trial without use of the protected materials, but,
practically speaking, the information was now known).
323. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (discussing survey results
suggesting that individual clients and corporate employees may speak freely with
attorneys because they believe their communications are in fact safe from
disclosure).
324. See generally Young Lee, Forum Selection Clauses: Problems of Enforcement in
Diversity Cases and State Courts, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 663, 665-75 (discussing the
factors and application of well drafted forum selection clauses).
325. See Ken M. Zeider, Inadvertent Disclosure and the Attorney-Client Privilege: Looking
to the Work-Product Doctrine for Guidance, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1358-64 (2001)
(discussing work-product protection for disclosed communications).
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Even given all of the problems discussed above, there is probably a
kernel of fairly certain protection. For example, a natural—rather
than corporate—person who orally communicates with an attorney
alone, for the purpose of receiving purely legal advice, and intends to
keep the entire conversation confidential, can be confident that the
communications will be privileged in a subsequent judicial
proceeding, provided that the circumstances of the communication
in no way implicate even a broadly construed crime-fraud or at-issue
exception, and the client and the attorney are informed and careful
326
enough not to involuntarily waive the privilege.
Yet, once one
moves slightly away from this core—to include, inter alia,
communications from a corporate agent to in-house counsel, from an
attorney to a client, embodied in drafts of documents, circulated to
representatives or consultants, or which may be “at-issue” in later
litigation—this confidence should quickly erode.
Thus, in many contexts, attorneys and their clients have little
assurance, looking forward from the time of a communication, that
the communication will be protected. We have not, therefore,
327
achieved reasonable certainty. To the extent attorneys and clients
think their communications are safe from disclosure, the foregoing
analysis ought to make them think again. The law governing the
attorney-client privilege within particular jurisdictions and across the
country is so conflicted, confused, and underdeveloped, I suggest
that trial judges and other decision makers are free to make ad hoc
privilege determinations in many circumstances. This regime makes
no sense: an uncertain privilege creates significant transactional and
social costs—often inhibiting access to the truth—while failing to
provide the assurance of protection necessary to enhance attorneyclient communication and candor.
III. THE SOLUTION: FEDERALIZING PRIVILEGE
Part I discusses the need for reasonably certain attorney-client
privilege protections. Part II demonstrates that, despite this need,
the privilege affords surprisingly and intolerably uncertain
protection. Now, more than a quarter century after Congress passed
326. Cf. Theories and Justifications, supra note 30, at 1488 (stating that, even
uncertain rules generally possess at least a core of certainty, surrounded by a
“penumbra of uncertainty”).
327. After discussing the amount of confusion and conflict in the law of privilege,
a leading treatise reached the following conclusion: “The foregoing state of affairs is
clearly less than optimum from the standpoint that predictability in the application
of the privilege, logically indispensable for any utilitarian effect, is largely lacking in
many areas.” MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 87, at 347.
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on its last opportunity to fashion privilege doctrine, significant
reform is both justified and needed. Although the call for greater
certainty in the privilege area is not new, no existing proposal
addresses the entire problem. Indeed, even the best, most ambitious
proposed reforms—for example, adopting a sensible choice-of-law
regime or codifying a new set of privilege rules for federal criminal
and federal question cases—offer only partial solutions that do not
address key root causes of the existing disarray.
The only way to achieve reasonable certainty in privilege law is to
enact federal legislation providing clear, national protections for
attorney-client communications that will apply regardless of the
fortuity of the forum—state, federal, or nonjudicial—in which the
privilege is asserted. Only a codified, preemptive, and unqualified
federal privilege can resolve current privilege woes.
Perhaps contrary to prevailing thought, Congress is the most
appropriate policy-making body to address the existing problems with
privilege doctrine. First, the common-law method has failed to
328
develop predictable privilege protections. Second, under the Rules
Enabling Act, only Congress can codify federal privilege
329
protections; hence, even the more limited proposed reforms—such
as codifying a set of privilege rules for federal courts—would require
congressional action.
Although enacting sufficiently detailed
legislation would require Congress to resolve a number of difficult,
lingering issues, these issues deserve vigorous debate and resolution.
Congress is now well-equipped for such policy making: it has far more
commentary, history, and experience to draw upon than it did a
330
quarter century ago, as well as established vehicles for receiving
331
judicial, scholarly, and other input.
Moreover,
although
privilege
protections
often
are
332
mischaracterized as procedural or evidentiary “rules,” they embody
333
substantive protections or rights promoting extra-judicial interests.
Thus, Congress—which already has recognized the substantive nature
334
of privilege protections —has the power under the Commerce
Clause to enact legislation guaranteeing these protections in all
328. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
329. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2000); see also Zeider, supra note 325, at 1316-38
(discussing the common-law background, application, and possible codification of
revised privilege doctrine).
330. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
331. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
332. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 751 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1985)
(defining the attorney-client privilege as an evidentiary rule regulating disclosure).
333. See infra notes 395-401 and accompanying text.
334. See infra notes 404, 406 and accompanying text.
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courts and nonjudicial fora, and this exercise of power does not
offend the Tenth Amendment.
A. The Need For a Codified, Preemptive, Federal Privilege
1.

The limitations of other proposed reforms
Since 1975, and particularly since Upjohn, there has been a steady
stream of critical commentary and proposed reforms. Many of these
proposals have sought to increase certainty by altering or resolving
335
disputes regarding various aspects of privilege doctrine.
While
some calls for change or greater clarity have gained widespread
336
337
adherence, others have received only sparse attention, and still
338
Although I support some of
others have been largely ignored.
these proposed changes in privilege doctrine, even widespread
adoption of any particular proposal would have only a limited impact.
Despite plenty of attention, uncertainty and confusion in many areas
of privilege law remain pervasive rather than isolated, and are both
inter- and intra-jurisdictional. Thus, the problems with privilege,
given their pervasiveness and magnitude, cannot be addressed on an
issue-by-issue basis.
Recognizing the need for more holistic reforms, other
commentators have sought to address systemic problems in the
creation and application of privilege doctrine.
For example,
Professor Broun and others are seeking to revitalize the movement to
convince Congress to codify a set of testimonial privileges—including
the attorney-client privilege—applicable in federal criminal and
339
federal question cases.
Such a codification offers a number of
potential benefits, including increasing certainty by providing a
uniform set of privilege rules for federal disputes and promoting the
convergence of privilege law by providing national leadership on
340
Other reformers have sought to create greater
privilege doctrine.
certainty not by clarifying or enhancing convergence of substantive
335. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 68, at 281 (advocating abandonment of the
Garner approach because its balancing test fosters uncertainty); Talton, supra note
205, at 301-06 (proposing a single, more predictable standard for determining
whether inadvertent disclosure constitutes waiver); Weiss, supra note 68, at 394
(arguing that, to promote certainty, courts should use specified criteria to determine
which communications between in-house attorneys and their clients are privileged).
336. See Zeider, supra note 325, at 1320-33 (outlining popular proposals).
337. See id. (discussing such theories as the “subjective intent approach” and the
“circumstances approach”).
338. See id. (alluding to other derivative theories).
339. See sources cited supra note 10.
340. Broun, supra note 1, at 784-85.
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privilege rules, but rather by advocating adoption of new choice-oflaw principles that would give attorneys and clients assurance that a
particular state’s privilege law would apply, regardless of the court in
which the litigation occurs. Professor Bradford’s approach, which
calls for federal legislation providing that, when there is a conflict,
the privilege law of the jurisdiction in which the attorney practices
governs the privilege determination, is perhaps the most convincing
341
of these proposals.
Undoubtedly, implementation of such broad reforms would be
342
steps in the right direction.
Nevertheless, the reforms thus far
proposed cannot address all of the causes of uncertainty, nor all of
the inadequacies within the current regime. Professor Bradford
concedes that his proposal will not address the uncertainty created by
343
the vertical differences between federal and state law.
He also
acknowledges that his choice-of-law proposal would not address the
uncertainties and confusion in privilege law within particular
344
jurisdictions.
Moreover, while he suggests intra-jurisdictional
uncertainties are “around the edges,” the discussion in Part II, supra,
demonstrates that many unresolved questions are in fact both central
and common. Thus, a sensible choice-of-law regime is not a
complete solution because federal versus state conflicts and
significant intra-jurisdictional confusion will remain.
While Professor Broun’s proposal will assist in providing much
needed clarity in federal privilege law, it alone cannot produce
sufficient certainty. His proposed rules for testimonial privileges
would apply only in federal court, and more particularly, only in
341. See Bradford, supra note 9, at 945-46 (arguing that, if the attorney-client
privilege is to serve its purpose to produce certain and predictable results, only a
territorial rule will allow an attorney and client to know in advance whether their
communications will be protected). Professor Bradford offers several reasons why a
rule centered on the state of practice is superior to other territorial rules—such as
one based on the state of the communication or the client’s domicile. See id. at 94650 (listing attorney expertise in local privilege law, and the relative ease and costeffectiveness of limiting privilege research to the attorney’s local forum). Because
his proposal can only enhance predictability if it is widely adopted, he suggests that it
should be imposed on the states by federal legislation. Id. at 951.
342. For example, even though Professor Bradford’s territorial rule would not
create uniformity, it would aid the attorney and client in predicting—at the time of
the communication—whether the communication is privileged. It would also reduce
the “cat out of the bag” problem—at least for privilege decisions that are not
erroneous—because every court would apply the privilege law of the attorney’s state
of practice.
343. See Bradford, supra note 9, at 950 (conceding proposal permits some chilling
of attorney-client communications because the attorney and client often will not
know at the time of the communication whether the claim will be state or federal or
both).
344. Id. at 950-51.
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345

federal criminal and federal question cases.
Thus, privilege
protections will continue to be subject to the fortuity of the forum
and nature of the underlying claims, unless federal codification were
to promote significant convergence and clarity in state privilege law.
However, such convergence would take years and may not be
forthcoming. Although I agree with Professor Broun and others that
an absence of national leadership on the law of privilege—from
Congress and the Supreme Court—has contributed to the lack of
uniformity in privilege law, such leadership alone cannot solve the
problem. Even in the rare circumstance in which the Supreme Court
has provided some leadership, such as in Upjohn and decisions
stressing the need for unqualified protections, states have been slow
346
or resistant to follow the federal lead.
Similarly, state courts and
legislatures have resisted adopting the original and revised versions of
Uniform Rule of Evidence 502, despite a general willingness to adopt
347
other parts of the Revised Uniform Rules of Evidence.
Thus,
federal codification, even if finely crafted, offers an incomplete
solution unless it extends well beyond federal question and federal
criminal cases.
2.

Systemic problems with a common-law approach to privilege
The problems that render these other reforms incomplete—
continuing inter-jurisdictional conflict, lingering intra-jurisdictional
confusion, and the unlikelihood of convergence—are largely
attributable to a single source, namely, the common law. Indeed,
satisfactory reform requires acknowledging, as few have, that the
traditional common-law approach to developing privilege doctrine
has failed and must be abandoned in its entirety.
Professor Broun, although recognizing the virtues of the common348
law approach, accepts the premise that codification will bring about

345. In deference to objections raised when Congress rejected codification in the
early 1970s, Professor Broun’s proposal would maintain the current rule that, in
federal court, state privilege law will govern where state law supplies the rule of
decision. Broun, supra note 1, at 934-36, 953-57.
346. See supra notes 217-22, 266-70 and accompanying text. Professor Broun
suggests that the careful scrutiny state courts have given Upjohn suggests the force of
federal precedent in the states. Broun, supra note 1, at 947-49. However, state
jurisdictions’ direct or indirect resistance to the Upjohn approach suggests that its
impact is more limited.
347. See supra notes 134-38 (summarizing judicial and legislative treatment of Rule
502).
348. See Broun, supra note 1, at 934 (stating that the common-law approach avoids
some risks of a legislative approach, including the freezing of privilege at the drafting
stage and the influence of various special interests).
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greater certainty, at least as it applies to federal privilege law.
Codifying a set of clear privilege rules applicable in federal cases is
not enough, however, because court-made privilege doctrine
predominates elsewhere. In many states, as in federal court, privilege
350
law is expressly left to the common law. In other jurisdictions, the
privilege has been codified, but at a level of generality that leaves
much of the law governing the details of privilege to judicial creation
351
and modification.
Thus, throughout the country, privilege is
largely a creature of common law.
The common-law approach cannot foster the needed certainty and
predictability in the law of privilege for a number of reasons. First,
there is the problem of “too many cooks in the kitchen.” Forging
privilege doctrine with specificity is an enormously difficult task.
Indeed, many disagreements within and between jurisdictions can be
attributed in part to the fact that striking the right balance between
promoting client candor and protecting the truth-seeking function is
exceptionally challenging. Courts simply disagree on how this
balance should be struck and how to fashion privilege doctrine
accordingly. In addition, courts do not make policy in a vacuum.
They make these determinations in specific contexts—that is,
confronting differing types of communications, parties, and conflicts
before them—which, added to the competing interests courts must
consider, naturally lead to disparate conclusions.
Second, it is axiomatic that the common-law method is ill-equipped
for developing clearly defined rules. The flexibility of the case
method is one of the common law’s enduring strengths. But, in the
attorney-client privilege context, in which substantial certainty
regarding future legal treatment and consequences is not merely
efficient or preferable, but also essential, the common-law method is
inadequate.
Ironically, this problem is made plain in Upjohn, despite the
Supreme Court’s emphasis on the need for certainty. After stating
that a privilege uncertain in doctrine or application “is little better
349. See id. at 935 (arguing that a more satisfactory set of rules could be
promulgated governing privilege in cases involving federal law than that developed
by courts on “a circuit-by-circuit, district-by-district, and case-by-case basis”); id. at 14142 (discussing how codification would make privilege doctrine simpler and more
certain).
350. See supra notes 138, 221 and accompanying text.
351. Some jurisdictions have adopted all or part of the original or revised versions
of Uniform Rule of Evidence 502 or similar codifications. These codifications,
however, do not provide detailed or clear guidance in many contexts, including the
general parameters of the privilege, the crime-fraud exception, and waiver doctrine.
See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4503 (Consol. 2002); REV. UNIF. R. EVID. 502(a)-(c) (1999).
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the Court went on to state as follows:

Needless to say, we decide only the case before us, and do not
undertake to draft a set of rules which should govern challenges to
investigatory subpoenas. Any such approach would violate the spirit
of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 . . . While such a “case-by-case” basis
may to some slight extent undermine desirable certainty in the
boundaries of the attorney-client privilege, it obeys the spirit of the
Rules.353

The Upjohn Court correctly observed that the limits of its
holding would undermine certainty, but, for the reasons
previously discussed, the Court wrongly predicted that the effect
354
on certainty would be “slight.”
Likewise, the Court correctly
concluded that it was unable to provide greater certainty, but the
Court was wrong to suggest that Congress imposed the operative
constraints. Although I contend that Congress mistakenly left the
development of the attorney-client privilege to the courts,
Congress’s view that the privilege would be developed on a caseby-case basis was simply descriptive of the common-law method.
Indeed, at the very outset of the Upjohn opinion, the Court all but
concedes that it is constrained by its own adherence to the
strictures of the case method, rather than any constraints
imposed by Congress:
We are acutely aware, however, that we sit to decide concrete cases
and not abstract propositions of law. We decline to lay down a
broad rule or series of rules to govern all conceivable future
questions in this area, even were we able to do so.355
352. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
353. Id. at 396-97. The Court did virtually the same thing fifteen years later, when
it recognized the existence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege under federal law in
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996). In recognizing the need for an absolute—
rather than qualified—privilege, the Court declared that “[m]aking the promise of
confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s later evaluation of the relative
importance of the patient’s interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure
would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege” because the participants in the
confidential conversation “must be able to predict with some degree of certainty
whether particular discussions will be privileged.” Id. Yet, despite its emphasis on the
need for certainty and predictability, the Court refused to provide guidance on the
parameters of the privilege, stating that “it is neither necessary nor feasible to
delineate its full contours in a way that would govern all conceivable future
questions,” and later conceding that there may be situations in which the privilege
may give way to other concerns. Id. See generally Daniel J. Capra, Communications with
Psychotherapists and Social Workers, 216 N.Y. L.J. 3 (1996) (critiquing Jaffee and the
common-law method).
354. See supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text.
355. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 386. In another ironic moment almost a decade after
Upjohn, the Supreme Court suggested that, despite Rule 501 and the courts’ historic
role in declaring and defining privilege rules, developing privilege law is best viewed
as a legislative prerogative. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990). While
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This case-by-case process and the judicial restraint accompanying it
have not and cannot produce generally applicable, particularized
356
privilege rules that provide certainty.
Third, the limited efficacy of the common law in developing clear
governing rules and principles is even more pronounced in the
privilege area because privilege determinations usually are
357
interlocutory. As discussed previously, trial courts’ privilege rulings
358
Also, unless appealed
therefore are rarely subject to review.
immediately, privilege decisions generally evade review because most
cases are resolved before final judgment, and if not, the particular
privilege decisions may be mooted, as a legal or practical matter,
359
once disclosure has occurred.
Indeed, once privileged
communications are available to adversaries, third parties, or the
360
public, much of the benefit of the privilege is lost.
Thus, the attorney-client privilege receives limited appellate
361
attention.
This leaves trial courts confronting difficult privilege
questions with few clear and binding precedents to apply, little
guidance, and almost no oversight. Clear rules and predictable
outcomes are unlikely to result in such circumstances; to the
contrary, a hodge-podge of approaches and quotable “sound bites” of
doctrine are more likely to emerge, creating a pervasive atmosphere
of uncertainty.

refusing to create a new privilege against the disclosure of peer review materials, the
Court observed:
[A]lthough Rule 501 manifests a congressional desire “not to freeze the law
of privilege” but rather to provide the courts with flexibility to develop rules
of privilege on a case-by-case basis, we are disinclined to exercise this
authority expansively. We are especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in
an area where it appears that Congress has considered the relevant
competing concerns but has not provided the privilege itself. The balancing
of conflicting interests of this type is particularly a legislative function.
Id. (emphasis added). The Court went on to discuss how Congress must have
considered and approved of access to such materials in passing portions of Title VII.
Id. at 190-92.
356. In addition, if a court does decide to announce a broad, generally applicable
rule on privilege, and that broad pronouncement is not necessary to the disposition
of the case, even lower courts can choose to ignore it later. See, e.g., Coregis Ins. Co.
v. Law Offices of Carole F. Kafrissen, P.C., 186 F. Supp. 2d 567, 573 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(discussing the limits of stare decisis and refusing to follow dicta in an earlier Third
Circuit opinion that had suggested that the privilege covers all communications from
an attorney to a client).
357. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
359. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 317-22 and accompanying text.
361. For example, circuit courts rarely grant mandamus review of privilege
determinations. Glynn, supra note 193, at 218.
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Trial judges and magistrates will do their best, but, when largely
left alone to determine the governing rules of privilege, they face a
particularly daunting task.
Determining whether a particular
communication is privileged—in an in camera review, for example—
is surprisingly difficult and extraordinarily time consuming even if
the governing privilege rules are clear. Yet trial judges not only must
apply privilege doctrine, but often also must make it in the first place.
This burden may lead judges to adopt governing rules or procedures
that are problematic, insufficient, and unlikely to promote
362
certainty.
Fourth, trial judges—and perhaps courts in general—may be
particularly ill-suited to make policy judgments regarding generally
applicable privilege rules. Judges are asked to formulate privilege
rules in the context of the individual cases proceeding before them.
This requires a careful balancing of the extrinsic values that the
privilege serves—that is, the aggregate benefits that accrue from
having privilege protections—against the intrinsic costs of the truthseeking process, along with an assessment of how such rules are likely
363
to operate in practice.
Yet, when a court confronts these policy
issues, the particular communications at issue already exist, while the
stark, potential costs of recognizing the privilege—namely, shielding
relevant evidence from discovery—do not. Realistically, judges
seeking to do justice in the particular case before them will find it
difficult to engage in an appropriate balancing of interests and
analysis of whether various approaches will foster sufficient certainty.
Faced with the stark costs of the privilege in the case before them,
judges may discount or ignore the extrinsic values that the privilege is
362. For example, the sheer volume of allegedly privileged documents can create
an enormous burden. Realistically, this burden, in turn, can lead judges to adopt
questionable procedures for determining whether documents are privileged.
Defense counsel argues this occurred in the Minnesota tobacco litigation. See
Mulderig et al., supra note 248, at 18-23 (criticizing the court for reviewing only
randomly selected documents among disputed thousands). Although the Minnesota
court ultimately may have reached the right decision on many of the disputed
documents, the sampling procedures it employed, id., were less than ideal. My
concern, however, is the significant danger that judges, magistrates, and special
masters in similarly large cases will allow the overwhelming size of the task—and the
difficult choice of procedures to employ—to influence their views on what privilege
doctrine ought to be, rather than focusing on the competing interests and costs of
the privilege, and the practical effect of a selected doctrine on attorney-client candor
and communication.
363. See, e.g., Capra, supra note 353, at 3 (stating that the determination of
whether a privilege should exist is based on a necessarily political balance of
interests); cf. Privileged Communications, supra note 26, at 1505 (noting that utilitarians
focus on the systemic benefits of the privilege, but suggesting that there are
additional, litigant-specific benefits, such as protecting rights, that also should be
considered).
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supposed to serve or the level of certainty needed to serve those
364
values.
Finally, the inadequacy of the common-law approach to privilege is
made more acute by the fact that more and more disputes are now
resolved in extra-judicial fora, including arbitration, administrative,
365
and legislative proceedings. In order for privilege protections to be
reasonably certain—whether creatures of common law or otherwise—
366
they must be generally applicable. Yet court-made privilege law may
367
In addition,
not be binding in these other types of proceedings.
even if common-law privilege protections apply—either formally, or
because nonjudicial decision makers choose to defer to them—in
some of these proceedings, the decision makers may be free to
decide among the conflicting privilege rules, to proceed where the
law is confusing, or to fashion their own rules, exceptions, or
qualifications. Again, this is particularly problematic given that these
decision makers often are not attorneys and, as a legal or practical
matter, will not have their decisions subjected to appellate or outside
scrutiny. Thus, the common-law method is not only internally
problematic, but it also embodies a court-centered approach to
privilege protection that fails to address the growing mass of extrajudicial dispute resolution mechanisms.
This critique of the common-law method faces a number of
counter-arguments. For example, skeptics may contend that my

364. See, e.g., Broun, supra note 1, at 938-40 (suggesting that Congress likes
privileges better than courts in part because courts recognize that privileges will
deprive them of relevant and sometimes crucial evidence); Berger, supra note 1, at
275 (noting the “traditional hostility of the judiciary” toward rules that keep relevant
information from the courts and the trend toward recognition of qualified privileges
in the wake of Rule 501). Also, case-by-case assessments of privilege protections are
bound to lead some judges to interpret the doctrine as allowing qualifications or
other post hoc modifications of existing protections that defeat certainty. Moreover,
we cannot expect judges to ignore how legal rules will affect the work they must
perform in a given case. They will be tempted to fashion rules that fit the
particularized needs of the case—making the in camera inspection easier or
otherwise advancing the litigation—rather than adopting rules that seek to strike the
right balance of interests and foster certainty. Thus, I disagree with those scholars
who have suggested that privilege doctrine should be made by judges,
retrospectively, rather than by policy makers with a prospective viewpoint. Cf. Miller,
supra note 10, at 803 (discussing judicial approach to creating an evidentiary
privilege).
365. See sources cited supra note 301.
366. I therefore disagree with those scholars who believe that privileges ought to
be viewed as either procedural in nature or court-centered. See, e.g., Miller, supra
note 10, at 795-97 (arguing that privileges are more procedural than substantive in
nature, and therefore privilege policy making belongs to the judiciary).
367. For example, the Federal Arbitration Act does not provide for judicial review
of arbitrators’ privilege determinations. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10
(2002) (setting forth the narrow grounds for vacating an arbitration award).
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criticism proves too much: given that the attorney-client privilege
always has been a court-created doctrine, and that attorneys and
clients always have communicated with one another, I am either
wrong that the common law cannot produce sufficiently certain
privilege protections to promote attorney-client communications, or I
368
have overstated the level of certainty needed.
In response, my critique is limited to contemporary circumstances.
The common-law method may have provided adequate certainty
historically, given that parties generally knew the forum that would
resolve their disputes, discovery was limited, and attorney-client
communications were less frequent, less varied, and usually occurred
369
in the litigation context. Circumstances are far different today: our
modern regulatory regime is enormously complex; courts now
employ broader discovery rules in civil matters and can extend their
compulsory process farther than in the past; there is greater
corporate and interstate activity; and litigation and dispute resolution
370
alternatives have grown substantially in both frequency and scope.
Thus, clients seek legal advice both more regularly and more
pervasively than in the past. Attorney-client communications are
more likely to fall within the scope of legitimate discovery requests
and, hence, are more likely to be disputed. And attorneys and clients
are less likely to be able to predict whether and where they will end
up litigating or otherwise seeking to resolve disputes. In this modern
environment, the common-law approach cannot provide sufficient
certainty.
In addition, I do not believe I have overstated the level of certainty
that is needed or, at minimum, desirable. Indeed, while my critique
of the failings of the common-law approach is more far-reaching,
other commentators have offered similar criticisms of various aspects
371
of privilege doctrine and enforcement. Given this steady stream of
368. See, e.g., Committee on Federal Courts, supra note 10, at 153 (arguing against
codification of privileges in part because there is no evidence suggesting a
compelling need to do so).
369. See Michael M. Mustokoff et al., The Attorney/Client Privilege: A Fond Memory of
Things Past; An Analysis of the Privilege Following United States v. Anderson, 9 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 107, 108-20 (2000) (discussing general evolution of the attorney-client
privilege).
370. National litigation and national law firms have become far more common.
Broun, supra note 1, at 961; Michael D. Goldhaber, Among 2000’s Lessons: The Big Get
Bigger, the Small Stay Pretty Small, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 4, 2000, at A1 (discussing how the
nation’s largest law firms are growing, consolidating, and becoming more national in
scope).
371. See, e.g., Capra, supra note 353, at 3 (criticizing the common-law method and
advocating a legislative approach in part because “a privilege can probably be made
more explicit upon legislative enactment than by judicial fiat.”).
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critical commentary over the last two decades, uncertainty must have
deterred attorneys and clients from communicating in various
372
contexts. Many other parties may be unaware of how uncertain the
protection is and would have been deterred had they known the
373
truth.
Moreover, if I am wrong, and many attorneys and clients
would engage in full and frank communications even when wellinformed of the doctrinal confusion in various contexts and the other
risks described in Part II, then one must question—as some privilege
skeptics do—whether the privilege is useful at all, much less useful
enough to justify its extraordinary costs. Yet, as discussed previously,
the privilege probably is here to stay in one form or another, and we
will never be able to verify its actual effect on attorney and client
374
behavior.
Thus, to achieve its purported benefits, the privilege—
which will continue to exist and inflict costs—must provide
protections sufficiently certain to convince attorneys and clients, who
otherwise would curb their communications, to speak freely. The
common-law method has not produced such protections.
Other skeptics of my proposal may argue that, even if the commonlaw method does not result in sufficiently certain privilege
protections, a legislative approach would be no better, or perhaps
worse. Many critics may fear that Congress will act inappropriately,
either by extending privilege protections too far or, conversely, by
375
“gutting” needed protections.
I address these political process
concerns in the next subpart. Yet other observers simply may argue
that legislative bodies, including Congress, are unlikely to produce
376
clearer or more predictable governing principles.
For example,
many state legislatures or courts have codified privilege protections,
yet even in these jurisdictions, the details are largely left to commonlaw development.
As an initial matter, legislators are not hamstrung by the
aforementioned constraints that prevent judicial policy makers from
crafting generally applicable and sufficiently particularized privilege
protections. In addition, the fact that state legislatures have been
satisfied with less particularized codification models—such as the
372. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 68, at 408 (arguing that, because the attorney-client
privilege has not been applied consistently, attorneys are likely to be conservative in
predicting which communications will be protected).
373. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 61, 91, and accompanying text.
375. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 10, at 788-89 (arguing that the judiciary can be
more objective than the necessarily partisan legislature because the judiciary is “more
insulated” from political lobbies).
376. See, e.g., Committee on Federal Courts, supra note 10, at 153 (stating that an
attempt to legislate the boundaries of privileges would be difficult, if not impossible).
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Revised Uniform Rules of Evidence—does not mean that legislatures
in general or Congress in particular are incapable of codifying clearer
377
rules. This is true given that, to the extent Congress would respond
to calls for codification, it would act precisely because the law of
privilege is in need of greater predictability and clarity. For the
reasons discussed in the next subpart, Congress now has the tools—
including a wealth of history, commentary, and well-established
378
vehicles for receiving expert guidance —it needs to draft legislation
that will resolve many of the current problems in privilege law and
379
provide far greater certainty.
Another commonly expressed concern about a legislative approach
to fashioning privilege law is that the legislative tack will “freeze” the
380
doctrine, preventing positive or necessary development.
First, I
377. Indeed, the Uniform Rules of Evidence are conscientiously general and
flexible. Similarly, Professor Berger describes the Federal Rules of Evidence as
“general rules or ‘standards’ rather then inflexible rules of law.” See Berger, supra
note 1, at 255 (noting that Congress enacted both the very general Federal Rules of
Evidence and more detailed regulatory statutes such as the Bankruptcy and Internal
Revenue Codes, thereby implying a conscious decision on the part of Congress to
maintain generality and flexibility in the Federal Rules of Evidence).
378. See infra note 418 and accompanying text.
379. See, e.g., Broun, supra note 1, at 771 (arguing that codification will bring
about a more satisfactory set of rules than those created on a case-by-case basis);
Anne Bowen Poulin, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege After Jaffee v. Redmond: Where
Do We Go from Here?, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341, 1341 (1998) (insisting that privilege law,
in particular, is well suited for statutory treatment because it involves policy questions
and other details of application that the legislature, rather than the judiciary, is best
equipped to address). In discussing his proposal for codification of various
evidentiary privileges in the federal courts, Professor Broun argues that the
codification approach can bring about significant improvements: “[I]f drafted with
sufficient care and input from the public, the bar and the judiciary, the codification
can be a significant improvement over the set of rules that have developed in the
federal courts under Rule 501.” Broun, supra note 1, at 771. Although Professor
Broun concedes that codification cannot resolve every potential problem associated
with privilege law, he nevertheless maintains that the law of privilege could be made
“much simpler and more certain . . . if there were a federal rule guiding the courts
through the more predictable and important issues.” Id. at 788-89.
380. See, e.g., Committee on Federal Courts, supra note 10, at 152-53 (arguing against
codification of privilege rules in the federal courts because the common law allows
adaptation, flexibility, and gradual delineation of boundaries that is beneficial to
development of the law of privilege); Miller, supra note 10, at 789-92 (arguing against
the legislation of a privilege law because the legislative method is less flexible than
the common-law method and judicial decision makers, unlike legislatures or rule
makers, have the ability to “fine tune” and modify privilege protections). Some also
expressed this concern during the congressional debates over Article V of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See Broun, supra note 1, at 769, 773-77 (discussing the
criticism raised by scholars, practitioners, judges, and members of Congress, against
federal codification of the law of privilege); see also Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S.
182, 189 (1990) (stating that Rule 501, as currently enacted, reflects a congressional
desire to maintain flexibility and refrain from freezing the law of privilege). Some of
this concern, however, was directed at freezing in or freezing out certain types of
privileges, rather than specific aspects or particulars of the individual privileges. See,
e.g., Miller, supra note 10, at 789-95 (stating a preference for common-law creation
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agree with other commentators who have questioned whether
381
I also question
codification would have a harmful chilling effect.
whether Congress—once it chooses to enact a privilege law—would
be slower to respond to particular problems in privilege doctrine
than judicial decision makers. For example, despite all of the
controversy and confusion surrounding the corporate privilege since
Upjohn, the Supreme Court has yet to provide further guidance, some
twenty years later. More importantly, however, the last quarter
century of limited convergence and doctrinal disarray suggests that
the law of attorney-client privilege desperately needs to be clarified
and then “frozen,” at least in substantial part. Reasonable certainty
demands that attorneys and clients be able to predict—at the time of
their communication—the principles that will govern whether the
communication will be safe from disclosure. Once Congress codifies
the law of privilege, modifications in the doctrine should be rare.
Finally, some critics of my proposal may argue against codification
because it will create new transaction costs, particularly in litigation.
To the contrary, codification will substantially reduce transaction
costs. Without question, new legislation spawns litigation, even if the
legislation is carefully drafted. Yet, provided Congress passes
appropriate privilege legislation as discussed below, the transaction
costs of enforcing privilege will decline substantially over time.
Again, in the current regime, parties often must litigate not only how
the court should apply privilege doctrine in certain circumstances
382
and to certain communications, but also what doctrine governs.
Indeed, much of the current privilege litigation—in thousands of
383
state and federal cases —concerns doctrine rather than application.
Carefully drafted national legislation that resolves many of the
current disputes and ambiguities and provides a single set of
governing principles will substantially reduce litigation over doctrine,
384
leaving primarily disputes over application.
In defining privilege
and development of privilege law).
381. See, e.g., Broun, supra note 1, at 801-03 (noting that the law of evidence has
neither become inflexible nor “frozen,” as its critics predicted when the Federal
Rules were enacted in 1975). Instead, Professor Broun argues, the law of evidence
“has moved with the times.” Id. at 802.
382. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing intra- and inter-jurisdictional conflicts and
confusion in the law of privilege).
383. See supra note 7 (indicating the volume of privilege litigation in state and
federal courts).
384. Cf. Berger, supra note 1, at 265 (noting that those subject areas of the Federal
Rules of Evidence which have undergone the most comprehensive treatment have, in
turn, produced little litigation). Clearer and more predictable protections also will
produce savings prior to litigation: attorneys and their clients will need to spend less
time and fewer resources on determining how or whether to communicate and what
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doctrine, a legislative body like Congress can take into account the
aggregate costs of application, and, to the extent possible given other
385
Thus, after an
interests, fashion the doctrine to limit such costs.
initial adjustment period, the legislative approach I propose will
produce a substantial cost savings.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the common-law approach should
be abandoned. The common law not only has failed to produce
reasonably certain privilege protections, but it also is incapable of
doing so. Legislation, rather than the common law, ought to be the
386
primary source of privilege doctrine.
Given that the common-law
approach predominates in most jurisdictions, the only way to ensure
a legislative approach is to have Congress adopt national privilege
legislation that preempts contrary state privilege law.
3.

The essential contents of a national privilege law
The purpose of this article is not to outline the particulars of a
national attorney-client privilege statute, nor to advocate how
Congress ought to resolve all disputes and ambiguities in the law of
privilege. However, in order to correct the problems in the current,
largely common-law regime and achieve reasonable certainty, the
legislation must at least satisfy the three conditions discussed in Part
II. Namely, privilege legislation must provide protection that is clear,
unqualified, and generally applicable.
The first prerequisite for achieving reasonable certainty is to clarify
the scope of the protection: confusing, ambiguous, or flexible
privilege rules and exceptions do not offer predictable protection.
Obviously, no codification can resolve every possible ambiguity,
simplify every inquiry or application, or anticipate all interpretive
questions. Given the competing interests at stake, some doctrinal
387
complexity must remain.
Yet carefully drafted legislation can
largely resolve many of the lingering ambiguities and important
disputes that plague privilege doctrine in the current regime. For
risks they face if they do communicate.
385. For example, Professor Rice argues that the confidentiality/secrecy
requirement should be abolished. See Rice, Eroding Confidentiality, supra note 203, at
888-98. He contends that this requirement is both unnecessary and the cause of a
substantial portion of the costs of litigating the privilege. See id. Congress should
take these kinds of considerations into account when fashioning privilege doctrine.
386. It is worth noting that codification would not harm other interests served by
the privilege—such as protection against self-incrimination, fostering professionalism
and loyalty, and preserving privacy and dignity. All of these interests likewise are
served by a clear and generally applicable privilege. See generally Broun, supra note 1,
at 789-803 (arguing that other interests served by testimonial privileges benefit from
uniform and predictable privilege protections).
387. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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example, the legislation can resolve whether and when
communications from the attorney to the client are privileged, clarify
the requirements for intending and maintaining confidentiality,
provide a uniform and clear framework for determining who is the
corporate client, address the status of communications to in-house
counsel, and define the limits of the crime-fraud and at-issue
exceptions. Carefully drafted legislation also can clarify the scope
and applicability of various waiver doctrines, including inadvertent
disclosure and subject matter waiver. Such legislation would offer far
more guidance and predictability than have the common law and
388
more generalized state-law codifications.
The second necessary element for achieving reasonable certainty is
that the privilege protections be unqualified and not subject to post
hoc reconsideration or abandonment. As the Supreme Court
emphasized in both Swidler & Berlin and Jaffee, a qualified privilege—
one that is subject to a post hoc balancing of harms or interests—
389
precludes certainty at the time of the communication. To root out
further lingering doubts about the protection, the legislation should
prohibit judicially created exceptions and waiver doctrines. Likewise,
legislatively recognized exceptions and waiver doctrines must be clear
390
and provide strict limits to avoid easy manipulation.
Thus, to the
388. Although conceding that codification of the privilege rules will not resolve
every issue existing in the current common-law privilege doctrine, Professor Broun
argues that “good, thoughtful drafting can eliminate many of the most troublesome
areas and at least suggest a generalized approach for dealing with others.” Broun,
supra note 1, at 786. In his proposal, Professor Broun discusses a number of
unresolved issues involving attorney-client privilege as examples of areas of the
doctrine that can be clarified through codification. See id. at 786-89 (describing
privilege doctrines in areas of corporate attorney-client communications, invocation
of the crime-fraud exception, inadvertent disclosure of privileged matter, and other
unresolved problems in common-law privilege law).
389. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409 (1988) (admitting
that, at the time of a client’s disclosure to counsel, the client has no ability to know
whether such disclosure will become relevant, or whether it will hold substantial
importance in either a civil or criminal trial at a later juncture). For this reason, the
Supreme Court has rejected the use of a “balancing test” to define the contours of
the attorney-client privilege, pronouncing that “[b]alancing ex post the importance of
the information against client interests, even [when] limited to criminal cases,
introduces substantial uncertainty into the privilege’s application.” Id. (referring to
its denial of the balancing test in Upjohn). See also sources cited supra note 353.
390. Again, by “unqualified,” I do not mean without exceptions. The exceptions
and other limiting principles simply must be categorical and defined in advance. See
supra note 11. In addition, an appropriate privilege regime would recognize that the
persons entitled to preserve or waive the privilege on behalf of a corporate or other
organizational client may change. For example, I am not suggesting that the same
set of corporate insiders should always control the entity’s privilege nor that the
judicial determination of entitlement to control can always be governed by a strict or
bright-line rule. I do believe, however, that the standards for making this
determination should be defined in advance and delineated with more clarity than
they are in the current regime (Garner and its progeny), so that application of such
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extent communications fall within the scope of the privilege and
outside recognized, categorical exceptions, the protection must be
absolute, since protections remain wholly uncertain when subject to
391
qualification or post hoc abandonment.
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, the legislation must be
universally applicable. The attorney and client must have confidence
at the time of the potential communication that the protections
afforded by the statute will apply regardless of the fortuity of the
forum—federal, state, or nonjudicial—the civil or criminal nature of
392
the proceeding, or the substantive claims giving rise to the dispute
in which the client may have to assert the privilege. Universal
applicability avoids the uncertainties arising from the existence of
conflicting law, the happenstance of the forum, and the decision
393
maker’s choice among privilege rules.
To achieve universal applicability, the legislation must ensure that
privilege doctrine preempts contrary state privilege rules. In other
words, the legislation should provide that the client possesses a
federal substantive right—a “federal privilege right”—to refuse to
disclose privileged communications during discovery, by resisting a
subpoena, and by refusing to testify or allowing the attorney to
394
testify.
Viewing the protection afforded by the privilege as a “substantive
395
right” is not as novel as it may seem. As previously discussed, much
of the criticism of Article V of the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence was that privilege protections are substantive in nature.
Although privileges have been mischaracterized as merely
396
evidentiary, testimonial, or procedural rules in the past, they do not
merely govern the manner or means by which courts resolve

standards is as predictable as possible to all constituencies and does not simply
degenerate into an ad hoc balancing of interests.
391. However, to the extent there are strong, countervailing social policies that
ought to override application of the privilege, those social policies must be taken
into account in the legislation (by tailoring the limitations and exceptions to the
privilege accordingly). Allowing individual decision makers to balance competing
policies destroys certainty.
392. In Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 408-09, the Supreme Court observed that no
case authority exists to support the proposition that the privilege applies differently
depending on whether in the civil or criminal context. Id.
393. A single source of law also reduces the appearance of uncertainty by
removing the static that inevitably results from multiple, disparate doctrines.
394. This also could be described as a federally recognized immunity to certain
forms of compulsory process or disclosure.
395. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
396. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 751 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1985)
(defining the attorney-client privilege as an evidentiary rule regulating disclosure).
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397

disputes. Unlike other rules of evidence and procedure, privileges
defeat, rather than serve, the judicial function of elucidating the
398
As many commentators have recognized—during the
truth.
debates over the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence and
thereafter—privilege doctrine is substantive because it serves interests
extrinsic to the particular litigation in which the privilege is
399
asserted.
The attorney-client privilege is concerned with “primary
400
conduct and affairs,” in the words of Justice Harlan, because its
purposes
are
extrajudicial,
promoting
and
protecting
communications between attorneys and clients, and thereby
producing various social benefits. Moreover, Congress implicitly
recognized the substantive nature of the attorney-client privilege
when it amended the Rules Enabling Act after passage of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, granting back to the Supreme Court the authority
to promulgate rules of evidence, but preserving for itself the exclusive
401
authority to create, abolish, and modify privileges.
Thus, my
proposal is novel not in recognizing a substantive right of privilege,
but rather in federalizing it.
Also, while universality requires creation of this federal substantive
right, it does not mean that Congress must recognize a federal cause
of action based on that right. Although Congress could make
available federal injunctive relief in some circumstances, creating a
cause of action premised on an assertion of privilege in another
proceeding would create enormous practical and administrative
difficulties, incur substantial transaction costs, and raise additional

397. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
398. Goldberg, supra note 119, at 683-84 (contrasting evidentiary rules, such as
those governing the admission and exclusion of evidence, examination of witnesses,
judicial notice, competency of witnesses, and relevance with privilege rules, and
finding that, whereas evidentiary rules aid the fact-finding process, privilege rules
help to hide the truth).
399. See supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text; see also Goldberg, supra note
119, at 684 (providing that privilege rules “impede the truth-seeking process in order
to serve extrinsic social policies”); Weinstein, supra note 119, at 370-73 (discussing
the substantive nature of privilege rules, how they serve extrinsic policies, and
therefore how privilege rules differ from other rules of evidence); see also MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, §§ 169, 175-176 (discussing why privilege protections are
substantive rather than procedural). But see Miller, supra note 10, at 796-97 (stating
that, although privileges have both substantive and procedural aspects, they should
be within the realm of the judiciary because their impact is largely procedural).
400. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(discussing Erie and noting the difficulties associated with Supreme Court’s choice-oflaw doctrine in federal diversity actions).
401. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2000) (“Any such rule creating, abolishing, or
modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by
Act of Congress.”).
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402

constitutional concerns beyond those discussed in the next subpart.
Instead, I simply propose that the legislation recognize the right of a
client, without creating an independent cause of action, to resist
being
compelled
to
disclose
protected
attorney-client
communications in any proceeding in which such communications
403
are sought. The client would retain this federal right, in any forum
or proceeding, whether judicial or nonjudicial, unless the client
404
waives its application in that forum.
Universality does not ensure uniform or perfectly predictable
application. For example, even if every judicial and nonjudicial
decision maker must apply the same privilege law, interpretations
and outcomes may not always be the same and errors may occur. The
danger of erroneous application or interpretation may be particularly
great in nonjudicial fora, in which the decision makers often are not
attorneys, and clients may have little or no access to judicial review.
And, as discussed previously, trial courts applying the doctrine often
405
may not be subject to appellate oversight.
Perhaps Congress also should consider additional, limited reforms
to enhance oversight: for example, providing for interlocutory review
406
for certain privilege issues arising in federal district court cases, or
amending the Federal Arbitration Act to expand judicial review to
407
cover privilege determinations in arbitration. Yet, even without
additional avenues of review, a single, clear set of rules governing the
attorney-client privilege should simplify greatly the task for most
decision makers and thereby reduce the frequency of error.

402. For example, creating a federal cause of action against state decision makers
seeking to compel disclosure may raise Eleventh Amendment concerns. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XI (“[T]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.”).
403. Again, while this appears novel at first blush, Congress has acted similarly in
the past. See, e.g., infra notes 485-89 and accompanying text (noting the similarities
between the proposed legislation and the substantive protections afforded by the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)).
404. Thus, for example, an arbitration panel could not compel the client to
produce privileged communications unless the client had agreed to forego the
privilege in arbitration or otherwise had waived it.
405. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
406. See Glynn, supra note 193, at 258-65 (proposing that, to enhance appellate
review in problem areas such as privilege, rule makers should consider promulgating
rules allowing for mandatory review of discrete categories of interlocutory orders).
The provision for interlocutory review need not be permanent: Congress could
provide that the provision expires after the amount of time it deems sufficient to
resolve most interpretive issues. Id.
407. Cf. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000) (setting forth the narrow reasons for vacating an
arbitration award).
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Similarly, the clear, unqualified, and universal nature of the
protection reduces the risk of manipulation.
To the extent
ambiguities remain, they may be resolved more quickly than current
controversies, because state and federal courts cannot ignore
definitive federal interpretations in cases involving state-law claims.
Indeed, there will be at least the potential for direct federal oversight
of state-court treatment, because the Supreme Court will have the
ability to review state-court privilege decisions.
Furthermore, to combat the corrosive effect of potential errors on
attorney and client confidence in the privilege, the legislation could
reduce the “cat-out-of-the-bag” problem by making clear that
compelled disclosure of privileged communications in any forum
does not constitute waiver of the protection as against other parties in
other proceedings. As a practical matter, clients may lose the full
benefit of confidentiality in some circumstances, such as when
opposing counsel represents adverse parties in other cases. But, by
ensuring that privileged communications are not legally required to
remain absolutely secret, such a provision will prevent some of the
408
ripple effects that erroneously compelled disclosures cause.
While the particulars of a national attorney-client privilege should
be left to a thorough deliberative process, truly effective legislation
must contain several fundamental attributes. No privilege regime can
provide completely predictable protection, but the type of national,
preemptive legislation I have described comes far closer than any
other proposal.
B. Congress’s Capacity and Power to Federalize Privilege
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the best approach to
resolve all of the lingering conflicts and confusion in privilege
doctrine, and thereby provide reasonably certain privilege
protections, is codification of the law of the attorney-client privilege,
providing clear, unqualified, and generally applicable privilege
protections. Although no legislative outcome is certain, Congress has
408. A party may still be barred from re-litigating the issue of privilege under the
doctrine of issue preclusion. See generally Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d
735 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (discussing how the barriers of issue preclusion and waiver
doctrine preclude the re-examining of issues except in certain circumstances).
However, issue preclusion will attach in the later proceeding only if the privilege
determination is merged into a final judgment. Id. at 740-41. Also, to the extent that
the court in the first proceeding compelled disclosure under an exception or waiver
doctrine that is inapplicable in the second proceeding, assertion of the privilege will
not be precluded. Id. The legislation should make clear that preclusion applies only
to judicial proceedings; it should not apply to determinations of nonjudicial decision
makers.
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both the capacity and constitutional power to enact such legislation.
1.

Congress’s ability to craft appropriate legislation
Many who otherwise agree that a single, clear, and generally
applicable set of rules governing the attorney-client privilege is
desirable or even necessary might be skeptical of Congress’s
willingness and capacity to enact the kind of particularized legislation
that is needed. For example, Congress had the opportunity to
address the attorney-client privilege—and privileges generally—in the
409
early 1970s, and chose to avoid doing so.
Other observers simply
may fear that once Congress takes on the attorney-client privilege, it
will succumb to political pressures or interests and produce
legislation that either inappropriately curtails privilege protections or
410
extends privilege protections too far.
One ought to have healthy doubts and concerns about Congress’s
ability to address these kinds of issues, and, of course, the ultimate
outcome of the legislative process is uncertain. Yet, for a number of
reasons, both the time and the circumstances are right for Congress
to enact the type of legislation I propose and, in so doing, strike an
appropriate balance between competing interests.
First, Congress’s refusal to codify the proposed privilege rules in
1975 does not mean that it would refuse to codify the attorney-client
privilege today. The legislation I propose does not implicate several
of the concerns that led Congress to reject Article V. For example,
this proposal addresses only the attorney-client privilege, which is
recognized in all state and federal jurisdictions. Thus, unlike Article
V, this proposal does not ask Congress to recognize or expand
controversial privileges such as the secrets of state and official
411
information privileges, nor does it seek to narrow or “freeze out”
412
My proposal for
other privileges recognized in some states.
statutory reform also avoids entirely the concerns about the limits of
judicial rule-making authority under the Rules Enabling Act that was
the subject of so much critical commentary during congressional
413
hearings in the early 1970s.

409. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
410. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 1, at 276 (“Congress is, of course, free to enact
privileges, but it would then have to make choices between competing groups
clamoring for the privilege of having a privilege—the very choice it obviously sought
to avoid by passing rule 501.”).
411. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
412. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
413. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.

GLYNN.PRINTER.DOC

2002]

12/4/2002 1:29 PM

FEDERALIZING PRIVILEGE

153

Perhaps more importantly, my proposed legislation avoids the Erie
concerns that troubled commentators and some members of
414
Congress during the earlier debate. The legislation not only would
eliminate the need to decide which privilege “rules” should govern in
diversity actions in federal court, it would abandon a court or
judicially-centered view of the privilege: its privilege protections
would apply in all jurisdictions and all nonjudicial fora. Again, my
approach recognizes—and indeed is premised upon—the substantive
rather than procedural nature of attorney-client privilege
415
protections.
As those commentators who were concerned about
Erie argued during the debates, privilege doctrines are concerned
with protecting and promoting primary activity and embody rights
serving interests extrinsic to the dispute and possessed to maintain
416
confidentiality.
My legislative proposal respects the substantive
nature of these rights; it simply federalizes them.
Thus, assuming Congress would have the same kinds of concerns it
had when it rejected the proposed privilege rules and enacted Rule
501, my proposal would have to overcome only two of the major
objections to codification discussed a quarter century ago. Primarily,
Congress would have to be convinced that it was wrong in concluding
that (1) the development of privilege law is best left to the courts, and
(2) state policy choices regarding attorney-client privilege law are
entitled to deference, at least in disputes involving state law. That
Congress erred in both respects is now apparent, as the foregoing
analysis demonstrates. Moreover, the likelihood that attorneys and
clients must consider the implications of inter-jurisdictional conflicts
has grown because business and communication are more national—
and indeed global—in scope than they were in 1975, and the national
417
bar and national litigation have expanded substantially.
Today,
more than ever, the need for certainty is a national interest, and can
be served only by national, legislative reform.
Second, Congress is more capable today than it was in 1975 of
resolving lingering ambiguities in attorney-client privilege doctrine
and drafting clear and particularized language defining the privilege.
There is now a wealth of history, case law, and scholarship on which
Congress can draw in making these determinations. The privilege’s
most troublesome areas—the confidentiality doctrine, the corporate
privilege, the crime-fraud exception, and various ambiguities in the
414.
415.
416.
417.

See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 392-94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 370.
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law of waiver—have received an enormous amount of attention and
have been subjected to extensive scholarly scrutiny and debate. This
body of commentary is ripe for legislative review. Moreover,
Congress now has well-established vehicles for receiving expert
guidance on drafting such legislation, including the Judicial
Conference of the United States, the American Bar Association and
other legal associations, state organizations, and rule-making bodies,
418
and the American Law Institute.
Congress could establish a
commission—somewhat akin to the Federal Courts Study
Commission—to conduct hearings and a thorough study of this area
of the law, make findings, and undertake initial drafting
responsibilities. Thus, Congress now has the tools to craft sufficiently
particularized and effective legislation.
Third, although political pressures will exist in any legislative
process, and various interest groups will no doubt seek to influence
the content of privilege law, I believe there is a good chance that
Congress can enact appropriately balanced legislation. In the
attorney-client privilege context, there seems to be a rare balance of
highly interested, influential constituencies and, correspondingly,
strange bedfellows. For example, well-organized industry groups,
various legal organizations, and the criminal defense bar are likely to
prefer strong privilege protections, while law enforcement
constituencies and the plaintiffs’ bar will prefer strict limitations on
419
these protections.
In fact, skeptics fearful of subjecting the privilege to the legislative
process may offer opposing assessments: one contingent may argue
that Congress will simply capitulate to industry groups and expand
the privilege inappropriately; the other may contend that Congress
will simply gut the privilege because the privilege is used to hide the
truth. Given the powerful interests on both sides, both fears are
418. As Professor Broun notes:
[T]here is a ready-made vehicle for providing judicial input into the drafting
process. The Judicial Conference of the United States has standing
committees set up to consider amendments to rules, including the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Those committees are composed not only of federal
judges, but of state court judges, practitioners and academics. The
committees hold open deliberative sessions as well as public hearings on any
proposed amendments to the rules.
Broun, supra note 1, at 814.
419. The presence of well-organized and financed interest groups on both sides of
the issue reduces the risk, expressed by public choice theorists, that privilege
legislation will favor a single, organized interest group to the detriment of social
welfare. See generally Susan Block-Lieb, Congress’s Temptation to Defect: A Political and
Economic Theory of Legislative Resolutions to Financial Common Pool Problems, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 801, 819-24 (1997) (discussing the impact on legislative development of various
external political and economic factors).
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exaggerated. In particular, capture of privilege legislation by industry
groups is unlikely at this moment in history, given the recent Enron
debacle and the resulting public and congressional sentiment for
greater public disclosure, transparency, and accountability.
Perhaps the remaining critics—particularly advocates for criminal
defendants who believe Congress may gut the privilege—have more
to be concerned about, especially in the wake of the terrorist activities
of September 11. Yet I still believe a congressional approach will be
more measured than these critics fear. A substantial curtailing of the
privilege would face significant opposition from legal organizations
beyond the criminal defense bar. In addition, if my approach is
followed, there will be no distinction between the privilege
protections that apply in the civil and criminal settings. A uniform
privilege will link the destinies of civil and criminal defendants,
providing greater leverage against congressional overstepping. Even
if Congress is tempted to limit protections too severely in the criminal
420
context, its actions will have Fifth Amendment (privilege against
421
(right to counsel)
self-incrimination) and Sixth Amendment
implications. If these implications do not deter overreaching,
recourse to the courts will remain. Furthermore, I question whether
the risks of congressional action are as great as they seem, particularly
422
given the current, problematic state of privilege law.
Finally, despite the risks associated with the legislative process, we
ought to have a national, public debate on many of the lingering
privilege issues that judicial decision makers have been unable to
resolve. The difficult balancing of interests, benefits, and costs that
must occur in delineating the parameters of the privilege is a
uniquely legislative function, and, for all of the foregoing reasons, it
is one that cries out for a resolution. Although the process will not
necessarily succeed, Congress, our national, politically accountable
body, ought to attempt to craft a workable resolution.

420. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself . . . .”).
421. Id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”).
422. For example, without a statute addressing the subject, the Justice Department
can continue to set its own rules with regard to monitoring detainees’
communications with counsel, unless a federal court were to find such monitoring
unconstitutional. Similarly, without a congressional mandate, the Department of
Defense, in crafting rules governing military tribunals, need not incorporate
privilege protections comparable to those available in civilian courts. Also, given the
confusion and ambiguity in privilege law, judges now often can find a justification for
denying privilege protection.
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All of this being said, the question remains whether Congress
would ever be interested enough to take on the challenge of
codifying the attorney-client privilege and preempting contrary state
law. Indeed, undertaking a serious study of, and then overhauling,
the attorney-client privilege probably is not high on Congress’s
current agenda. My message, however, is addressed not only to
members of Congress but to others—scholars, judges, and
practitioners—interested in addressing and working to solve the
problems in the current privilege regime. Under the Rules Enabling
Act, only Congress can codify privilege law for the federal judicial
system, and only Congress can implement other holistic changes,
423
such as creating a national choice-of-privilege-law regime.
Congressional action, therefore, is needed for any significant national
reform addressing privilege law. To the extent commentators,
practitioners, the Judicial Conference, or others can capture
Congress’s attention, they should use that rare opportunity to
federalize the law of privilege, rather than to seek more limited, less
effective reforms.
2.

Congress’s power to federalize privilege
Even if Congress is both willing and capable of crafting clear,
unqualified, and generally applicable attorney-client privilege
legislation, it must have the power to enact such a far-reaching
measure. Although Congress occasionally has enacted legislation
addressing privilege issues, these provisions have been narrow in
scope, tied to federal agency activities, or, in the case of Rule 501,
424
applicable only to certain matters litigated in federal courts. The
legislation I propose—which would endow the client with a federal
privilege right that supersedes and preempts contrary state privilege
law and would apply in all judicial and nonjudicial fora—obviously
raises greater concerns about congressional power.
This is
particularly true given the Supreme Court’s “new federalism”
425
jurisprudence.
Yet I contend that Congress has the authority to
426
act. Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to
regulate and protect the provision of legal services, and, under the
423. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000) (“Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right.”).
424. See supra note 144.
425. See generally, e.g., David C. Feola & David R. Fine, The “New Federalism”: Ignore It
at Your Peril, COLO. LAW., (Nov. 2000); Ann Althouse, On Dignity and Deference: The
Supreme Court’s New Federalism, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 245 (2000); Mark Tushnet, What Is
the Supreme Court’s New Federalism?, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 927 (2000).
426. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing Congress with the power “[t]o regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States . . . .”).
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427

Supremacy Clause, to preempt contrary state law. While the states
have a long tradition of regulating the practice of law, their disparate
approaches to the privilege may inhibit and burden the attorneyclient relationship, which is a subject of national interest and
commerce. Exercising this power will not run afoul of the Tenth
428
429
Amendment or the values of federalism it serves.
a.

The Commerce Clause

Article I, section 8 of the Constitution allocates to Congress the
430
power “to regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”
If
Congress enacts legislation pursuant to this authority, it may, if it so
chooses, preempt state regulation in the field pursuant to the
431
Supremacy Clause. Congress’s Commerce Clause power extends to
three broad categories of activity: “[f]irst, Congress may regulate the
432
use of the channels of interstate commerce;” “[s]econd, Congress
may regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though
433
the threat may come only from intrastate activities;” and, “[f]inally,
Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to regulate those
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, . . . or
in other words, those activities that substantially affect interstate
434
commerce.” The privilege legislation I propose would fall primarily
435
within the third category.
427. Id. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
428. Id. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, not prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.”).
429. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE
L.J. 947, 997-1001 (2001) (discussing the Tenth Amendment and the normative
values of federalism that the U.S. system of dual sovereignty serves).
430. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
431. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
432. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000) (quoting United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)) (citations omitted).
433. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558) (citations omitted).
434. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59) (citation omitted).
435. Of course, some of the attorney-client communications that would be subject
to the legislation would fall within the other categories. For example, the legislation
would protect attorney-client communications made over the telephone or other
wire or electronic means. Also, because the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination and Sixth Amendment right to counsel have been incorporated
against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, then Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment may provide an alternative basis for federalizing the
privilege in criminal cases. See id. amend. XIV, § 5 (giving Congress the power to
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment by “appropriate legislation”).
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Pursuant to its authority to regulate activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce, Congress has enacted an enormous
variety of legislation regulating intrastate activities sufficiently related
436
to interstate commerce.
Recently, however, in United States v.
437
438
Morrison and United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court, while
affirming Congress’s power to regulate intrastate activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce, has made clear that
439
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause has limits.
In
440
Lopez, the Court invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which
441
made the possession of a gun on or near school premises a crime.
In Morrison, the Court struck down the portion of the Violence
442
Against Women Act that provided a federal civil remedy for the
443
victims of gender-motivated violence.
In both cases, the Court
found that the activity Congress sought to regulate was beyond the
purview of the Commerce Clause because it was non-economic or
noncommercial in nature and had only an attenuated effect on
444
interstate commerce.
Morrison and Lopez emphasize that Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause has outer boundaries, and each case serves notice
that the Supreme Court will not always defer to Congress’s judgments
on matters of commerce. These cases do not, however, stand in the
way of national privilege legislation. Unlike the regulation of gun
possession in a school zone or the provision of a civil remedy for
victims of gender-motivated violence, a national attorney-client
privilege law regulates—indeed fosters and protects—economic and
commercial activity, namely, commerce between attorneys and
clients. The provision of legal services is usually in exchange for
compensation; indeed, the nation’s legal industry does a huge
436. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609-11 (citing Supreme Court decisions where the
Court struck down federal legislation on the grounds that Congress had exceeded its
power under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60
(1995) (listing numerous examples when the Supreme Court has upheld
congressional acts regulating interstate economic activity where the Court has
considered the activities to substantially affect interstate commerce); Marina Lao,
Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information Economy, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1633, 1687
(1998) (discussing an array of “far-reaching” congressional legislation regulating
intrastate economic activities).
437. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
438. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
439. See id. at 559-64, 567-68 (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act);
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613-19 (invalidating as unconstitutional certain portions of the
Violence Against Women Act).
440. Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4844 (1990).
441. 514 U.S. at 559-64.
442. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994).
443. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-16.
444. Id. at 617; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
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445

amount of business.
The attorney-client privilege protects
communications upon which the industry’s article of commerce—the
provision of legal services—depends. Thus, there is little doubt that
legislation providing for such protection would be aimed directly at
regulating commercial activity.
In addition, far from having only an attenuated effect on interstate
commerce, the regulation of the communications that underlie the
provision of legal services would have a direct and substantial effect
on interstate commerce. The sheer volume of legal commerce has an
enormous effect on interstate commerce, even if the provision of
446
447
legal services were largely intrastate. Yet, as discussed previously,
448
there is a substantial amount of interstate legal activity. Nationwide
legal practices and national litigation continue to grow, and counsel
often is retained to assist clients with national or regional business
449
interests.
Moreover, in our modern regulatory regime of varied and complex
legal rules, businesses and individuals engaged in interstate
commercial activity must resort constantly to attorneys for legal
services. Indeed, the smooth functioning of interstate commercial
activity depends on attorneys and their continuous and sound advice.
It is precisely because of the nexus between attorneys and the
445. In the year 2000, the gross domestic product for the private legal services
industry was $133.5 billion. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
TABLE, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY INDUSTRY IN CURRENT DOLLARS: 1987-93 AND 19942000, http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn2/gpoc.htm (Oct. 31, 2001). The Bureau of
Labor Statistics estimates that, in the year 2000, 890,910 persons were employed in
the legal services industry. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
OCCUPATIONAL
EMPLOYMENT
STATISTICS
“LATEST
NUMBER,”
(2000),
http://www.bls.gov/oes/home.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2002).
446. See Note, Developments in the Law—Lawyers’ Responsibilities and Lawyers’
Responses, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1555-56 (1994) [hereinafter Lawyers’ Responses]
(arguing that it is common for attorneys to hold themselves out as specialists in such
high impact areas as banking or securities—areas which can have “significant and
widespread economic impact on the public”); see also supra note 445 and
accompanying text.
447. See supra note 417 and accompanying text (explaining that businesses have
become more national in scope).
448. The interstate nature of legal services distinguishes the attorney-client
privilege from most other testimonial privileges. For example, Congress probably
could not federalize, pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, the spousal and priestpenitent privileges because the communications these privileges protect do not
substantially affect interstate commerce, nor are such communications generally tied
to economic activity.
449. See, e.g., Broun, supra note 1, at 801 (stating that the national bar has grown
exponentially since the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 501); Goldhaber,
supra note 370 (discussing growing nationalization and increased commercial spread
of the country’s biggest law firms); Lawyers’ Responses, supra note 446, at 1555 (calling
multi-jurisdictional law firms and attorneys practicing in more than one jurisdiction
“common features of the profession”).
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interstate activity of their clients that a uniform, national privilege law
is needed: attorneys provide legal services to clients engaged in
business activities that may subject them to suit in different fora with
450
conflicting privilege rules. These conflicting rules not only burden
interstate commerce by inflicting transaction costs for those engaged
in interstate business activities, but these rules also threaten to
discourage communications that facilitate the legal services on which
these activities depend.
Of course, the provision of legal services is not exclusively
451
commercial. Yet nothing in Morrison, Lopez, or the Supreme Court’s
earlier Commerce Clause jurisprudence requires that the activity
Congress seeks to regulate be exclusively economic or commercial in
452
nature—provided the activity is not truly noneconomic in nature.
The Court rejected the arguments in both Morrison and Lopez that the
activities regulated had, in the aggregate, a substantial impact on
interstate commerce because of the tenuousness of the relationship
between the wholly noneconomic activity at issue and interstate
453
Similarly, while both decisions mention the lack of a
commerce.
jurisdictional element in the legislation limiting the reach of the
450. See supra note 368 and accompanying text (objecting to the creation of a
uniform privilege rule).
451. For example, the attorney-client relationship is fiduciary in nature rather
than merely contractual. See RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL
MALPRACTICE §§ 14.1-14.2 (4th ed. 1995 & Supp. 1998) (explaining that the basic
fiduciary duties of an attorney to a client are acknowledged by every American
jurisdiction); see also Gary A. Munneke & Anthony E. Davis, The Standard of Care in
Legal Malpractice: Do the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Define It?, 22 J. LEGAL PROF.
33, 53 (stating that, even if no contractual engagement has been established, the
attorney still owes a fiduciary duty to the client). There are circumstances in which
the provision of legal services is not for economic compensation; the Sixth
Amendment guarantees the right to counsel—and hence mandates the provision of
legal services—in criminal matters, U.S. CONST. amend. VI, and, even while serving
their clients, attorneys owe duties to the legal system and serve as officers of the
court. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 3.3 (2002) (discussing a lawyer’s
candor toward the tribunal); see generally Eugene R. Gaetke, Laywers as Officers of the
Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39 (1989). Also, in individual instances, legal services may be
entirely intrastate in nature.
452. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (stating that gender-motivated violence is not
economic activity); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (stating that the Gun Free School Zones
Act simply does not regulate commerce). Yet, the Court affirmed previous
precedents that had established broad congressional authority to regulate classes of
activity having a substantial effect on interstate commerce even if such activities were
wholly intrastate or had little economic impact. See id. at 557-61 (citing the ability to
regulate local farming, wages of lumber workers, and local motels because of a
substantial effect on interstate commerce).
453. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563. In Morrison in particular,
the Court described how, given the tenuous relationship between gender-motivated
violent criminal conduct and its purported effects on the national economy, the
same sweeping arguments could be used to justify regulation of anything—including,
for example, family law, since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and
childrearing on the national economy is significant. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16.
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regulation to activities tied to interstate commerce, the Court never
stated that such an element is required nor that legislation cannot
454
Thus, the Court did not overturn
reach purely intrastate activity.
longstanding precedent establishing that legislation under the
Commerce Clause can reach instances in which the activity is
noncommercial in nature or wholly intrastate as long as the class of
activities regulated exerts a substantial effect on interstate commerce
455
or the national economy.
National privilege legislation therefore
would be a valid exercise of Commerce Clause power even though it
would reach instances of noncommercial and wholly intrastate
activity, because it would regulate a class of activities that is largely
commercial and exerts both a direct and substantial effect on
456
interstate commerce.
Finally, although both Morrison and Lopez make reference to areas
of traditional state regulation, both opinions do so in the context of
striking down congressional acts that regulated noneconomic activity
457
with attenuated effects on interstate commerce. As to congressional
454. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62.
455. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610 (favorably referring to substantial effect
precedent) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552-61 (discussing and
upholding a variety of decisions recognizing the expansive authority of Congress over
classes of activity having a substantial effect on interstate commerce, even if entirely
intrastate or having little economic effect). See generally Perez v. United States, 402
U.S. 146, 154-56 (1971) (looking to the class of activities as a whole and determining
that, if the collective effect of the class on interstate commerce is substantial, a law
governing such activity is constitutional when applied to all within the class);
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968) (stating that, where statutory
scheme substantially relates to commerce, the de minimis character of individual
instances arising under the statute is inconsequential); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111, 125 (1942) (stating that even local activity not commonly regarded as commerce
may be reached by Congress if the activity exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce).
456. Wholly intrastate or pro bono legal services have an impact on the rendering
of legal services as a whole and, hence, commerce, just as the consumption of home
grown and consumed wheat in Wickard had an impact on interstate commerce in
wheat. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (characterizing the Wickard rationale as a regulation
of intrastate activity that resultingly affected interstate commerce) (citing Wickard,
317 U.S. at 128).
457. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18 (rejecting the notion that Congress can
regulate violent criminal conduct based on the assumption that the conduct’s
aggregate effect will impact interstate commerce); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (concluding
that the possession of a gun within a designated school zone is not an economic
activity that in the aggregate will affect interstate commerce). In Morrison, for
example, the Court stated as follows:
[T]he Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and
what is truly local. In recognizing this fact we preserve one of the few
principles that has been consistent since the [Commerce] Clause was
adopted. The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not
directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate
commerce has always been the province of the States.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.
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regulation of economic activity, the Court was clear: “Where
economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation
458
regulating that activity will be sustained.” Thus, while the attorneyclient privilege—and the legal profession more generally—has been
largely, but not exclusively, regulated by the states, congressional
legislation regulating the privilege would be valid because it would
regulate economic activity that substantially affects interstate
459
commerce.
Indeed, as this Article hopefully demonstrates, the
problems with the privilege that the legislation would address are
truly national in character.
b.

The Tenth Amendment and the values of federalism

This legislation likewise would not offend the Tenth Amendment
460
In several recent cases, the
or the values of federalism it serves.
Supreme Court has sought to delineate when congressional
enactments, purportedly pursuant to Congress’s enumerated powers,
in fact exceed these powers and invade the province of state
461
sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment.
For example, in
462
New York v. United States, the Court struck down a portion of the
463
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act as exceeding
Congress’s power because the Act left states in a position where they
either were “commandeered” into the service of federal regulatory
purposes, or were required to implement legislation enacted by
464
465
Congress. Similarly, in Printz v. United States, the Court invalidated
458. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560).
459. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158 (1992) (analyzing the
changing nature of the economy and asserting that activities once thought to be
purely local now have a substantial effect on the national economy and, therefore,
fall under the Commerce Clause); see also Dudley, supra note 273, at 1832-36
(discussing the growing federal interest in regulating the attorney-client privilege
because of the growth of federal litigation and federal regulation in various fields
and suggesting that the implication is that federal privileges should apply
preemptively even in state court when the dispute involves federally regulated
activity).
460. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”).
461. See infra notes 462-71 and accompanying text.
See generally Erwin
Chemerinksy, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7 (2001) (discussing historical
and contemporary trends in the Supreme Court’s Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence).
462. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
463. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j (1994) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99
Stat. 1842).
464. New York, 505 U.S. at 175 (striking the portion of the Act that gave state
governments the choice of either taking title to radioactive waste and assuming
liability of generators’ damages, or regulating the disposal of waste according to
Congress’s instructions). The Court found this choice unconstitutional, since both
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a provision in the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act
requiring state officers—namely, “chief law enforcement officer[s]”
of local state jurisdictions—to conduct background checks on
prospective purchasers of handguns because the legislation
compelled states and state executive officials to administer a federal
467
regulatory program.
468
More recently, however, in Reno v. Condon, the Court upheld the
469
portion of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”) that
restricts the states’ ability to disclose a driver’s personal information
470
without the driver’s consent.
Distinguishing New York and Printz,
the Condon Court concluded that the regulatory scheme of the DPPA
is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power that does
not run afoul of the Tenth Amendment because it neither requires
states to enact laws or legislation, nor commands state executive
officials to assist in the enforcement of federal law regulating private
471
individuals.
The New York and Printz decisions—both internally and now in
light of Condon—do not call into question the validity of the privilege
legislation I propose. To the extent that parties assert the federal
privilege right in state court, the limitations on commandeering state
officials articulated in New York and Printz do not apply. Indeed, in
both decisions, the Supreme Court recognized that state judicial
472
officers must enforce federal law.
For example, in New York, the
Court distinguished earlier cases involving enforcement of federal
laws in state courts:
These cases involve no more than an application of the Supremacy
Clause’s provision that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the
Land,” enforceable in every State. More to the point, all involve
congressional regulation of individuals, not congressional
requirements that states regulate. Federal statutes enforceable in

options went beyond Congress’s power to regulate, and both options commandeered
state officials into serving federal regulatory purposes. Id.
465. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
466. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-925A (2000) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107
Stat. 1536).
467. Printz, 521 U.S. at 924-25.
468. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
469. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 30, 108 Stat. 2099 (1994).
470. Condon, 528 U.S. at 150-51.
471. See id. (finding also that drivers’ information, which historically has been sold
in commerce, is in fact an article of commerce sufficient to support federal
regulation).
472. See infra notes 473-76 and accompanying text. See generally Bellia, supra note
429, at 956-57 (discussing recent trends in federal control over state courts and their
enforcement of federal law and procedure).

GLYNN.PRINTER.DOC

164

12/4/2002 1:29 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:59

state courts do, in a sense, direct state judges to enforce them, but
this sort of federal “direction” of state judges is mandated by the
text of the Supremacy Clause.473

In Printz, the Court offered a similar assessment, stating that “the
Constitution was originally understood to permit imposition of an
obligation on state judges to enforce federal prescriptions, insofar as
those prescriptions related to matters appropriate for judicial
474
power.” The Court noted that this notion comes directly from the
475
“Judges Clause” portion of the Supremacy Clause, which provides
476
that “the Judges in every State shall be bound [by federal law].”
Since New York and Printz, some scholars have questioned whether
Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause or otherwise
to require state judges to conform to federal regulatory mandates in
477
all circumstances. This is particularly true in the wake of The Y2K
478
Act of 1999, in which Congress sought to require state courts to
change the mode or manner in which they adjudicate state-law claims
479
arising from the “Y2K bug.”
For example, in a recent article,
Professor Bellia argues that, while state courts must enforce federal
rights of action and defenses, and “procedural” rules that are “part
and parcel” of those federal rights, Congress has no authority to
prescribe procedural rules for state courts to follow in adjudicating
480
state-law claims.
I agree with Professor Bellia that there may be limits on Congress’s
authority to prescribe procedural rules for state courts to follow,
unhinged from any federal substantive right or defense. I do not
believe, however, that my proposal to federalize privilege runs afoul
of any such limitation. Although the privilege has been mislabeled
variously in the past as merely procedural, evidentiary, or testimonial,
473. New York, 505 U.S. at 178-79.
474. Printz, 521 U.S. at 907.
475. Id.
476. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
477. See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 429, at 964 (explaining the circumstances under
which the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate state court proceedings);
Wendy E. Parmet, Stealth Preemption: The Proposed Federalization of State Court Procedures,
44 VILL. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1999) (discussing a number of proposed federal regulatory
regimes that would impose procedural rules on state courts).
478. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601-6617 (2001).
479. For example, the Y2K Act prescribed notice and pleading requirements for
civil actions arising out of computer failures associated with the inability to read dates
after December 31, 1999. These notice and pleading requirements would apply not
only to federal claims or claims brought in federal court, but also to state-law claims
brought in state court. Id. § 6601; see also Bellia, supra note 429, at 953-55 (discussing
the Act’s provisions).
480. See Bellia, supra note 429, at 974-85 (analyzing the interpretations of relevant
cases regarding conflicts between state and federal laws and their impact on state
court proceedings).
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for all the reasons discussed earlier, the modern privilege is a
481
Unlike the provisions
doctrine embodying substantive protections.
of the Y2K Act, federal privilege legislation would not simply regulate
the mode and manner in which state-law claims are adjudicated.
Rather, the privilege regulates, indeed protects and promotes,
primary
conduct
and
commercial
activity—attorney-client
communications and the provision of legal services—and serves
482
interests wholly extrinsic to the litigation in which it is asserted.
The substantive character of privileges is one of the key reasons why
Article V of the Proposed Rules of Evidence failed, why Congress
adopted Rule 501 instead, and why Congress has exempted privileges
483
from the Supreme Court’s rule-making authority.
Thus, whether
called a “right,” an “immunity,” or a “defense” to compulsory
disclosure, the federal privilege protection I propose is substantive in
nature.
Congress has the authority to create substantive rights or defenses
that preempt contrary state regulations and which are applicable in
state courts even in the absence of a corresponding federal cause of
481. See supra notes 119-26, 394-401 and accompanying text.
482. See Dudley, supra note 273, at 1801-02 (discussing the substantive nature of
privilege rules and the substantive ends that they serve); Margaret G. Stewart,
Federalism and Supremacy: Control of State Decision-Making, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 431, 432
(1992) (“In other words, laws that tell you what promises you must keep, what degree
of care you must exercise toward others, and what lies you must not tell, all regulate
your daily conduct and are ‘substantive.’”); Weinstein, supra note 119, at 373
(discussing the substantive impact of privilege rules and the extrinsic interests they
serve).
Similarly, the attorney-client privilege is distinguishable from other rules of
evidence that simply regulate the character of proof in judicial proceedings. A
leading evidence treatise draws this distinction nicely, first explaining as follows:
Most evidence law is . . . essentially dissociated from substantive policies, for
it does not seek to protect any particular social value outside the immediate
context of the conduct of litigation, nor even to insure that a particular
kind of claim will be made relatively easier or more difficult to pursue or
defend.
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 175, at 263. Privileges, however, do not
exist primarily to aid in ascertaining the facts or preserving efficiency. See id.
(discussing the need to reconcile federal law of privileges with Erie). Rather,
privilege law seeks to implement policies which in any given instance are
likely to be wholly extrinsic both to the litigating process and the factascertaining policy underlying most evidence law, and extrinsic as well to
the policies underlying the laws which govern the substantive issues at the
heart of the lawsuit.
Id.; Goldberg, supra note 119, at 683-84 (distinguishing privileges from other rules of
evidence).
483. See supra note 482 and accompanying text. Even if the Supreme Court were
to accord Congress little deference on the question of what constitutes a substantive
right, it would be difficult for the Court to ignore the history and commentary—
including the Court’s own—recognizing that the privilege is unlike most procedural
rules in that it regulates primary conduct and serves exclusively extra-judicial
interests. See supra note 400 and accompanying text.
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484

action.
Such federal preemptive rights or defenses need not
address the substance or merits of the state-law claim to be fully
enforceable in state court; in other words, a right or defense asserted
in litigation is not “procedural” in nature simply because it does not
485
486
address the merits of the claims.
The Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”), for example, federalizes the right to enforce arbitration
clauses in written contracts and preempts state law less protective of
487
that right.
Among other things, the Act severely limits judicial
488
review of arbitration awards. In so doing, however, the Act neither
creates a corresponding federal right of action nor serves as a defense
484. Professor Bellia and other scholars do not dispute that, pursuant to the
Judges Clause, state courts must enforce constitutionally enacted federal defenses to
state claims, in addition to enforcing federal claims. See Bellia, supra note 429, at 97476 (reviewing the Judges Clause, New York, and Printz, and concluding that state
courts must enforce valid federal claims or a defense to a state claim).
485. After tracing the historical treatment of enforcement of federal law in state
courts, Professor Bellia argues that federal regulation of state-court procedures
independent of federally recognized substantive rights exceeds Congress’s authority
because, under traditional conflict-of-law principles, a forum state, like other
sovereigns, may apply its own procedural law to all rights of action that it enforces.
Id. at 988-89. He therefore concludes that states can exclusively regulate procedure
when enforcing a cause of action that arises under the laws of another state. Id. at
992. Although he does not define “procedure” in detail, he does state that
procedure includes remedies and modes of proceeding, unless such remedies or
modes are part and parcel of federally recognized rights. Id. at 989.
Although I find most of Professor Bellia’s analysis convincing, he does not address
privileges or other similar doctrines, and therefore does not consider the possibility
of federal substantive rights and protections that do not form the basis for a federal
claim or a federal defense to the substance or merits of a state claim. I simply argue
that federal substantive rights are not limited to federal rights of action or federal
defenses to the substance or merits of state claims, but also extend to rights
addressing primary conduct that can be enforced or protected in other ways, such as
through immunity from compulsory disclosure. Yet, to the extent Professor Bellia
would distinguish between “substance” and “procedure” along the lines traditionally
utilized by courts analyzing conflict-of-law situations, mechanical application of such
an approach would not work in the privilege context. Historically, the privilege
often has been viewed as a court-centered and, hence, evidentiary or procedural
doctrine. See discussion supra Part I.A. For all of the reasons I have discussed,
however, the modern privilege is not a purely procedural doctrine, despite past
characterizations. See supra notes 119-26, 394-401 and accompanying text. Thus, the
fact that most courts have defaulted to the privilege law of the forum when facing a
conflict, see supra Part II.C, should not inform our analysis of whether federal
regulation of privilege infringes upon state sovereignty.
486. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307.
487. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984) (describing the
FAA’s preemptive effects as unintentional by Congress, where limiting the Act to
disputes subject only to federal court jurisdiction would frustrate the intent of
Congress that arbitration agreements be placed on the same ground as other
contracts).
488. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (limiting the grounds for judicial vacation of arbitration
awards); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987) (stating
that the FAA necessarily limits judicial review of arbitration awards); Southland Corp.,
465 U.S. at 14-15 (concluding that the FAA’s provisions are applicable in state
courts).
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to the substance or merits of underlying state-law claims, which may
489
Yet the
be asserted and prosecuted in the arbitration proceeding.
Supreme Court has held that the FAA creates substantive protections
applicable in state courts and represents a proper exercise of
490
Congress’s power.
Similarly, the federal privilege right I propose
would be neither the basis for a federal claim nor a defense to the
substance or merits of state-law claims, but, like the FAA, a federal
privilege would protect federally recognized substantive rights and
therefore would not intrude upon a sphere of state court sovereignty
491
over pure procedure, to the extent one exists.
To the extent my proposed federal privilege protection applies to
administrative and legislative proceedings, it still does not invade the
province of state sovereignty as delineated in New York, Printz, and
Condon. From the outset, it is worth noting that Printz reaffirms
earlier decisions in which the Court upheld congressional mandates
requiring state administrative agencies to apply federal law while
492
acting in a judicial capacity.
Thus, to the extent administrators,
489. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32
(1983) (stating that the FAA creates a body of federal substantive law regarding the
duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, but the FAA does not create any
independent federal question jurisdiction).
490. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 11-12; Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 25
n.32.
491. Indeed, because privilege law is truly independent of the merits of a claim,
congressional privilege law does not create the kinds of dangers to the values of
federalism that Professor Bellia and others fear. See Bellia, supra note 429, at 996-97
(expressing concern that federal regulation of state court procedure might
federalize tort law without even allowing public recognition or consideration). One
of the concerns commentators have raised about the Y2K Act and other proposed
tort reforms is that Congress will covertly or slyly federalize tort law by modifying, for
example, pleading standards or burdens of proof. See id. (suggesting that
federalizing state court procedures in technical and obscure manners is a way for the
federal government to preempt state tort law) (quoting Parmet, supra note 477, at
65). Because the federal privilege right that I propose is universal and wholly
independent of the underlying claims and defenses, it has no such covert effects.
If my proposed legislation required state courts to order disclosure or admission
of attorney-client communications not protected by the legislation, there would be a
better argument that the legislation would require states to adopt certain procedures
detached from a federal substantive right. But I only propose that Congress enact
protective legislation, establishing a single, uniform immunity from disclosure of
protected attorney-client communications. If this federal protection is inapplicable
in a given instance, state courts obviously are free to refuse to compel disclosure or
admit the communications on other grounds, such as, for example, protection of
work product, or avoidance of unfair prejudice. Moreover, while I would
recommend that states simply adhere to the federally mandated privilege protection,
they could provide more protection, if they so chose.
492. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929 & n.14 (1997) (upholding Testa v.
Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982)). In fact, the
Printz Court stated that, when states transfer some adjudicatory functions to
administrative agencies, Congress can also, either explicitly or implicitly, prescribe
that such adjudication must account for federal law. Id.
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administrative law judges, commissioners, or other state executives
serve in a judicial capacity, Congress can require them to apply
federal law in their adjudicative proceedings.
Yet, even in nonadjudicative contexts, the federal privilege right
does not run afoul of the Tenth Amendment because the federal
privilege neither requires states to enact legislation nor
commandeers state executive officials to assist in the enforcement of
federal law. Like the DPPA found constitutional in Condon, the
privilege legislation would be self-executing, requiring no state
legislative enactment of laws or regulations. Similarly, the privilege
legislation would not require state officials to assist in the
493
enforcement of federal law regulating private individuals.
My
proposed privilege legislation simply prohibits state officials from
compelling
parties
to
reveal
protected
attorney-client
communications. Although this prohibition may require some effort
on the part of state officials to comply with congressional mandates—
including determining the scope of the protection—such efforts do
not offend the Constitution. As the Court indicated in Condon, since
regulation demands compliance, action required for compliance is
an inevitable and commonplace consequence of regulated state
494
activity.
The legislation therefore validly extends to state
administrative and legislative proceedings, whether adjudicative or
not.
Finally, while federal privilege legislation survives scrutiny under
New York, Printz, and Condon because it commandeers neither state
legislatures nor state executive officials, it also does not offend the
values of federalism the Court emphasized in these and other “new
federalism” cases.
The value of federalism cherished most
495
prominently in New York and Printz is political accountability.
In
New York, for example, the Court scolded Congress for acting in
stealth, which ultimately reduces the accountability of both federal
and state officials:
If the citizens of New York, for example, do not consider that
making provision for the disposal of radioactive waste is in their
best interest, they may elect state officials who share their view.

493. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (finding that the DPPA
regulates states as database owners, and does not require the state legislatures to
enact any laws nor require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal
statutes).
494. See id. at 150 (finding no constitutional defect when a state, wishing to engage
in certain federally regulated activities, takes legislative action to comply with federal
standards) (quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988)).
495. See infra notes 496-97 and accompanying text.
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That view can always be pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause if
it is contrary to the national view, but in such a case it is the Federal
Government that makes the decision in full view of the public, and
it will be federal officials that suffer the consequences if the
decision turns out to be detrimental or unpopular. But where the
Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state
officials who bear the brunt of public disapproval, while federal
officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated
from the electoral ramifications of their decision. Accountability is
thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state
officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the local
electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.496

Similarly, in Printz, the Court criticized Congress for forcing state
officials to bear the costs and blame for implementing a federal
497
regulatory program.
The federal privilege legislation I propose enhances rather than
diminishes political accountability.
As preemptive, generally
applicable legislation, my proposal applies equally to state and federal
judicial and nonjudicial proceedings, and federal courts ultimately
will have the final say on matters of interpretation. Thus, unlike the
regulatory regimes that the Court faulted in New York and Printz,
Congress is not delegating the dirty or unpopular work of fashioning
498
and implementing a regulatory scheme to state officials. Up to this
point, both the federal and state governments have left privilege
policy making largely in the hands of the judiciary, their least
politically accountable branch. My proposal would bring the policy
debate out of the shadows of the common law and into the full light
of legislative discourse, where, for the reasons discussed earlier, the
499
debate belongs. There is no stealth here: once Congress enacts this
legislation, Congress alone would be accountable for the policy
choices contained in the legislation, and would not be able to avoid
responsibility for the law’s successes or failures.

496. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992).
497. Printz, 521 U.S. at 929-30.
498. Although the difficult task of actually applying privilege doctrine will fall
largely on judges, administrative law judges, arbitrators, and other decision makers,
this will be the case whether or not Congress enacts the legislation that I have
proposed. In fact, if Congress were to enact the proposed legislation, Congress
would ease the burden of state decision makers by explicitly supplying the legal
doctrine to be applied. Moreover, absent exclusive federal jurisdiction, any federal
enactment will impose the burdens of compliance on state officials, and application
on state judges. See Condon, 528 U.S. at 151 (explaining that federal regulatory
statute frees state legislature from need to enact laws and regulations).
499. See supra Part III.B.
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Similarly, both New York and Printz make clear that the prerogative
of the central government in a system of dual sovereigns is to regulate
500
Thus, Congress—pursuant to
individuals, not other governments.
the Commerce Clause and other enumerated powers—is to exercise
501
its legislative authority directly over individuals, not through states.
Consistent with this principle, federal privilege legislation regulates,
protects, and promotes commerce between attorneys and clients
directly by shielding attorney-client communications from compelled
disclosure by anyone, including judges and other officials.
A further value inherent in the concepts of “dual sovereignty” and
limited central government is that of decentralization and sharing of
502
governmental control.
For example, a balance of power between
503
governments reduces the risk of abuse of power.
In addition,
decentralization allows for greater experimentation and local
504
Dual sovereignty also recognizes,
variations to fit local needs.
however, that this value has its limits, and, in fact, that there is also
505
value in centralization.
The Commerce Clause itself was intended
to address the failure of the Articles of Confederation to regulate
506
commerce crossing sovereign boundaries.
The balance between
these values is not static: the value of local experimentation and
variation subsides when it begins to have a harmful or burdensome
507
effect on the nation as a whole.
For this reason, the Court
acknowledged in Lopez, Morrison, and New York that the scope of
Congress’s authority to regulate has changed appropriately over time
508
to fit changing circumstances.
Indeed, “activities once considered
500. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 919-20 (stating that the Framers designed a system in
which the federal and state governments would exercise concurrent authority, rather
than the federal government acting through the states); New York, 505 U.S. at 166
(noting that the Constitution confers upon Congress the power to regulate
individuals, not states).
501. New York, 505 U.S. at 162 (stating that “the Constitution has never been
understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the states to govern
according to Congress’ instructions.”).
502. See infra notes 500-06 and accompanying text.
503. Printz, 521 U.S. at 921.
504. See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 429, at 999-1000 (arguing that federalism “serves
the diverse needs of a heterogenous society and promotes experimentation with
different programs”).
505. See infra notes 506-07.
506. See New York, 505 U.S. at 158 (“The defect of power in the existing
confederacy to regulate the commerce between its several members [has] been
clearly pointed out by experience.”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 267 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
507. See id. at 157 (noting that today’s federal government undertakes activities
beyond the imagination of the Framers because our constitutional framework has
been sufficiently flexible over the past two centuries to permit enormous changes in
the nature of government).
508. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607-08 (2000); United States v.
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purely local have come to have effects on the national economy, and
have accordingly come within the scope of Congress’s commercial
509
power.”
These lessons apply in the attorney-client privilege context. Earlier
in the nation’s history, local development of, and variations in,
privilege law made sense, particularly given the difficulty in balancing
the interests at stake. But that time has now passed. As the nation’s
economy, regulatory structure, and litigation practices have changed,
the role of legal services and, correspondingly, the privilege, also
have changed. While perhaps once provincial in character, the
privilege now has obvious national implications, and the balance of
interests informing privilege doctrine and application is now
necessarily a matter of national concern.
CONCLUSION
Two things about the attorney-client privilege are certain: it is here
to stay despite lingering controversy, and it will continue to inflict
substantial costs. The challenge then, is how to maximize the
potential benefits of the privilege while minimizing its costs. The
current regime is ill-equipped to meet this challenge. Today’s
common-law approach to developing privilege doctrine has failed to
achieve reasonably certain privilege protections. Indeed, privilege
doctrine is in disarray. The conflicts between, and confusion within,
jurisdictions around the country not only burden courts, clients, and
attorneys with additional transaction costs, but also create sufficient
uncertainty to defeat the very purposes that the privilege is supposed
to serve. Other proposed reforms seek to address aspects of this
uncertainty, but fail to offer an adequately comprehensive solution.
Federalizing privilege is the answer. To achieve reasonable
certainty, we must abandon our multi-jurisdictional, common-law
approach in favor of a national, codified solution. That leads
inevitably to Congress. Congress has the capacity and power to enact
legislation that provides clear, unqualified, and generally applicable
privilege protections. If and when privilege reformers capture
Congress’s attention, Congress should craft this type of legislation,
rather than settle for lesser reforms.

Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995); New York, 505 U.S. at 158.
509. New York, 505 U.S. at 158.

